Appellants, relying on § 101(a) (1) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 [73 Stat. 522, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1)]1 asked for injunctive relief to restrain the conduct of a scheduled union election by Keystone Lodge No. 42, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, unless and until they had been accorded an equal opportunity to nominate and vote for candidates in the election. The District Court dismissed the appellants' claim that they had been denied an equal right to nominate and vote for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter on the authority of Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 85 S. Ct. 292, 13 L. Ed. 2d 190 (1964), and this appeal followed.

Appellant Caldarelli was nominated for the office of Treasurer-Collector of Lodge No. 42 and also for election as Vice-Chairman of the Grievance Committee, Philadelphia Division of the Lodge. He and the other appellants were among those who signed his nomination petitions. In response to an objection raised by another member, the President of the Grand Lodge sent a letter on October 25, 1966, (approximately a month before the scheduled elections) stating:

"I wish to further advise that inasmuch as Brother Caldarelli is restricted to yard work and has been working in the Enola Yards for the last several years, which yards are under the exclusive jurisdiction of Lodge 694, he would not be eligible to be a candidate in the election for vice chairman, treasurer or any other office in Lodge 42, and furthermore, he would be required to hold membership in Lodge 694, which Lodge has jurisdiction over his employment and such transfer should be immediately effected, inasmuch as Lodge 694 is rightfully entitled to his membership."

Consequently, appellant Caldarelli's name was removed from the ballots mailed to all members November 7, 1966, one of which ballots was mailed to him for his vote.

In dismissing the complaint, the judge below characterized the appellants' contention as one concerning solely eligibility restrictions of candidates for union office.2 Calhoon v. Harvey, supra, makes clear, however, that the crucial question for the court is whether or not a union member has been discriminated against in one of the rights enumerated in § 101 (a) (1).3 If such discrimination is present, a cause of action exists under § 101 (a) (1) regardless of other claims; absent such discrimination, the courts have no such jurisdiction. This case is outside the mandate of Calhoon v. Harvey, since the factual context shows that discrimination in the nominating and voting rights of membership lies at the core of this controversy. Unlike Calhoon v. Harvey, no attempt is made to show that application of an existing union eligibility requirement leads to a § 101(a) (1) violation. Rather, here a distinction made among "members" allegedly infringed their § 101(a) rights to nominate and vote equally. See O'Brien v. Paddock, 246 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y.1965); cf. Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371, 374 (2d Cir. 1964). That the alleged discrimination ultimately had consequences for the eligibility of a candidate for office may be inherent in showing unequal treatment in the rights to vote and nominate, but the eligibility determination is not the crux of this complaint.

As the union constitution provided in § 133, "[t]he membership of a subordinate lodge * * * [was] confined to the jurisdiction assigned it by the President."4 Lodge No. 42 was a "road" lodge for freight trainmen employed on Pennsylvania Railroad road territory between Philadelphia and Altoona, Pa. Lodge No. 694 was a "yard" lodge with jurisdiction over trainmen working in the Enola, Pennsylvania, yards. Presumaby, as the President's letter points out, if a man went from "road" to "yard" work, he would have to transfer his membership to another lodge.

But the testimony at the hearing below showed that such was not the practice and that many men doing "yard" work at the Enola Yard were still members of Lodge No. 42. The explanation of this situation appears twofold. Testimony revealed that a certain group of employees called "Group 10" had dual seniority on or eligibility for both "road" and "yard" work. Although such men might have performed primarily yard work, as long as they were free to bid for road work, they could remain in a "road" lodge like No. 42. This was true, apparently, even if it was highly unlikely that a man would have sufficient seniority to "hold" a road job when extras were needed. Furthermore, men in such a dual position could make the opposite election and be members of a "yard" lodge like No. 694 even if they worked on the "road." The section of the Brotherhood Constitution that governed Lodge membership apparently provided for this situation by the proviso "that members who do not leave the jurisdiction of the local grievance committee of the lodge * * * shall not be compelled to transfer." Secondly, a "Ruling" of the Brotherhood on this section suggests that even if a member did not fall within this proviso, past practice in requiring transfer had been lax.5

These membership requirements are crucial to this case because only "members" are allowed to be elected as Lodge officers.6 Appellant Caldarelli ran for the same Lodge office of Treasurer-Collector in 1963 and, although nominated, lost the election. Moreover, in 1962 he ran for vice chairman of the Local No. 42 grievance committee and was elected. Both nominations and his subsequent service went unchallenged. All this followed his heart attack in 1961 and his "temporary restriction" to "yard" duty at that time. Testimony on the record reveals that this physical restriction is apparently still temporary and that contemplated changes in railroad communication may well increase the chances that this restriction will be lifted in the future. Nonetheless, of all those having "dual seniority" and thus remaining members of Lodge No. 42 since under the jurisdiction of their grievance committee while working in the Enola yards, appellant Caldarelli was the only one with a physical restriction as opposed to a "restriction" from "road" work resulting from insufficient seniority.

Nothing in the testimony or exhibits, or in the Brotherhood's Constitution, § 85(a), seems to provide for a distinction among "members" eligible to be nominated for Lodge office. Appellant Caldarelli is either a full member under § 85 for purposes of Lodge officer elections or he is not one at all. Appellees seem to concede that he is a member at least for purposes of voting.7 On the face of the pleadings and record, therefore, appellants made out a case of discriminatory treatment of Caldarelli sufficient to justify a finding that he had been placed in a class of membership lacking equal opportunity to nominate and vote.8 Such a contention gives the court jurisdiction under §§ 101(a) (1) and 102.

The requirements for grievance committee elections differ significantly from those for Lodge election by adding further conditions: only "members who are employed in services represented by the Brotherhood" are allowed to be elected as members of grievance committees and, furthermore, in order to vote for members of certain grievance committees, voting members must be "actually employed on regular or spare positions in the craft represented. * * *"9 General Rule No. 1 for local grievance committees adds the requirement that the vice chairman is "to be elected from among and by the members in actual service on the division or system which the committee is to represent."10

In light of the above testimony and these provisions of the Brotherhood's Constitution, the present record does not permit the conclusion as a matter of law that the appellants have been deprived of their rights to vote and nominate equally for vice-chairman of the local grievance committee. The special category that appellees claim appellant Caldarelli falls into with his physical restriction appears consonant with "reasonable rules and regulations" of the Brotherhood, particularly in view of the distinctions in membership made for purposes of grievance committee elections and offices such as "actual service on the division" represented and actual employment "on regular or spare positions in the craft represented."11 Appellants failed to show that these membership distinctions were not applied uniformly in practice and that a distinction based on man's physical restrictions was ignored in past similar situations.12

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the District Court dismissing this suit will be reversed and the case will be remanded for findings on whether or not appellant Caldarelli was discriminated against when placed in a class of members who could neither nominate nor vote for themselves, and who could not be nominated by or voted for by other members of Lodge No. 42, as far as Lodge officers are concerned. The District Court does have jurisdiction to determine this contention of appellants under § 101(a) (1) in view of the record in this case.