Filed: Jan. 17, 2020
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 17-3504 Singh v. Barr BIA Poczter, IJ A208 618 125 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTA
Summary: 17-3504 Singh v. Barr BIA Poczter, IJ A208 618 125 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTAT..
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17-3504
Singh v. Barr
BIA
Poczter, IJ
A208 618 125
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 17th day of January, two thousand twenty.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
8 MICHAEL H. PARK,
9 Circuit Judges. 1
10 _____________________________________
11
12 SATNAM SINGH,
13 Petitioner,
14
15 v. 17-3504
16 NAC
17 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
18 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
19 Respondent.
20 _____________________________________
21
22 FOR PETITIONER: Dalbir Singh, New York, NY.
23
24 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant
25 Attorney General; Linda S.
26 Wernery, Assistant Director;
1
Judge Christopher F. Droney, who was originally assigned to the panel, retired from the Court, effective
January 1, 2020, prior to the resolution of this case. The remaining two members of the panel, who are in
agreement, have determined the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); 2d Cir. IOP E(b); United States v. Desimone,
140 F.3d 457, 458–59 (2d Cir. 1998).
1 Gregory M. Kelch, Trial Attorney,
2 Office of Immigration Litigation,
3 United States Department of
4 Justice, Washington, DC.
5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
8 is DENIED.
9 Petitioner Satnam Singh, a native and citizen of India,
10 seeks review of a September 29, 2017, decision of the BIA
11 affirming a January 31, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge
12 (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
13 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Satnam
14 Singh, No. A206 618 125 (B.I.A. Sept. 29, 2017), aff’g No.
15 A206 618 125 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 31, 2017). We assume
16 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
17 procedural history in this case.
18 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
19 both the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions. See Yun-Zui Guan v.
20 Gonzales,
432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable
21 standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C.
22 § 1252(b)(4); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,
891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d
23 Cir. 2018).
24 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
25 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
2
1 determination on the . . . candor[] or responsiveness of the
2 applicant . . . , the consistency between the applicant’s .
3 . . written and oral statements . . . , the internal
4 consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such
5 statements with other evidence of record . . . without regard
6 to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to
7 the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant
8 factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to
9 an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality
10 of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-
11 finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu
12 Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord
13 Hong Fei
Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Although two of the IJ’s
14 findings are questionable, we find substantial evidence for
15 the adverse credibility determination given Singh’s clearly
16 contradictory statements about whether members of opposition
17 political parties visited his family home looking for him and
18 beat his mother.
19 Singh alleged that he was attacked twice on account of
20 his status as a worker for the Shiromani Akali Dal Man
21 Amritsar, or SADA. He testified that at some point after
22 the second attack, opposition party members went to his
23 family home looking for him and beat his mother. The
3
1 agency reasonably relied on Singh’s inconsistent statements
2 about what happened to his mother. See 8 U.S.C.
3 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Singh testified that people went to
4 his family home, asked where he was, and beat his mother,
5 which was why she no longer lived in the home. When asked
6 why his mother’s letter did not mention this incident,
7 Singh retracted his testimony and stated that she was not
8 beaten, and that people did not ask where he was; rather,
9 he said his mother feared that she would be beaten if she
10 returned to the family home. As the IJ noted, Singh’s
11 application also omitted any allegation that his mother was
12 beaten or that she fled the family home out of fear of
13 being beaten. These inconsistencies provide substantial
14 evidence because they go to the heart of Singh’s claim that
15 opposition party members continue to target him for harm.
16 See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289,
17 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a single material
18 inconsistency relating to the persecution from which an
19 applicant sought asylum provided substantial evidence for
20 an adverse credibility determination); see also Siewe v.
21 Gonzales,
480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A] single false
22 document or a single instance of false testimony may (if
23 attributable to the petitioner) infect the balance of the
4
1 alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence.”).
2 Singh does not challenge the IJ’s findings that he failed
3 to rehabilitate his testimony with reliable corroborating
4 evidence. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545
5 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (providing that issues not raised in an
6 opening brief are waived).
7 The IJ’s remaining findings do not add significant
8 support for the adverse credibility determination. Although
9 in response to a question on cross examination about whether
10 he was a member of SADA, Singh said yes, he otherwise
11 affirmatively and consistently stated that he was only a
12 worker for the party. To the extent the IJ found an
13 inconsistency about whether Singh left hiding to travel to
14 Delhi for a visa, while we acknowledge that Singh could have
15 been more candid, there is no internal inconsistency in his
16 testimony: he said he did not leave hiding during the day and
17 when questioned about his trip to Delhi, explained that he
18 traveled at night. Despite these two questionable findings,
19 remand is not warranted given the direct inconsistencies
20 regarding his mother’s beating and the visit to his family
21 home. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
471 F.3d
22 315, 335 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that an error does not
23 require remand if “we can state with confidence that the same
5
1 decision would be made if we were to remand”).
2 Given the inconsistencies in Singh’s testimony and the
3 lack of reliable corroboration, the adverse credibility
4 determination is supported by substantial evidence. See
5 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167;
6 Biao Yang v. Gonzales,
496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An
7 applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may
8 bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in
9 general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony
10 that has already been called into question.”). The agency
11 therefore properly denied asylum, withholding of removal, and
12 CAT relief because all three forms of relief are based on the
13 same discredited factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales,
14
444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).
15 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
16 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
17 stays VACATED.
18 FOR THE COURT:
19 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
20 Clerk of Court
21
6
