Filed: Sep. 16, 2020
Latest Update: Sep. 16, 2020
Summary: 18-924 Singh v. Barr BIA Poczter, IJ A206 894 259 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTAT
Summary: 18-924 Singh v. Barr BIA Poczter, IJ A206 894 259 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATI..
More
18-924
Singh v. Barr
BIA
Poczter, IJ
A206 894 259
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 16th day of September, two thousand twenty.
PRESENT:
JON O. NEWMAN,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
Circuit Judges.*
_____________________________________
MANPREET SINGH, AKA RABI
BAMADUR,
Petitioner,
v. 18-924
NAC
WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Deepti Vithal, Richmond Hill, NY.
* Circuit Judge Peter W. Hall, originally a member of the panel, is
currently unavailable. Circuit Judge Jon O. Newman has replaced Judge
Hall on the panel for this matter. See 2d Cir. IOP E(b).
FOR RESPONDENT: Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting
Assistant Attorney General;
Anthony P. Nicastro, Assistant
Director; Dana M. Camilleri, Trial
Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States
Department of Justice, Washington,
DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Manpreet Singh, a native and citizen of India,
seeks review of a March 8, 2018, decision of the BIA affirming
a May 12, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). In re Manpreet Singh, No. A 206 894 259 (B.I.A. Mar.
8, 2018), aff’g No. A 206 894 259 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May
12, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA and address only the
grounds for the adverse credibility determination that the
BIA relied on. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
2
426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards
of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B);
Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,
891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018).
“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s
or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal
consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such
statements with other evidence of record . . . and any
inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard
to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to
the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant
factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to
an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality
of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-
finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu
Xia Lin v. Mukasey,
534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord
Hong Fei
Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial evidence supports
the agency’s adverse credibility determination.
Singh alleged past persecution and a fear of future
persecution on account of his political affiliation with the
3
Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar (“SADA”) party. The agency
reasonably relied on inconsistencies and omissions relating
both to his family’s history of persecution on political
grounds and threats his family received after he left India.
Singh alleged that his father was a longtime member of SADA,
but when asked on direct examination whether his father had
been attacked, he said no. When pressed on cross-examination
as to why he would have been targeted when his father had not
been, Singh changed his story and alleged, for the first time,
that his father had been attacked in the past. The agency
reasonably relied on this inconsistency as well as Singh’s
omission of this fact from his application because it went to
his family’s history of political persecution. See Xiu Xia
Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (upholding agency’s reliance on
inconsistencies and omissions); see also Hong Fei
Gao, 891
F.3d at 78–79 (“probative value of the omission of certain
facts” turns on “whether those facts are ones that a credible
petitioner would reasonably have been expected to disclose
under the relevant circumstances”). Moreover, a letter from
Singh’s parents also omitted any mention of that attack
despite referencing Singh’s father’s political affiliation.
4
See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“An applicant's failure to corroborate his or her testimony
may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration
in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate
testimony that has already been called into question.”).
The adverse credibility determination finds further
support in an omission of the sole fact supporting Singh’s
claim that political opponents remained interested in him.
See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. At the hearing he testified
that his parents had received threats after he left India,
but he omitted that fact from his written statement in support
of his application. And, as with his father’s past harm, his
parents’ letter also omitted this key information and thus
did not rehabilitate his credibility on this point. See Biao
Yang, 496 F.3d at 273. The agency was not required to credit
Singh’s explanations for the inconsistencies—that translators
may have forgotten to include the information and that he and
his parents chose to emphasize other facts. See Majidi v.
Gonzales,
430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must
do more than offer a plausible explanation for his
inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate
5
that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit
his testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
adverse credibility determination is dispositive because
Singh’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
relief were all based on the same factual predicate. Paul
v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY the petition for
review. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
stays VACATED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
6
