Filed: Jan. 08, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 17-1771 Ramos-De Lopez v. Whitaker BIA Christensen, IJ A206 896 837/838 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DA
Summary: 17-1771 Ramos-De Lopez v. Whitaker BIA Christensen, IJ A206 896 837/838 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DAT..
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17-1771
Ramos-De Lopez v. Whitaker
BIA
Christensen, IJ
A206 896 837/838
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 8th day of January, two thousand nineteen.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Chief Judge,
JON O. NEWMAN,
GUIDO CALABRESI,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
ROSA IRMA RAMOS-DE LOPEZ, CARLOS
STANLEY LOPEZ-RAMOS,
Petitioners,
v. 17-1771
NAC
MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, ACTING
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONERS: H. Raymond Fasano, New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Russell J.E.
Verby, Senior Litigation Counsel;
John D. Williams, Trial Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation,
United States Department of
Justice, Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Rosa Irma Ramos-De Lopez and her son, Carlos
Stanley Lopez-Ramos, natives and citizens of El Salvador,
seek review of a May 8, 2017, decision of the BIA affirming
a December 7, 2016, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
denying their applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). In re Rosa Irma Ramos-De Lopez and Carlos Stanley
Lopez-Ramos, Nos. A 206 896 837/838 (B.I.A. May 8, 2017),
aff’g No. A 206 896 837/838 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 7,
2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, and address only
the adverse credibility determination. See Xue Hong Yang v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The
applicable standards of review are well established. See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,
534 F.3d
162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). “Considering the totality of the
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circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may
base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency
between the applicant’s . . . written and oral statements .
. . , the internal consistency of each such statement, [and]
the consistency of such statements with other evidence of
record . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Xiu
Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. The multiple inconsistencies
in Ramos-De Lopez’s statements provide substantial evidence
for the adverse credibility determination.
The agency reasonably relied on the record of Ramos-De
Lopez’s credible fear interview. Although “adverse
credibility determinations based on ‘discrepancies’ with a
credible fear interview should be examined with care,” the
interview record here bears sufficient indicia of
reliability. See Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 725 (2d
Cir. 2009). The interview was conducted with an interpreter,
Ramos-De Lopez expressly declined to have her attorney
present, the interview was memorialized in a question and
answer format, the questions posed were designed to elicit
details of Ramos-De Lopez’s asylum claim, and her responses
indicated that she understood the questions.
Id. (listing
“hallmarks of reliability”).
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Given the reliability of the interview record,
substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination
that Ramos-De Lopez was not credible as to her claim that
members of El Salvador’s Mara gang targeted her and her son
on January 4, 2014, because she proselytized Catholicism in
gang territory. Ramos-De Lopez’s statements at the
interview were inconsistent with her testimony regarding
the gang’s motive for targeting her and her son and she
added additional instances of persecution to her
application and testimony. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). At her credible fear interview, she
said that the gang members targeted her on January 4
because she would not allow them to take her son away to
work for them carrying drugs. At that interview, she was
asked whether there was any other reason she feared going
back to El Salvador, and answered no. Ramos-De Lopez did
not compellingly explain these discrepancies. See Majidi
v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner
must do more than offer a plausible explanation for . . .
inconsistent statements to secure relief; [s]he must
demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be
compelled to credit h[er] testimony.” (internal quotations
4
omitted)). Although she now argues that the IJ failed to
consider a psychological report diagnosing her with post-
traumatic stress disorder, she failed to exhaust this issue
because she did not raise it before the BIA. See Lin Zhong
v. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 117-25 (2d Cir. 2007)
(describing issue exhaustion as mandatory).
The agency also reasonably relied on Ramos-De Lopez’s
inconsistent testimony concerning when the gang members gave
her brother an extortion letter. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). In her written statement and
testimony, Ramos-De Lopez asserted that she stopped staying
at her brother’s home when she saw people watching the house,
and she specified that after her departure, the gang members
delivered an extortion letter to her brother. In contrast,
her brother wrote that his receipt of the note was the event
that prompted Ramos-De Lopez to return to her own home.
Given the inconsistencies between Ramos-De Lopez’s
statements and between her statements and documentary
evidence about the incidents central to her and her son’s
claim, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is
supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That determination was dispositive of
5
asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all
three claims were based on the same factual predicate. See
Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
34.1(b).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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