Filed: Aug. 02, 2006
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 8-2-2006 Kopec v. Tate Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 05-3698 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006 Recommended Citation "Kopec v. Tate" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 627. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/627 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States
Summary: Opinions of the United 2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 8-2-2006 Kopec v. Tate Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 05-3698 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006 Recommended Citation "Kopec v. Tate" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 627. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/627 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States C..
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Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
8-2-2006
Kopec v. Tate
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-3698
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006
Recommended Citation
"Kopec v. Tate" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 627.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/627
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2006 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_________
NO. 05-3698
_________
MICHAEL KOPEC,
Appellant
v.
OFFICER TYRONE TATE and
TOWNSHIP OF WHITEMARSH.
_________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 02-cv-00430)
District Judge: Hon. J. Curtis Joyner
_________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 19, 2006
BEFORE: McKEE and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges,
and McCLURE,* District Judge
(Opinion Filed: August 2, 2006)
________
*
Hon. James F. McClure, Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________
McCLURE, District Judge:
Appellant Michael Kopec instituted a civil rights action against appellee
Officer Tyrone Tate pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Tate, a police
officer employed by Whitemarsh Township, used excessive force by placing
excessively tight handcuffs on Kopec. The factual background of the case, while
not relevant to this appeal, is discussed in an earlier opinion of this court reversing
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Tate. See
Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 2004).
After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant, and the district
court entered judgment in favor of Tate and against Kopec. Kopec appeals,
arguing that “[t]he lower court erroneously charged the jury on intentionality when
it instructed that Plaintiff had the burden of proving that Defendant police officer
intentionally deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional rights.” (Appellant’s Br. at 2.)
For the reasons stated herein, we find that even if Kopec preserved his objection to
the intentionality instruction, when viewed as a whole, the jury instructions
properly stated the correct legal standard.
I. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
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A. Jurisdiction
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and
1367 in that the complaint alleged federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and supplemental state law claims. Because the district court entered final
judgment after a jury verdict, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
B. Standard of Review
“If a timely objection preserved the issue for appeal, we exercise plenary
review to determine if the jury instructions, as a whole, stated the correct legal
standard. Otherwise, we may exercise our discretion to reverse the judgment only
for plain error contained in the instructions.” Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
128 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 1997).
The parties dispute whether Kopec actually preserved his objection to the
district court’s intentionality instruction. Because we find that the instructions
withstand plenary review, we find it unnecessary to decide the issue.
II. DISCUSSION
We must determine whether the jury instructions, read as a whole, stated the
correct legal standard. Id.; Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1293
(3d Cir. 1997). “If looking at the charge as a whole, the instructions were capable
of confusing and thereby misleading the jury, we must reverse.” Mosley v.
3
Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 1996).
A. The Standard for Claims of Excessive Force
“[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force . . . in
the course of an arrest . . . should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its
‘reasonableness’ standard . . . .” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
“[T]he ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the
question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the
facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent
or motivation.”
Id. at 397; Mosley, 102 F.3d at 95.
B. The District Court’s Instructions
In this case, the district court charged the jury with the correct legal
standard. The court stated:
The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene rather than with 20/20 vision of hindsight . . . . This
reasonableness inquiry is an objective one. The question
is whether the officer’s actions are objectively reasonable
in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him
without regard to their underlying intent or motive.
(App. at 143-44.) The district court explicitly instructed the jury to disregard the
underlying intent or motive of Officer Tate. However, appellant Kopec complains
of a previous instruction, which stated:
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Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code
provides that any citizens [sic] may seek redress in this
court by way of damages against any person who, under
color of state law or custom, intentionally deprive [sic]
that citizen of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured or protected by the constitutional laws of the
United States.
(App. at 141) (emphasis added). The district court immediately explained that
instruction in discussing the elements a plaintiff must establish to prove his claim.
The court stated that the plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance of the
evidence, “[f]irst, that the defendant intentionally committed acts which operated to
deprive the plaintiff of the rights secured by the Constitution of the United States.”
(App. at 141) (emphasis added).
Reading the instructions as a whole, we find that they stated the correct legal
standard. The district court properly instructed the jury on the objective
reasonableness standard articulated in Graham. While the district court misstated
the law when it instructed the jury that section 1983 enables citizens to seek redress
against any person who “intentionally deprive[s] that citizen of” his rights,
immediately thereafter, the district court clarified the instruction and stated that the
plaintiff must show that the “defendant intentionally committed acts which
operated to deprive the plaintiff” of his rights. This is merely a recognition that
“Fourth Amendment violations require intentional actions by officers, rather than
5
‘the accidental effects of otherwise lawful government conduct.’” Hudson v. New
York City, 271 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Brower v. County of Inyo,
489
U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989) (Fourth Amendment seizure only occurs “when there is a
governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally
applied.”)).
Because “the jury instructions, as a whole, stated the correct legal standard,”
Ryder, 128 F.3d at 135, and because the instructions as a whole were not “capable
of confusing and thereby misleading the jury,”
Mosley, 102 F.3d at 94, we will
affirm.
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