Filed: May 30, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 17-2088 Yang-Jin v. Barr BIA Loprest, IJ A205 583 177 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE N
Summary: 17-2088 Yang-Jin v. Barr BIA Loprest, IJ A205 583 177 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NO..
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17-2088
Yang-Jin v. Barr
BIA
Loprest, IJ
A205 583 177
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 30th day of May, two thousand nineteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JON O. NEWMAN,
8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
9 GERARD E. LYNCH,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 HUA YANG-JIN, AKA JIN HUA YANG,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 17-2088
17 NAC
18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Gerald Karikari, Karikari &
24 Associates, P.C., New York, NY.
25
26 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
27 Attorney General; Douglas E.
28 Ginsburg, Assistant Director; Erik
29 R. Quick, Trial Attorney, Office
30 of Immigration Litigation, United
31 States Department of Justice,
32 Washington, DC.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
4 is DENIED.
5 Petitioner Hua Yang-Jin, a native and citizen of the
6 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 9, 2017,
7 decision of the BIA affirming a December 7, 2016, decision of
8 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Petitioner’s application
9 for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
10 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Hua Yang-Jin, No.
11 A 205 583 177 (B.I.A. June 9, 2017), aff’g No. A 205 583 177
12 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 7, 2016). We assume the parties’
13 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
14 in this case.
15 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
16 both the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions. See Yun-Zui Guan v.
17 Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable
18 standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C.
19 § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,
891 F.3d 67, 76
20 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse credibility determination
21 under a substantial evidence standard).
2
1 The governing REAL ID Act credibility standard provides
2 as follows:
3 Considering the totality of the circumstances, and
4 all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a
5 credibility determination on the demeanor, candor,
6 or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, . .
7 . the consistency between the applicant’s or
8 witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the
9 internal consistency of each such statement, the
10 consistency of such statements with other evidence
11 of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods
12 in such statements, . . . or any other relevant
13 factor.
14
15 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s
16 credibility determination unless . . . it is plain that no
17 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility
18 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.
19 2008); accord Hong Fei
Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial
20 evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility
21 determination.
22 First, Petitioner has waived any challenge to the
23 agency’s demeanor and corroboration findings by not
24 challenging them in her brief. See Yueqing Zhang v.
25 Gonzales,
426 F.3d 540, 541 n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005).
26 Second, Petitioner failed to mention during her border and
27 credible fear interviews that she was forced to undergo an
3
1 abortion. See Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 724-25 (2d
2 Cir. 2009) (observing that credibility determinations can be
3 based on inconsistencies arising from a credible fear
4 interview). Given the significance of that event and the
5 interviewers’ questions as to whether Petitioner had suffered
6 any other mistreatment, the IJ was not required to accept
7 Petitioner’s explanations for the omission. Cf. Majidi v.
8 Gonzales,
430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must
9 do more than offer a plausible explanation for h[er]
10 inconsistent statements to secure relief; [s]he must
11 demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled
12 to credit h[er] testimony.” (internal quotation marks and
13 citations omitted)); see also Hong Fei
Gao, 891 F.3d at 79-
14 80 (“in assessing the probative value of the omission of
15 certain facts, an IJ should consider whether those facts are
16 ones that a credible petitioner would reasonably have been
17 expected to disclose under the relevant circumstances”).
18 Third, Petitioner’s testimony was internally
19 inconsistent regarding whether her husband was detained for
20 a half-day or eight days following her abortion. Contrary
21 to her argument, Petitioner was asked to explain her change
4
1 in testimony regarding whether her husband came home on the
2 day she had her abortion. Furthermore, whether Petitioner’s
3 husband was detained for half a day or eight days is a plainly
4 obvious inconsistency that the IJ could rely on without asking
5 for an explanation. Cf. Ming Shi Xue v. BIA, 439 F.3d 111,
6 121 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]here the perceived incongruities in
7 an asylum applicant’s testimony are not plainly obvious, an
8 IJ cannot rely on them to support an adverse credibility
9 ruling without first identifying the alleged inconsistencies
10 for the applicant and giving the applicant an opportunity to
11 address them.”). Nor did the BIA err in rejecting
12 Petitioner’s allegation of translation error as Petitioner
13 did not provide any independent evidence of the error.
14 Given the corroboration and demeanor findings, which
15 Petitioner has not challenged, the omission of her forced
16 abortion from her credible fear and border interviews, and
17 her inconsistent testimony regarding the length of her
18 husband’s detention, the totality of the circumstances
19 supports the adverse credibility determination. See Xiu Xia
20
Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Because Petitioner’s claims were all
21 based on the same factual predicates, the adverse credibility
5
1 determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of
2 removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148,
3 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006); Siewe v. Gonzales,
480 F.3d 160, 170
4 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining that lack of credibility in one
5 area can affect balance of applicant’s testimony).
6 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
7 DENIED.
8 FOR THE COURT:
9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
10 Clerk of Court
6
