Filed: Dec. 18, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 17-726 Thompson v. Whitaker BIA Renner, IJ A099 113 000 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
Summary: 17-726 Thompson v. Whitaker BIA Renner, IJ A099 113 000 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE ..
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17-726
Thompson v. Whitaker
BIA
Renner, IJ
A099 113 000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 18th day of December, two thousand
5 eighteen.
6
7 PRESENT:
8 DENNIS JACOBS,
9 ROBERT D. SACK,
10 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
11 Circuit Judges.
12 _____________________________________
13
14 ORA CLEMENTINE THOMPSON, AKA
15 ABRIANNA R. TINGLE, AKA ORA
16 THOMPSON,
17 Petitioner,
18
19 v. 17-726
20 NAC
21 MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, ACTING
22 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
23 Respondent.
24 _____________________________________
25
26 FOR PETITIONER: Nicholas J. Mundy, Brooklyn, NY.
27
28 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
29 Attorney General; M. Jocelyn Lopez
30 Wright, Senior Litigation Counsel;
31 Anna Juarez, Trial Attorney,
32 Office of Immigration Litigation,
1 United States Department of
2 Justice, Washington, DC.
3
4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
7 is DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.
8 Petitioner Ora Clementine Thompson, a native and citizen
9 of Dominica, seeks review of a February 24, 2017, decision of
10 the BIA affirming an October 4, 2016, decision of an
11 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Thompson’s application for
12 withholding of removal and relief under the Convention
13 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ora Clementine Thompson, No.
14 A 099 113 000 (B.I.A. Feb. 24, 2017), aff’g No. A 099 113 000
15 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 4, 2016). We assume the parties’
16 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
17 in this case.
18 Because Thompson’s removal order is based on criminal
19 convictions, including an aggravated felony and controlled
20 substance offense, our jurisdiction is limited to
21 “constitutional claims or questions of law.” 8 U.S.C.
22 § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D). We review any such claims de novo.
23 Pierre v. Holder, 588 F.3d 767, 772 (2d Cir. 2009). We have
24 reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for the sake of
2
1 completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d
2 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).
3 Removability
4 Thompson argues that her order of removal should be
5 vacated because Harbin v. Sessions,
860 F.3d 58 (2d Cir.
6 2017), changed our analysis regarding controlled substance
7 offenses. We have jurisdiction to review whether a
8 conviction is an aggravated felony, see
Pierre, 588 F.3d at
9 772, but we find no error in the agency’s determination and
10 deny the petition to the extent it challenges removability.
11 Harbin held that New York Penal Law (“NYPL”) § 220.31 is
12 not a drug trafficking aggravated felony because the New York
13 definition of “controlled substance” is broader than the
14 federal
definition. 860 F.3d at 68. However, Thompson was
15 convicted of controlled substance offenses under NYPL
16 §§ 220.39(1) and 220.44(2), which criminalize sale of a more
17 discrete set of substances. Thompson has not alleged that
18 any controlled substance criminalized under those statutes is
19 not also included in the federal controlled substance
20 schedules. Thompson’s convictions for NYPL §§ 220.39(1) and
21 220.44(2) are therefore aggravated felonies. See Pascual v.
22 Holder,
707 F.3d 403, 405 (2d Cir. 2013), aff’d on reh’g, 723
23 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that a conviction for sale
24 of a controlled substance under § 220.39(1) is an aggravated
3
1 felony). Because these convictions are aggravated felonies,
2 the criminal bar applies: 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). So (as
3 discussed below) the petition is dismissed in remaining part
4 as to withholding of removal and CAT relief.
5 Withholding of Removal
6 The agency did not commit legal or constitutional error
7 in concluding that Thompson was barred from withholding of
8 removal because she was convicted of a particularly serious
9 crime. Aliens convicted of “particularly serious crime[s]”
10 are statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal. 8
11 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Presumptively, aggravated
12 felony drug trafficking offenses are particularly serious.
