Filed: Sep. 10, 2020
Latest Update: Sep. 10, 2020
Summary: 18-563 Singh v. Barr BIA A088 186 012 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY
Summary: 18-563 Singh v. Barr BIA A088 186 012 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ..
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18-563
Singh v. Barr
BIA
A088 186 012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 10th day of September, two thousand twenty.
PRESENT:
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
MICHAEL H. PARK,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
KARAMJIT SINGH,
Petitioner,
v. 18-563
NAC
WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Jackson Heights,
NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney
General; Anthony C. Payne,
Assistant Director; Liza S.
Murcia, Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Karamjit Singh, a native and citizen of India,
seeks review of a February 12, 2018 decision of the BIA
denying his motion to reopen. In re Karamjit Singh, No. A
088 186 012 (B.I.A. Feb. 12, 2018). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.
We review a denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of
discretion. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168–69
(2d Cir. 2008). When the agency considers relevant evidence
of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we
review its factual findings under the substantial evidence
standard.
Id. at 169.
An alien seeking to reopen may file one motion to reopen
no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i). However, these time
and number limitations do not apply if the motion is filed in
order to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions
arising in the country of nationality or the country to which
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removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and
was not available and would not have been discovered or
presented at the previous hearing.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
It is undisputed that Singh’s motion was number barred and
untimely because it was his second motion to reopen, filed
seven years after his removal order.
The agency’s determination that Singh failed to establish
a material change in country conditions is supported by
substantial evidence. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169;
see also In re S–Y–G–, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007)
(explaining that in evaluating evidence of changed country
conditions, the BIA “compare[s] the evidence of country
conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at
the time of the merits hearing below”). The BIA considered
Singh’s evidence, which consisted of news articles and
reports describing general human rights conditions in India.
His evidence showed some attacks on Sikhs both before and
after his hearing and did not show worsened conditions for
Sikhs and Khalistan supporters since the 2008 hearing.
Accordingly, the agency reasonably concluded that the country
3
conditions evidence was insufficient to demonstrate a change
in conditions material to Singh’s alleged fear of persecution
as a Sikh political activist. See 8
U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (requiring evidence of changed
circumstances to be “material” to asylum eligibility); see
also In re J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976, 981 (BIA 1997) (noting
that an alien seeking reopening based on changed country
conditions must show that the change will materially affect
the basis of his asylum claim).
Singh argues that his personal statement that the police
arrested his father in 2017 in an attempt to locate him is
sufficient to establish changed conditions. But the agency
was not required to credit that uncorroborated statement
because Singh was found not credible in the underlying
proceedings. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143,
146–47 (2d Cir. 2007).
Singh also argues that he is prima facie eligible for
asylum despite the underlying adverse credibility ruling
because his current fear is based on a subsequent event (i.e.,
his father’s arrest). But as already noted, the BIA was not
required to credit this statement. Id. In addition, the
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factual predicate of Singh’s claim of future persecution was
not independent from Singh’s previous testimony that was not
found reliable. Singh alleged that his father was arrested
because of Singh’s past political activities, but the IJ did
not credit Singh’s testimony regarding his past political
activities. Accordingly, in light of the IJ’s past adverse
credibility ruling as to past persecution, Singh’s claim
based on fear of future persecution is not viable. See Paul
v. Gonzales,
444 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2006). Given Singh’s
failure to establish a material change in conditions in India,
the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion as
untimely and number barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A),
(C)(i), (ii).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
stays VACATED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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