Filed: Aug. 01, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 17-2071 Solano-Sanchez v. Sessions BIA Kolbe, IJ A202 075 479/480/481/490 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC
Summary: 17-2071 Solano-Sanchez v. Sessions BIA Kolbe, IJ A202 075 479/480/481/490 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC D..
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17-2071
Solano-Sanchez v. Sessions
BIA
Kolbe, IJ
A202 075 479/480/481/490
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 1st day of August, two thousand eighteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 DENNIS JACOBS,
8 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
9 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 ERIKA MARISOL SOLANO-SANCHEZ,
14 JAQUELINE ARIANA CARDOZA-SOLANO,
15 MANUEL ALEXANDER VALENCIA-
16 SOLANO, MANUEL ENRIQUE VALENCIA
17 DURAN,
18
19 Petitioners,
20
21 v. 17-2071
22 NAC
23 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
24 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
25
26 Respondent.
27 _____________________________________
28
1 FOR PETITIONERS: S. Michael Musa-Obregon, White
2 Plains, NY.
3
4 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
5 Attorney General; John S. Hogan,
6 Assistant Director; Rebecca
7 Hoffberg Phillips, Trial
8 Attorney, Office of Immigration
9 Litigation, United States
10 Department of Justice,
11 Washington, DC.
12
13 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
14 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, IT IS HEREBY
15 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
16 is DENIED.
17 Petitioners Erika Marisol Solano-Sanchez, Jaqueline
18 Ariana Cardoza-Solano, Manuel Alexander Valencia-Solano, and
19 Manuel Enrique Valencia Duran, natives and citizens of El
20 Salvador, seek review of a June 12, 2017, decision of the BIA
21 affirming a December 8, 2016, decision of an Immigration Judge
22 (“IJ”) denying Solano-Sanchez’s and Duran’s applications for
23 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
24 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 In re Erika Marisol
25 Solano-Sanchez, Jaqueline Ariana Cardoza-Solano, Manuel
26 Alexander Valencia-Solano, Manuel Enrique Valencia Duran,
1Solano-Sanchez and Duran’s minor children, Cardoza-Solano
and Valencia-Solano, were included on their applications as
derivative beneficiaries.
2
1 Nos. A202 075 479/480/481/490 (B.I.A. June 12, 2017), aff’g
2 Nos. A202 075 479/480/481/490 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 8,
3 2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
4 facts and procedural history in this case.
5 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
6 the IJ’s decision as the final agency decision. Shunfu Li v.
7 Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2008). The applicable
8 standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C.
9 § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder,
562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d
10 Cir. 2009). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that
11 the agency did not err in denying Solano-Sanchez’s and Duran’s
12 applications for asylum and withholding of removal.2
13 In order to establish eligibility for asylum and
14 withholding of removal based on membership in a particular
15 social group, an applicant must establish both that the group
16 is legally cognizable, Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey,
509 F.3d 70,
17 73 (2d Cir. 2007), and that the applicant has suffered past
18 persecution or has demonstrated a well-founded fear or
19 likelihood of future persecution on account of her membership
20 in that group, see Rodas Castro v. Holder,
597 F.3d 93, 100
21 (2d Cir. 2010). To demonstrate the requisite nexus, an
2 They do not raise a CAT claim in their brief.
3
1 applicant’s status as a member of a particular social group
2 must be “one central reason” for the persecution. Id. at
3 103; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
4 The agency reasonably concluded that Solano-Sanchez and
5 Duran failed to establish that their membership in a
6 particular social group comprised of “small business owners
7 in El Salvador who attempted to assist the police” was a
8 central reason for the harm they suffered and feared. The
9 agency’s determination that Solano-Sanchez and Duran were
10 targeted for extortion based on their perceived ability to
11 pay, and not because they owned a small business and attempted
12 to assist the police, is supported by the record. See
13 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (providing that “administrative
14 findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable
15 adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary”).
16 As the IJ observed, Solano-Sanchez and Duran were targeted
17 before filing their police report, and there was no evidence
18 in the record that the gang was aware of their report or
19 sought to harm them because of it. Moreover, when asked why
20 they were targeted for extortion, Solano-Sanchez testified
21 that she was perceived to have money because of her business,
22 and Duran testified it was because that is how gangs operate.
4
1 Because their attempt to cooperate with the police postdated
2 the extortion, and there was no evidence that the gang was
3 aware of their cooperation or harbored animus to small
4 business owners in general, the agency reasonably found that
5 there was no nexus to a protected ground. See Siewe v.
6 Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where there
7 are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s
8 choice between them cannot be clearly
9 erroneous. . . . [R]ecord support for a contrary inference—
10 even one more plausible or more natural—does not suggest
11 error.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Melgar
12 de Torres v. Reno,
191 F.3d 307, 314 (2d Cir. 1999) (observing
13 that “general crime conditions are not a stated ground” for
14 asylum or withholding of removal).
15 Because the agency reasonably determined that Solano-
16 Sanchez and Duran failed to demonstrate the requisite nexus,
17 we decline to reach the agency’s alternative determination
18 that their alleged group was not cognizable. INS v.
19 Bagamasbad,
429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts
20 and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the
21 decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
5
1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
2 DENIED.
3 FOR THE COURT:
4 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe
5 Clerk of Court
6