13 In re Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274 (B.I.A. 2002), overruled
14 on other grounds by Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171
15 (2d Cir. 2004). Thompson’s convictions for NYPL §§ 220.39(1)
16 and 220.44(2) are aggravated felony drug trafficking
17 offenses. See
Pascual, 707 F.3d at 405.
18 To overcome the presumption that her aggravated felony
19 drug trafficking convictions were particularly serious,
20 Thompson had to show “extraordinary and compelling
21 circumstances” justifying a “rare” deviation from the
22 presumption. In re Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 276. At minimum,
23 Thompson had to show that her convictions involved:
4
1 (1) a very small quantity of controlled substance;
2 (2) a very modest amount of money paid for the drugs
3 in the offending transaction; (3) merely peripheral
4 involvement by the alien in the criminal activity,
5 transaction, or conspiracy; (4) the absence of any
6 violence or threat of violence, implicit or
7 otherwise, associated with the offense; (5) the
8 absence of any organized crime or terrorist
9 organization involvement, direct or indirect, in
10 relation to the offending activity; and (6) the
11 absence of any adverse or harmful effect of the
12 activity or transaction on juveniles.
13
14 Id. at 276–77.
15 Here, the agency applied the factors, acknowledged
16 Thompson’s testimony regarding the circumstances of her
17 convictions, and concluded that Thompson failed to overcome
18 the presumption. Because Thompson acknowledges that the
19 agency applied the proper factors and challenges only the
20 agency’s weighing of the facts, we lack jurisdiction to
21 further consider the denial of withholding of removal. See
22 Nethagani v. Mukasey,
532 F.3d 150, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2008)
23 (reviewing particularly serious crime determination as to
24 whether
25 “the BIA properly applied its own precedent” but not reviewing
26 the BIA’s weighing of the factors).
27 CAT Deferral
28 An applicant for CAT deferral must “establish that it is
29 more likely than not that . . . she would be tortured if
30 removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R.
5
1 §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a). “Torture is defined as any act
2 by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
3 is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . by or at the
4 instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
5 official or other person acting in an official capacity.”
6 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).
7 Thompson’s convictions constrain our review to
8 “constitutional claims or questions of law.” 8 U.S.C. §
9 1252(a)(2)(C), (D); Ortiz-Franco v. Holder, 782 F.3d 81, 86
10 (2d Cir. 2015). Thompson has raised no constitutional claim
11 or question of law regarding the agency’s denial of CAT
12 protection. Instead, Thompson argues, “this is a simple case
13 of the [agency] misapplying the facts to the law.” While
14 legal error may occur where the agency “totally overlook[s]”
15 or “seriously mischaracterize[s]” evidence, Thompson has
16 pointed to no evidence that the agency overlooked. Mendez
17 v. Holder,
566 F.3d 316, 323 (2d Cir. 2009); see Ortiz-Franco,
18 782 F.3d at 91 n.2. And the likelihood of a future event is
19 a finding of fact. Hui Lin Huang v. Holder,
677 F.3d 130,
20 134 (2d Cir. 2012). The IJ acknowledged that homosexual
21 conduct is criminalized in Dominica and that there have been
22 incidents in which the law had been applied to women, but
23 relied on more recent reports—the 2013 and 2015 State
24 Department Reports—that the government rarely enforced the
6
1 law. Because Thompson has pointed to no evidence that the
2 agency mischaracterized or ignored, we lack jurisdiction to
3 further review the agency’s factual finding that Thompson did
4 not demonstrate that it is more likely than not she would be
5 tortured. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C); Hui Lin Huang, 677
6 F.3d at 134.
7 Thompson has raised no constitutional question or
8 question of law and challenges only the agency’s factual
9 findings and weighing of evidence. This Court is therefore
10 without jurisdiction to further review the agency’s decision
11 denying her CAT protection. See
Ortiz-Franco, 782 F.3d at
12 86.
13 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
14 DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART. As we have completed
15 our review, the stay of removal that the Court previously
16 granted in this petition is VACATED. Any pending request for
17 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
18 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
19 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
20 FOR THE COURT:
21 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
7
