Filed: Oct. 16, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 17-844 Singh v. Sessions BIA Wright, IJ A205 922 840 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NO
Summary: 17-844 Singh v. Sessions BIA Wright, IJ A205 922 840 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOT..
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17-844
Singh v. Sessions
BIA
Wright, IJ
A205 922 840
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 16th day of October, two thousand eighteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 GERARD E. LYNCH,
8 DENNY CHIN,
9 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12 TAKHVINDER SINGH,
13 Petitioner,
14
15 v. 17-844
16 NAC
17 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
18 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
19 Respondent.
20 _____________________________________
21
22 FOR PETITIONER: Dalbir Singh, Dalbir Singh &
23 Associates, New York, NY.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Principal Deputy
26 Assistant Attorney General;
27 Russell J. E. Verby, Senior
28 Litigation Counsel; Kristin
29 Moresi, Trial Attorney, Office of
30 Immigration Litigation, United
31 States Department of Justice,
32 Washington, DC.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
4 is DENIED.
5 Petitioner Takhvinder Singh, a native and citizen of
6 India, seeks review of a February 24, 2017, decision of the
7 BIA affirming an August 24, 2016, decision of an Immigration
8 Judge (“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for withholding of
9 removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture
10 (“CAT”). In re Takhvinder Singh, No. A 205 922 840 (B.I.A.
11 Feb. 24, 2017), aff’g No. A 205 922 840 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City
12 Aug. 24, 2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
13 underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
14 We have reviewed the decisions of both the BIA and the
15 IJ “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of
16 Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The
17 applicable standards of review are well established. See 8
18 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder,
562 F.3d 510,
19 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
20 “The testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to
21 sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but
2
1 only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the
2 applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers
3 to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the
4 applicant is a refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); see
5 id. § 1231(b)(3)(C). “Where the trier of fact determines
6 that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates
7 otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided
8 unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot
9 reasonably obtain the evidence.”
Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
10 “No court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of
11 fact with respect to the availability of corroborating
12 evidence . . . unless the court finds, . . . that a reasonable
13 trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating
14 evidence is unavailable.”
Id. § 1252(b)(4).
15 As the agency found, Singh did not produce reasonably
16 available documentary evidence. The IJ reasonably required
17 proof that Singh worshipped Baba Ram Rahim in India,
18 whether through a letter from Baba Ram Rahim or one of his
19 followers, as well as evidence of persecution from fellow
20 followers of Baba Ram Rahim who were also beaten by Sikhs.
21 See
id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (providing that IJ can require
3
1 corroboration of even credible testimony). Singh was asked
2 several times to explain his failure to submit a letter or
3 other proof of his religious practice in India, and the IJ
4 did not err in concluding that Singh did not show the
5 evidence was unavailable as his explanations were
6 nonresponsive and he acknowledged that he had made no
7 attempt to obtain any letters. See Chuilu Liu v. Holder,
8 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2009) (“An IJ should point to
9 specific pieces of missing, relevant documentation and show
10 that this documentation was reasonably available; an alien
11 must have an opportunity to explain the omission; and the
12 IJ must assess any explanation that is given.” (internal
13 citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted)).
14 Although Singh also stated that he did not know Baba Ram
15 Rahim personally and knew his fellow practitioners only
16 from meetings, the IJ was not compelled to find any letters
17 unavailable because Singh admitted that he personally knew
18 some of the practitioners and because his failure to
19 request supporting documents did not establish that they
20 were not available. See id.; Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509
21 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding IJ’s finding when it
4
1 is “tethered to record evidence, and there is nothing else
2 in the record from which a firm conviction of error could
3 properly be derived”). Thus, the record does not compel a
4 finding that the evidence was unavailable. See 8 U.S.C. §
5 1252(b)(4).
6 Finally, Singh raises new arguments regarding the lack
7 of documentation of his religious practice in the United
8 States and the sufficiency of the documentation he provided,
9 such as a letter from the village leader and country
10 conditions evidence. But because he did not raise these
11 arguments before the BIA, we decline to consider them. See
12 Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 107 n.1 (2d
13 Cir. 2007) (providing that judicially imposed issue
14 exhaustion is mandatory). Even if sufficiently exhausted,
15 Singh has not identified any error in the burden finding given
16 the inconsistency between the village leader’s letter and
17 Singh’s testimony and the lack of evidence of recent or
18 ongoing violence against adherents of Baba Ram Rahim.
19 Given the absence of reliable corroboration and the fact
20 that Singh did not demonstrate that he could not produce
21 letters from his fellow followers of Baba Ram Rahim, the
5
1 agency reasonably concluded that Singh failed to meet his
2 burden of proof. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). This
3 determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of
4 removal, and CAT relief because all three claims are based on
5 the same factual predicate. See Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d
6 111, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2010).
7 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
8 DENIED.
9 FOR THE COURT:
10 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
11 Clerk of Court
6
