Filed: Jun. 08, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 16-64 Seepersad v. Sessions BIA Videla, IJ A029 380 732 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
Summary: 16-64 Seepersad v. Sessions BIA Videla, IJ A029 380 732 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE ..
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16-64
Seepersad v. Sessions
BIA
Videla, IJ
A029 380 732
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
8th day of June, two thousand eighteen.
PRESENT:
ROBERT D. SACK,
PETER W. HALL,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
ASHRAM SEEPERSAD,
Petitioner,
v. 16-64
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: RION LATIMORE, Minneapolis, MN.
FOR RESPONDENT: BENJAMIN C. MIZER, Assistant Attorney
General; Shelley R. Goad, Assistant
Director; Tim Ramnitz, Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation,
United States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
DISMISSED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Petitioner Ashram Seepersad, a native and citizen of
Trinidad and Tobago, seeks review of a December 9, 2015,
decision of the BIA, affirming a September 4, 2015, decision
of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Seepersad withholding
of removal, relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”), and a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(h). In re Ashram Seepersad, No. A029 380 732 (B.I.A.
Dec. 9, 2015), aff’g No. A029 380 732 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept.
4, 2015). In a separate per curiam opinion issued today, we
deny Seepersad’s petition as it relates to the waiver of
inadmissibility. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the
BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005).
Seepersad’s criminal conviction limits our jurisdiction to
constitutional claims and colorable questions of law, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(C), (D), for which our review is de novo, Pierre
v. Holder,
588 F.3d 767, 772 (2d Cir. 2009). Seepersad raises
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no such claims with respect to the agency’s conclusion that he
failed to show “that it is [was] more likely than not that
he . . . would be tortured.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).
Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review to the extent
that it challenges the denial of CAT relief. See Xiao Ji Chen
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir. 2006).
Seepersad seeks withholding of removal based on his fear
of future persecution, citing a proposed social group:
returning immigrants perceived as wealthy. Whether a group is
legally cognizable presents a question of law. Paloka v.
Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014).
An applicant seeking withholding of removal must establish
that his fear of future persecution is “on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). To be cognizable, a social group must be
“(1) composed of members who share a common immutable
characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3)
socially distinct within the society in question.” Matter of
M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014). The agency
applied the correct criteria in its analysis and did not err
in concluding that Seepersad did not establish that returning
3
immigrants perceived as wealthy have the particularity and
definable boundaries necessary to form a particular social
group. Seepersad testified to general violence and government
corruption in Trinidad, but could not name one individual or
group that would target him, testifying instead that his “fear
is more general.” Record at 65. As we have previously noted
with approval, “wealth” cannot form the basis of a social group
because it “is simply too subjective, inchoate, and variable
to provide the sole basis for membership in a particular social
group.” Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Seepersad presented no
evidence to distinguish his situation from that addressed in
Ucelo-Gomez. That some returning immigrants have been
attacked does not make the group cognizable. See Matter of
M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 242-43; see also
Ucelo–Gomez, 509
F.3d at 73 (“When the harm visited upon members of a group is
attributable to the incentives presented to ordinary criminals
rather than to persecution, the scales are tipped away from
considering those people a ‘particular social group’. . . .”).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DISMISSED IN PART insofar as it challenges the denial of CAT
relief and DENIED IN PART insofar as it challenges the denial
4
of withholding of removal. Seepersad’s motion for a stay of
removal is DISMISSED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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