Filed: May 01, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 17-2914 Singh v. Barr BIA Poczter, IJ A208 192 405 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTA
Summary: 17-2914 Singh v. Barr BIA Poczter, IJ A208 192 405 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTAT..
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17-2914
Singh v. Barr
BIA
Poczter, IJ
A208 192 405
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 1st day of May, two thousand nineteen.
PRESENT:
ROBERT D. SACK,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
SUKHJINDER SINGH, AKA RAJU THAPA
Petitioner,
v. 17-2914
NAC
WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Amy Nussbaum Gell, New York,
NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Keith I.
McManus, Assistant Director;
Giovanni B. Di Maggio, Trial
Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States
Department of Justice, Washington,
DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Sukhjinder Singh, a native and citizen of
India, seeks review of an August 31, 2017, decision of the
BIA affirming a November 15, 2016, decision of an Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding
of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). In re Sukhjinder Singh, No. A208 192 405 (B.I.A.
Aug. 31, 2017), aff’g No. A208 192 405 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City
Nov. 15, 2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
the IJ’s decision without considering the findings of the IJ
that the BIA did not reach. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable
standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,
891 F.3d 67, 76
(2d Cir. 2018).
“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
determination on . . . the consistency between the
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applicant’s . . . written and oral statements . . . , the
internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency
of such statements with other evidence of record . . . without
regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood
goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other
relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin
v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2008). Substantial
evidence supports the agency’s determination that Singh was
not credible as to (1) his claim that members of the Akali
Dal Badal Party attacked him twice in India on account of his
membership in the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar Party (“SADA”)
and (2) his fear of similar harm in the future.
The agency reasonably relied on Singh’s inconsistent
descriptions of the attack he purportedly suffered in 2014.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). In his written statement,
Singh asserted that Badal Party members punched, slapped, and
kicked him. However, he testified only that he was hit with
sticks on the legs without mentioning being hit in any other
manner.
The agency also reasonably relied on Singh’s omission
from his written statement of his later assertion that Badal
Party members started threatening him when he joined SADA in
2000 and threatened him several times before attacking him in
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2014. Although applicants need not list every incident or
describe every detail in their application statements, the
agency may rely on an omission of facts “that a credible
petitioner would reasonably have been expected to disclose
under the relevant circumstances.” Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d
at 78-79. The agency did not err in relying on Singh’s
failure to mention that he was threatened several times over
a period of fourteen years in his written statement because
that statement described at length and in detail his volunteer
activities and SADA’s social programs, and generally
described the Badal Party’s intimidation of SADA members
during that time yet failed to mention that Singh had been
personally threatened. See
id. at 78-79, 82. Singh could
not compellingly explain his inconsistent statements. See
Majidi v. Gonzales,
430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A
petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation
for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must
demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled
to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Having questioned Singh’s credibility, the agency
reasonably relied further on his failure to rehabilitate his
testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. “An
4
applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may
bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in
general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony
that has already been called into question.” Biao Yang v.
Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). The agency
reasonably declined to afford weight to affidavits and
letters from Singh’s relatives and acquaintances because the
authors were interested parties or were unavailable for
cross-examination. See Y.C. v. Holder,
741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d
Cir. 2013) (deferring to agency’s decision to afford little
weight to relative’s letter from China because it was unsworn
and from an interested witness); In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I.
& N. Dec. 209, 215 (B.I.A. 2010) (finding that letters from
alien’s friends and family did not provide substantial
support for alien’s claims because they were from interested
witnesses not subject to cross-examination), overruled on
other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder,
677 F.3d 130, 133-
38 (2d Cir. 2012). Further, as the agency noted, the
remaining personalized documents did not constitute evidence
that Singh suffered or feared harm on account of his political
opinion.
Given Singh’s inconsistent statements and insufficient
corroboration, the agency’s adverse credibility determination
5
is supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Contrary to Singh’s argument, the
credibility determination was dispositive of asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three
claims were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul
v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
34.1(b).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe
Clerk of Court
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