Filed: Nov. 14, 2003
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 11-14-2003 Bassett v. Rent A Ctr Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 02-4442 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003 Recommended Citation "Bassett v. Rent A Ctr" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 107. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003/107 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of
Summary: Opinions of the United 2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 11-14-2003 Bassett v. Rent A Ctr Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 02-4442 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003 Recommended Citation "Bassett v. Rent A Ctr" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 107. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003/107 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of t..
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Opinions of the United
2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
11-14-2003
Bassett v. Rent A Ctr
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 02-4442
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003
Recommended Citation
"Bassett v. Rent A Ctr" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 107.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003/107
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2003 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 02-4442
___________
MARSOREEZ BASSETT,
Appellant
v.
RENT-A-CENTER;
NICHOLAS FINELLI
___________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Civil No. 99-cv-06140)
District Judge: The Honorable Stephen M. Orlofsky
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 28, 2003
BEFORE: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, NYGAARD, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges.
(Filed November 14, 2003)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Marsoreez Bassett appeals the District Court’s order of summary
judgment in favor of Appellees Rent-A-Center (“RAC”) and Bassett’s supervisor,
Nicholas Finelli. Bassett sued RAC and Finelli alleging wrongful termination based on
disability and race discrimination. In granting summary judgment, the District Court
held: (1) Bassett could not assert a disability discrimination claim premised on a
personality test because he is not disabled, and (2) Bassett failed to make out a prima
facie case of race discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
(“NJLAD”). We will affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Because the facts are known to the parties, we review them only briefly.
Bassett, an African American male, applied for a job with RAC in 1997. As part of the
application process RAC required Bassett to take a personality profile test.1 Bassett was
hired on January 28, 1997 as an entry-level Account Manager. In late March of 1997,
Bassett took another personality profile test at RAC’s request. The test showed that
Bassett’s mental skills were better than 99% of the population, but indicated that he
suffered from depression and dependency.
1. Bassett calls the test the M innesota M ulti-Phasic Personality Inventory
(“M M PI”), while RAC calls the test a M anagem ent Trainee-Executive Pro file test.
W e will not pass judgment on the appropriate nom enclature, but will refer to the test
generically as a personality profile test.
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Over his time at RAC, Bassett accumulated a satisfactory employment
record including promotions from entry-level Account Manager to Inside/Outside
Manager to Executive Assistant Manager to Store Manager. When his store came under
new supervision—the supervisory position formerly held by an African American male
was filled with a Caucasian male—Bassett alleges he was targeted for termination. On
March 22, 1999, RAC terminated Bassett, allegedly because of an inventory discrepancy
amounting to $7000 that Bassett left unresolved for three months.
On November 6, 2002, the District Court granted summary judgment on
behalf of RAC. In its opinion, the Court admonished Bassett for misstating evidence.
Bassett appeals the summary judgment order and this Court has jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
This Court has plenary review of the District Court’s decisions to grant
summary judgment. See Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 602-03 (3d Cir.
2002). The Court takes the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
must grant summary judgment if there is no issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
B. ADA/NJLAD Inquiry Claim
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Bassett contests the District Court’s holding that he cannot assert a
disability discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and
the NJLAD because he is not disabled.
The ADA and NJLAD prohibit employers from using tests or
questionnaires that are meant to, or that incidentally, result in discrimination against
disabled individuals. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d); N.J.A.C. § 13:13-2.3(a) (“It is an
unlawful employment practice for any employer . . . to make use of any employment test
or other selection criterion that screens out . . . people with disabilities.”). The District
Court avoided the ultimate question of liability by finding that a non-disabled person
lacks standing to challenge his employer’s actions. See, e.g., Dist. Ct. Op., App. at A29.
Alternatively, courts have assumed arguendo that an employer is violating the statute, but
held that the particular plaintiff has no recourse because he is unable to demonstrate
injury based on the employer’s action. See, e.g., Tice v. Centre Area Transp. Auth., 247
F.3d 506, 519-20 (3d Cir. 2001); Armstrong v. Turner Indus., Inc.,
141 F.3d 554, 562 (5th
Cir. 1998).
We will follow this Court’s ruling in Tice that without an actual injury
stemming from the violation, summary judgment for the employer is appropriate. 247
F.3d at 519-20. Bassett has shown no tangible injury from being subjected to the
personality profile test. He cannot show a causal connection between the test and his
termination. Two years elapsed between Basset taking the test and being terminated, with
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three intervening promotions. Additionally, Bassett is unable to show that the individuals
responsible for his firing even saw his test results. See Tice, 247 F.3d at 520 (noting that
plaintiff “has not even identified a single person who improperly viewed his medical
files”). As Bassett fails to demonstrate an injury, we refuse to let him maintain a suit
against RAC on the alleged violation of the ADA and NJLAD.
We reach the same result as the District Court—that Bassett is not entitled
to relief on his ADA/NJLAD claim— though we do so on the basis that Bassett is unable
to demonstrate an injury stemming from the alleged violation. Id. Accordingly, we will
affirm the District Court’s order of summary judgment on behalf of RAC.
C. Race Discrimination Claim
Bassett claims the District Court erred when it found he could not make out
a prima facie case of race discrimination under the NJLAD, and even if he could make
out a prima facie case, he could not show that RAC’s race-neutral reasons for firing him
were pretextual.
To make out a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under the
NJLAD, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was
performing his job at a level that met his employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) he was
terminated, and (4) he was replaced. Clowes v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 538 A.2d 794, 805
(N.J. 1988). The District Court held that Bassett’s case was insufficient to meet the
second prong, since RAC could legitimately expect its store managers to operate stores
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without inventory discrepancies, or if inventory discrepancies arose, to resolve those
problems within three months. We agree. Bassett’s reference to his satisfactory work
history and pattern of promotions to support his claim that he was meeting RAC’s
legitimate expectations is unavailing. RAC had a legitimate expectation that as a store
manager Bassett would proactively avoid inventory discrepancies and quickly rectify any
such errors.
Because we find that Bassett failed to make out a prima facie case of race
discrimination, we do not need to shift the burden to RAC under McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Were we to do so, however, we agree with the
District Court that Bassett cannot show that RAC’s race-neutral reasons for termination
were pretextual.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the District Court’s order of
summary judgment in favor of RAC.
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_________________________
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
_/s/ Richard Nygaard _____________
Circuit Judge
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