Filed: May 20, 2003
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 5-20-2003 Willow Inn Inc v. Public Service Mutl Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket 02-2145 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003 Recommended Citation "Willow Inn Inc v. Public Service Mutl" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 548. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003/548 This decision is brought to you for free and open
Summary: Opinions of the United 2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 5-20-2003 Willow Inn Inc v. Public Service Mutl Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket 02-2145 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003 Recommended Citation "Willow Inn Inc v. Public Service Mutl" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 548. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003/548 This decision is brought to you for free and open ..
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Opinions of the United
2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
5-20-2003
Willow Inn Inc v. Public Service Mutl
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket 02-2145
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003
Recommended Citation
"Willow Inn Inc v. Public Service Mutl" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 548.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003/548
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2003 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No: 02-2145
WILLOW INN, INC.,
A Pennsylvania Corporation
v.
PUBLIC SERVICE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
A New York Corporation
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Court Judge: The Honorable Berle M. Schiller
(D.C. Civil No. 00-cv-05481)
Argued on April 10, 2003
Before: ALITO, FUENTES, Circuit Judges, and PISANO* District Judge
(Opinion Filed: May 20, 2003)
__________________
*Honorable Joel A. Pisano, United States District Judge for the District of New
Jersey, sitting by designation.
Edward M. Koch [Argued]
Louis J. Brown
White and Williams LLP
One Liberty Place
Suite 1800
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Appellant
Howard G. Silverman [Argued]
Kane & Silverman, P.C.
2401 Pennsylvania Avenue
Suite 1C-44, The Philadelphian
Philadelphia, PA 19130
Counsel for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM:
Willow Inn, Inc. (“Willow Inn”), a restaurant, bar, and residence in Willow Grove,
Pennsylvania and an insured of Public Service Mutual Insurance Company (“PSM”) at all
relevant times, commenced this breach of contract and bad faith action, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 8371 (2001), to challenge PSM’s adjustment of its property damage claim arising from
a windstorm on June 1, 1998. After a two day bench trial, the District Court found PSM
liable to W illow Inn for breach of contract and bad faith, and awarded $2,000 in
compensatory damages and $150,000 in punitive damages. The District Court granted
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Willow Inn’s post-trial motion for attorney’s fees and costs, but denied all other post-trial
motions. PSM then filed this appeal.1
On appeal, PSM raises four issues: (1) Did the District Court err in finding that
PSM breached the contract of insurance between Willow Inn and PSM?; (2) Did the
District Court err in finding that PSM acted in bad faith under the Pennsylvania Bad Faith
Statute?; (3) Is the District Court’s punitive damages award in the amount of $150,000
constitutionally excessive?; and (4) Did the District Court abuse its discretion in awarding
attorney’s fees and costs? This Court granted oral argument, but, after notice to the
parties, limited the argument to the punitive damages issue.
Only days before oral argument was held in this matter, the United States Supreme
Court filed an opinion in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v.
Campbell, ___ U.S. _____,
2003 WL 1791206, *1 (April 7, 2003), in which the Court,
reinforcing the particular guideposts it enunciated in BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore,
517 U.S. 559 (1996), articulated the principles that courts shall strictly apply before
imposing upon a defendant in a civil case a punitive damages award. In short, the three
guideposts are: (1) “the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the
disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive
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Although Willow Inn attempted to untimely file a cross-appeal, it ultimately
withdrew it after the District Court denied a motion to extend time to file a notice of
appeal under Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and after this
Court requested briefs on the issue of timeliness.
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damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury
and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” Campbell, ____ U.S.
at ____,
2003 WL 1791206, at *7 (citation omitted). The District Court’s written
memorandum opinion, however, does not explicitly apply the Gore/Campbell guideposts,
and simply concludes that a $150,000 punitive damages award is appropriate “[b]ased on
the evidence presented at trial and in light of the aforementioned factors [,“the character
of a defendant’s conduct, the nature and extent of the harm intended or caused to the
plaintiff, and the wealth of the defendant]. While our review is de novo in determining
whether sufficient evidence in the record exists to support a punitive damages award,
Alexander v. Riga,
208 F.3d 419, 430 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted), we recognize
nevertheless that the District Court is in the best position to first determine whether to
allow a punitive damages award, and, if so, the quantum of those damages. To be sure,
the District Judge presided over a two day bench trial, observed the demeanor of
witnesses, listened to witness testimony, and gained an overall sense of the case.
Because the District Court did not have the benefit of the Campbell decision when
it imposed upon PSM a punitive damages award, see, e.g., Casey v. Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania,
14 F.3d 848, 856-57 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing generally
the mandate rule and the Supreme Court’s mandate to lower courts), we vacate the
District Court’s Memorandum and Order filed January 4, 2002 and remand to the District
Court for a determination on the punitive damages issue in accordance with the Supreme
4
Court’s dictates in Gore/Campbell. On all remaining issues, we affirm without further
discussion.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we affirm in part and reverse in part the
judgment of the District Court.
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