Filed: May 01, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 17-1721 Ramirez-Martinez v. Barr BIA Christensen, IJ A206 781 781/782 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATA
Summary: 17-1721 Ramirez-Martinez v. Barr BIA Christensen, IJ A206 781 781/782 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATAB..
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17-1721
Ramirez-Martinez v. Barr
BIA
Christensen, IJ
A206 781 781/782
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 1st day of May, two thousand nineteen.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Chief Judge,
REENA RAGGI,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
ANA ALICIA RAMIREZ-MARTINEZ,
DAVID ALEXANDER REYES-RAMIREZ,
Petitioners,
v. 17-1721
NAC
WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.*
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONERS: H. Raymond Fasano, Esq., Youman,
Madeo & Fasano, LLP, New York, NY.
* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
43(c)(2), Attorney General William P. Barr is automatically
substituted for former Acting Attorney General Matthew G.
Whitaker.
FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division;
Leslie McKay, Senior Litigation
Counsel, Office of Immigration
Litigation; Lisa Morinelli, Trial
Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States
Department of Justice, Washington,
DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Ana Alicia Ramirez-Martinez, and her son,
David Alexander Reyes-Ramirez, natives and citizens of
Honduras, seek review of a BIA decision affirming an
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of Ramirez-Martinez’s
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ana Alicia
Ramirez-Martinez, David Alexander Reyes-Ramirez, Nos. A 206
781 781/782 (B.I.A. May 1, 2017), aff’g No. A 206 781 781/782
(Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 16, 2016). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005).
2
We review factual findings under the substantial evidence
standard, treating them as “conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d
191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014). We review questions of law de novo.
Paloka, 762 F.3d at 195.
Ramirez-Martinez claimed asylum and withholding of
removal based on her membership in a particular social group,
which she defined as “Honduran single mothers who are small
business owners.”1 In order to demonstrate her eligibility
for asylum and withholding of removal, Ramirez-Martinez had
to “establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion was or w[ould]
be at least one central reason for” her persecution. 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A); Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I.
& N. Dec. 341, 348 (B.I.A. 2010). In order for her group to
constitute a particular social group, it had to be
“(1) composed of members who share a common immutable
characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and
(3) socially distinct within the society in question.” Matter
1 Ramirez-Martinez also sought relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Because she only
cursorily challenges the denial of that claim, she has
waived that issue on appeal. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales,
426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005).
3
of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014); see also
Paloka, 762 F.3d at 196.
Even assuming arguendo that single mothers who are small
business owners comprise a cognizable group,2 the BIA did not
err in denying Ramirez-Martinez’s claims for asylum and
withholding of removal because she failed to establish that
a protected ground was a central reason for her past harm or
fear of future harm. She did not assert that the gang members
who threatened her mentioned her status as a woman, single
mother, or small business owner. Rather, Ramirez-Martinez’s
application stated that she feared “crime and delinquency
2
We need not decide whether the Board and the IJ provided
adequate reasoning for their conclusion that petitioner’s
proposed social group is not cognizable, because, in any
event, “we can state with confidence that the IJ would adhere
to his decision were the petition remanded.” Xiao Ji Chen v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 15861 (2d Cir. 2006).
Ramirez-Martinez failed to demonstrate that her proposed
group was socially distinct in Honduran society. Ramirez-
Martinez argues that the fact that women who own small
businesses are targets for violence evinces that they are
recognized as a social group in Honduras. Although
persecutory action toward a group may be a relevant factor in
determining the visibility of a group, when, as here, “the
harm visited upon members of a group is attributable to the
incentives presented to ordinary criminals rather than to
persecution, the scales are tipped away from considering
those people a ‘particular social group’ within the meaning
of the [Immigration and Nationality Act].” Ucelo-Gomez v.
Mukasey,
509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007). Ramirez-Martinez
also argues that national policies recognize women who own
small businesses, but points only to national policies that
generally “promote women’s economic development and
empowerment.” CAR 291.
4
that is prevalent” throughout Honduras, and which was “on the
rise because of . . . poverty.” CAR 472. She stated that
“[c]riminals extort law abiding citizens for their money,
which they earn through their hard work.” Id. In addition,
record evidence indicates that gang extortion is common in
Honduras and affects “all sectors of the economy.” CAR 264.
Therefore, there is no evidence that Ramirez-Martinez was
targeted because of her membership in the purported social
group as opposed to her resources. Because a fear of “general
crime conditions” is not a ground for asylum, the BIA did not
err in denying her application. Melgar de Torres v. Reno,
191
F.3d 307, 314 (2d Cir. 1999); see also In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I.
& N. Dec. at 249-51 (“The national community may struggle
with significant societal problems resulting from gangs, but
not all societal problems are bases for asylum.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
5
