Filed: Jul. 11, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 16-4147 Huang v. Sessions BIA Poczter, IJ A205 416 575 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
Summary: 16-4147 Huang v. Sessions BIA Poczter, IJ A205 416 575 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE N..
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16-4147
Huang v. Sessions
BIA
Poczter, IJ
A205 416 575
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 11th day of July, two thousand eighteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
8 REENA RAGGI,
9 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 ZENG EN HUANG,
14
15 Petitioner,
16
17 v. 16-4147
18 NAC
19
20 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
21 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
22
23 Respondent.
24 _____________________________________
25
26 FOR PETITIONER: Cora J. Chang, New York, NY.
27
28 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
29 Attorney General; Jessica E.
1 Burns, Senior Litigation Counsel;
2 Rosanne M. Perry, Trial Attorney,
3 Office of Immigration Litigation,
4 United States Department of
5 Justice, Washington, DC.
6
7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
10 is DENIED.
11 Petitioner Zeng En Huang, a native and citizen of the
12 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a November 30,
13 2016, decision of the BIA affirming a January 11, 2016,
14 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum,
15 withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
16 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zeng En Huang, No. A205 416
17 575 (B.I.A. Nov. 30, 2016), aff’g No. A205 416 575 (Immig.
18 Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 11, 2016). We assume the parties’
19 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
20 in this case.
21 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
22 both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of
23 completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d
24 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review
2
1 are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin
2 v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008).
3 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
4 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
5 determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of
6 the applicant or witness, . . . the consistency between the
7 applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . ,
8 [and] the internal consistency of each such statement . . .
9 without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or
10 falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim . . . .”
11 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia
Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-
12 64. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination
13 that Huang was not credible as to his claim that Chinese
14 family planning officials forced his wife to terminate a
15 pregnancy and detained and harmed him for violating China’s
16 family planning policy.
17 The agency reasonably relied in part on Huang’s demeanor,
18 noting that he was unresponsive and evasive at times. See
19 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Majidi v. Gonzales,
20
430 F.3d 77, 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005) (recognizing that
21 particular deference is given to the trier of fact’s
3
1 assessment of demeanor). That finding is supported by the
2 record.
3 The demeanor finding and the overall credibility
4 determination are bolstered by record inconsistencies. See
5 Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d
6 Cir. 2006). The agency reasonably found that Huang made
7 inconsistent statements regarding whether he interacted with
8 police after his release from detention, and where he and his
9 wife lived in hiding from family planning officials. See
10 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Huang did not provide
11 compelling explanations for these inconsistencies. See
12
Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80 (“A petitioner must do more than offer
13 a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to
14 secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-
15 finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal
16 quotation marks omitted)).
17 Having questioned Huang’s credibility, the agency
18 reasonably relied further on his failure to rehabilitate his
19 credibility with corroborating evidence. “An applicant’s
20 failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on
21 credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general
22 makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has
4
1 already been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales,
2 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). The agency did not err in
3 declining to credit unsworn letters from Huang’s relatives
4 because they were from interested parties who were not
5 available for cross-examination. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741
6 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013). There is no merit to Huang’s
7 argument that the IJ was required to identify what
8 corroborating evidence was missing and explain why it was
9 reasonably available given that the lack of corroboration
10 finding was made in the context of an adverse credibility
11 determination. See Diallo v. Gonzales,
445 F.3d 624, 633-34
12 (2d Cir. 2006).
13 Given the demeanor and inconsistency findings, as well
14 as the lack of corroboration, the agency’s adverse
15 credibility determination is supported by substantial
16 evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That
17 determination is dispositive of Huang’s claims for asylum,
18 withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three
19 claims are based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v.
20 Gonzales,
444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
21 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
22 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
5
1 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
2 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
3 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
4 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
5 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
6 34.1(b).
7 FOR THE COURT:
8 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
9 Clerk of Court
6
