Filed: Mar. 11, 2020
Latest Update: Mar. 11, 2020
Summary: 18-3558 United States v. Chambers 18-3558-cr United States v. Chambers UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DAT
Summary: 18-3558 United States v. Chambers 18-3558-cr United States v. Chambers UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATA..
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18-3558
United States v. Chambers
18‐3558‐cr
United States v. Chambers
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in
the City of New York, on the 11th day of March, two thousand twenty.
PRESENT: DENNY CHIN,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
Circuit Judges.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
‐v‐ 18‐3558‐cr
JOHN CHAMBERS,
Defendant‐Appellant.
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FOR APPELLEE: PAUL M. MONTELEONI, Assistant
United States Attorney (Alex Rossmiller
and Karl Metzner, Assistant United
States Attorneys, on the brief), for
Geoffrey S. Berman, United States
Attorney for the Southern District of
New York, New York, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLANT: JARED B. FOLEY, Gallet Dreyer &
Berkey, LLP, New York, New York.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Pauley, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Defendant‐appellant John Chambers appeals from a judgment of
conviction entered by the district court on November 21, 2018, following a five‐day jury
trial, convicting him of bribery, honest services fraud, and conspiracy, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 666, 1343, 1346, and 1349. He was sentenced principally to a term of
imprisonment of a year and a day. On appeal, Chambers argues that at trial the district
court erroneously excluded evidence of a meeting at which an undercover officer spoke
with Chambersʹs wife. We assume the partiesʹ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
procedural history of this case, and the issues on appeal.
Chambers, a former attorney who specialized in matters involving
firearms licenses, was indicted on March 15, 2018 for bribing New York City police
officer David Villanueva, who worked in the New York Police Departmentʹs firearms
licensing division. The indictment alleged that between 2010 and 2015 Chambers
bribed Villanueva by giving him cash and gifts in return for favorable treatment with
regard to Chambersʹs clientsʹ firearms matters. Villanueva was arrested in June 2016
and, in a separate criminal proceeding, pled guilty to accepting bribes.
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After Villanuevaʹs arrest but before Chambers was indicted, an
undercover officer visited Chambersʹs law firm and met with Christina Chambers ‐‐
Chambersʹs office manager, paralegal, and wife ‐‐ about applying for a New York City
gun license. The meeting was videotaped by the undercover officer, and nothing illegal
or incriminating occurred during the meeting. Before trial, the government moved in
limine to prevent Chambers from offering the video of the meeting or calling the
undercover officer to testify about it. On the first day of trial, the district court granted
the governmentʹs motion, reasoning that the conversation was irrelevant and,
alternatively, that evidence of the meeting constituted impermissible ʺgood‐actsʺ
evidence of specific non‐criminal conduct.
Toward the end of the governmentʹs case, Chambers moved to introduce
the video recording of the meeting. The district court denied this request, concluding
that the video was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, and constituted inadmissible
hearsay. Chambers was convicted, and this appeal followed.
We review a district courtʹs evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion,
United States v. McDermott, 245 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2001), and such rulings will only
be overturned if they are ʺarbitrary and irrational,ʺ United States v. White,
692 F.3d 235,
244 (2d Cir. 2012).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the evidence of the meeting, which took place two years after the
charged conduct, was irrelevant. First, Chambers was not present at the meeting, and
‐3‐
thus the conversation shed little if any light on his intent. Second, the undercover
officer was purporting to be a walk‐in, prospective new client, and therefore any
conversation Christina Chambers had with him was not probative of how Chambers or
his wife behaved with clients they knew. Third, Villanueva had already been arrested
for accepting bribes from lawyers in exchange for his assistance in gun licensing
matters, and therefore Chambers was likely aware that an investigation was pending.
Moreover, even assuming evidence of the meeting was relevant, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that its probative value was
substantially outweighed by the danger of confusion and needlessly cumulative
evidence. As the district court explained, introduction of the video recording of the
meeting could have led to ʺa lot of confusion for the jury with an undercover [officer]
visiting the law office.ʺ Appʹx at 128. The district court also noted that the evidence
would have been unduly cumulative because Christina Chambers, who was set to take
the stand, was going to provide ‐‐ and ultimately did provide ‐‐ information about
Chambersʹs law practice. Accordingly, the district court, which was in the best position
to evaluate the evidence, see United States v. Monsalvatge, 850 F.3d 483, 493 (2d Cir. 2017),
did not abuse its discretion.
Finally, ʺ[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to
prove a personʹs character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character.ʺ Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). This Court has long
recognized that ʺ[a] defendant may not seek to establish his innocence . . . through proof
‐4‐
of the absence of criminal acts on specific occasions.ʺ United States v. Scarpa, 897 F.2d 63,
70 (2d Cir. 1990). The reasoning behind this rule is straightforward: A single occurrence
of lawful conduct is ʺsimply irrelevantʺ to other occurrences of unlawful conduct.
United States v. Walker,
191 F.3d 326, 336 (2d Cir. 1999) (ʺWhether [the defendant] had
prepared other, non‐fraudulent applications was simply irrelevant to whether the
applications charged as false statements were fraudulent.ʺ). Chambersʹs argument that
his running of a legitimate law practice makes it less likely that he had corrupt intent to
bribe Villanueva is precisely the type of propensity inference that Rule 404(b)(1) is
intended to prohibit. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding evidence of the conversation that Christina Chambers, and not Chambers,
had with an apparent new potential client two years after the charged conspiracy.
***
We have considered Chambersʹs remaining arguments and conclude they
are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine OʹHagan Wolfe, Clerk
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