Filed: Jan. 14, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 16-3093 Fernandez Cruz v. Whitaker BIA Loprest, IJ A201 242 181 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (
Summary: 16-3093 Fernandez Cruz v. Whitaker BIA Loprest, IJ A201 242 181 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (W..
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16-3093
Fernandez Cruz v. Whitaker
BIA
Loprest, IJ
A201 242 181
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 14th day of January, two thousand nineteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
8 PETER W. HALL,
9 DENNY CHIN,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12 CECILIO FERNANDEZ CRUZ, AKA
13 CECILIO FERNANDEZ,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 16-3093
17 NAC
18 MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, ACTIN
19 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Zachary Sanders, New York, NY.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Principal Deputy
26 Assistant Attorney General;
27 Stephen J. Flynn, Assistant
28 Director; Arthur L. Rabin, Trial
29 Attorney, Office of Immigration
30 Litigation, United States
31 Department of Justice, Washington,
32 DC.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
4 is GRANTED.
5 Petitioner Cecilio Fernandez Cruz (“Cruz”), a native and
6 citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of an August 8, 2016
7 decision of the BIA affirming a December 14, 2015 decision of
8 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Cruz’s application for
9 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
10 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Cecilio Fernandez
11 Cruz, No. A 201 242 181 (B.I.A. Aug. 8, 2016), aff’g No. A 201
12 242 181 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 14, 2015). We assume the
13 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural
14 history in this case.
15 Cruz argues that he stated a pattern or practice claim
16 for withholding of removal based on his membership in a
17 particular social group. Specifically, he argues that he
18 offered evidence showing that gangs target young men who
19 resist gang recruitment. The Government argues that Cruz
20 failed to exhaust a pattern or practice claim before the
21 agency. But we conclude that remand is warranted here
22 because whether Cruz is a member of a particular social group
23 and whether he showed a pattern or practice of persecution
2
1 require substantially the same analysis. By arguing the
2 former before the IJ and BIA, Cruz sufficiently raised a
3 pattern or practice claim and the BIA erred by failing to
4 address it on the merits.
5 Withholding of removal requires the applicant to show
6 that it is more likely than not that his “life or freedom
7 would be threatened . . . on account of race, religion,
8 nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
9 political opinion.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b); Ramsameachire v.
10 Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). To constitute a
11 particular social group, a group must be: “(1) composed of
12 members who share a common immutable characteristic,
13 (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct
14 within the society in question.” In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N.
15 Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014). Although a “‘particular social
16 group’ cannot be defined exclusively by the claimed
17 persecution,”
id., 26 I. & N. Dec. at 232, 239, we have
18 previously recognized instances where a social group can be
19 partially defined by shared persecution, see Paloka v.
20 Holder,
762 F.3d 191, 198-99 (2d Cir. 2014) (remanding for
21 further consideration of purported social group based on
22 youth, gender, and persecution). An applicant may show he
23 would more likely be persecuted by proving his membership in
3
1 a social group and “the existence of ‘a pattern or practice
2 of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to
3 the applicant on account of . . . membership in [the]
4 particular social group[.’]” Kyaw Zwar Tun v. U.S. INS, 445
5 F.3d 554, 565 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 8 C.F.R.
6 § 208.16(b)(2)).
7 In this case, the analysies of the social group claim
8 and pattern or practice claim overlap. Cruz failed to invoke
9 the specific words “pattern or practice” in his briefs before
10 the IJ and BIA and raises the claim by name for the first
11 time in his brief to this Court. But Cruz argued before the
12 IJ that that he was a member of a particular social group of
13 young, poor, men targeted by gangs in El Salvador because of
14 their refusal to join them, and he argued before the BIA that
15 gangs targeted poor people who resisted gang recruitment. He
16 also submitted evidence, which he alleges shows the existence
17 and persecution of this group. By establishing this group
18 as a “particular social group” and the basis for his
19 withholding claim, Cruz would, in essence, establish a
20 pattern or practice of persecution of the members of that
21 group. See Kyaw Zwar
Tun, 445 F.3d at 565.
22 Given the overlapping analyses, the BIA has failed to
23 address the dispositive issue: whether Cruz showed that he
4
1 would more likely than not be persecuted on account of his
2 group membership. Remand would not be futile because the BIA
3 did not address the pattern or practice claim and declined to
4 reach the IJ’s finding that “young, poor men who resist gang
5 recruitment” did not constitute a particular social group.
6 See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 339
7 (2d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we remand for the BIA to more
8 fully consider Cruz’s fear of future persecution on account
9 of his allegations that he will be persecuted on account of
10 his group membership.
11 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
12 GRANTED.
13 FOR THE COURT:
14 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
15 Clerk of Court
16
5
