Filed: Oct. 11, 2005
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 10-11-2005 Hannah v. City of Dover Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 05-2422 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005 Recommended Citation "Hannah v. City of Dover" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 432. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/432 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions
Summary: Opinions of the United 2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 10-11-2005 Hannah v. City of Dover Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 05-2422 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005 Recommended Citation "Hannah v. City of Dover" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 432. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/432 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions ..
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Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
10-11-2005
Hannah v. City of Dover
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-2422
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005
Recommended Citation
"Hannah v. City of Dover" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 432.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/432
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2005 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-2422
MOZELL HANNAH, individually and as personal representative
of the Estate of Reginald L. Hannah; SHERRY CLARK, as parent and next friend of
Reginald L. Clark and Latonya Clark; CHRISTINE PERRY, as Legal Guardian and next
friend of Zackary Perry; JOY HARRIS, as parent and next friend of Montel Sudler;
ANGELNKUE BRYAN, as parent and next friend of Keyanna Bryan
v.
CITY OF DOVER; PFC PAUL KUNTZI, individually
and as agent of the City of Dover Police Department; PFC DAVID GIST, individually
and as agent of the City of Dover Police Department; PFC HARVEY JAKSCH,
individually and as an agent of the City of Dover Police Department
Mozell Hannah,
Appellant
_______________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civ. No. 01-cv-00312)
Chief District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
October 3, 2005
Before: ALITO, SMITH and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed October 11, 2005)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
In November 2001, Appellant Mozell Hannah filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations against the City of Dover,
Delaware, and three Dover Police Officers in the death of her son, Reginald Hannah. The
District Court granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, from which
Hannah now appeals. We will affirm the District Court’s order because Hannah does not
assert the deprivation of a constitutional right and raises no cognizable § 1983 claim.
I.
On the morning of March 9, 2001, State Police Corporal Robert Bishop stopped a
vehicle driven by Glen Matthews. Matthews failed a field sobriety test and was placed
under arrest. Meanwhile, Matthews’ passenger, Reginald Hannah, emerged from the
vehicle. Bishop offered Reginald a ride home. He accepted. Reginald got into the back
seat of Bishop’s car next to the handcuffed Matthews and asked to be driven to Capital
Green, a Dover development. During the drive, Reginald showed no signs of violent,
angry, or psychotic behavior. However, as they approached the development, Reginald
suddenly grabbed Matthews by the neck and threatened him with violence. Bishop pulled
over and attempted to remove Reginald from the car, but he resisted. Bishop then radioed
for assistance. Dover Police Officers Gist, Kuntzi, and Jaksch arrived. Reginald had
since exited the vehicle on his own but was still holding Matthews. The officers ordered
Matthews released, at which point Reginald dropped his hold and charged toward the
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officers. After a short struggle, Reginald was subdued, handcuffed, and carried to a
squad car. He then collapsed on the seat. Bishop tried to sit him up, but to no avail.
Reginald was pronounced dead at Kent General Hospital one hour later. An autopsy
performed by the State Medical Examiner revealed that the cause of death was sudden
cardiac arrest due to cocaine and ethanol induced excited delirium. Reginald was either
thirty-eight or thirty-nine at the time of his death.1
Shortly thereafter, Mozell Hannah, acting individually and on behalf of Reginald’s
estate, along with a number of Reginald’s other relatives, brought a counseled suit
alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. Counsel withdrew in January
2002. Hannah then pursued the suit pro se. On October 22, 2002, the District Court
dismissed all of the complaining parties with the exception of Mozell Hannah in her
individual capacity. After two years of litigation, the Defendants again moved for
summary judgment. The District Court granted the motion, concluding that Hannah
failed to show that the City of Dover had in place a policy or custom that resulted in the
death of her son, or that the police officers used excessive force.2
II.
The first step in examining a claim brought under § 1983 is to “‘determine whether
1
The record reflects only that Reginald Hannah was born in 1962 and died in
2001.
2
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we exercise plenary review
over the grant of a motion for summary judgment. See Wastak v. Lehigh Valley Health
Network, 342 F.3d 281, 285 (3d Cir. 2003).
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the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all . . . .’”
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (quoting Connecticut v. Gabbert,
526 U.S.
286, 290 (1999)). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely
provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver,
510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (Rehnquist J., plurality opinion) (citation and internal
quotations omitted). Thus, a plaintiff must adequately assert the personal deprivation of a
right before she can pursue a suit under § 1983.
The District Court correctly concluded that a pro se non-lawyer parent may not
represent the rights of a child in a suit brought before the federal courts, and must assert
rights personally held by the litigant. See Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d
225, 231 (3d Cir. 1998). Neither Hannah nor the District Court expressly identified what
constitutional deprivation Hannah has alleged. Based on her claims, we see two rights
upon which Hannah could attempt to base her suit: (1) the due process liberty interest
created by the parent-child relationship; and (2) the Fourth Amendment. We address each
in turn.
A. Parental-Child Relationship
In McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2003), we were faced with a case
remarkably parallel to the current action. There, the Philadelphia Police shot and killed
McCurdy’s nineteen-year-old son during a routine traffic stop. McCurdy brought suit
under § 1983 claiming that as a parent, he has a protected liberty interest in the
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companionship of his son. Id. at 825. We recognized that the parent-child bond does
create a liberty interest, the deprivation of which is actionable under § 1983, but held that
the protection is limited to the relationship between a parent and a minor child.
Id. at
829-30. We refused to extend the liberty interest in a child’s companionship to a parent
and his “independent adult child.”
Id. at 830. Similarly, Hannah has no liberty interest
created by her relationship with her adult son. She thus cannot assert a claim for damages
for the deprivation of a right which is not conferred by the Constitution.
B. Fourth Amendment
Fourth Amendment rights are personal and may not be asserted vicariously by third
parties. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) (citations omitted). Hannah
attempts to assert Reginald’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizures. However, Hannah herself has not been the recipient of an allegedly unlawful
intrusion. See Three Rivers Ctr. for Indep. Living, Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of
Pittsburgh,
382 F.3d 412, 422 (3d Cir. 2004) (“a personal right is necessary to the
existence . . . of a right of action under § 1983.”).3
For the foregoing reasons, Hannah fails to allege any deprivation of a
constitutional right on which to premise her § 1983 suit. The District Court’s order
3
For similar reasons, Hannah cannot proceed pro se and assert a violation of equal
protection on behalf of her son. See O’Malley v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 785, 789 (3d Cir.
1973) (stating that a litigant may not assert the civil rights of others). Nor does she allege
that either the City of Dover or its officers treated her unequally.
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granting the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be affirmed.4
4
Hannah also moves for sanctions for the Appellees’ failure to serve a reply brief
on Angelnkue Bryan. Bryan did not file a timely notice of appeal and is not party to this
appeal. Thus, no service is required. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a), 28(b). Even if we were to
construe Bryan’s participation statement as a properly filed notice of appeal, see Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(3); L.A.R. 3.4, as stated above, a parent may not proceed pro se on behalf of
a child. Accordingly, the motion for sanctions will be denied.
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