Filed: Jul. 16, 2007
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 7-16-2007 USA v. Jones Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 05-4288 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007 Recommended Citation "USA v. Jones" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 769. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/769 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States C
Summary: Opinions of the United 2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 7-16-2007 USA v. Jones Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 05-4288 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007 Recommended Citation "USA v. Jones" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 769. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/769 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Co..
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Opinions of the United
2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
7-16-2007
USA v. Jones
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-4288
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007
Recommended Citation
"USA v. Jones" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 769.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/769
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2007 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 05-4288
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
LAWRENCE DENNI JONES, JR.,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 03-cr-00217-8)
District Judge: Honorable Alan N. Bloch
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 15, 2007
Before: FISHER, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed July 16, 2007)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Lawrence Denni Jones appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence for
conspiracy to distribute more than100 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846, and possession with intent to distribute and distribution of 50 kilograms or more
but less than 100 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(c). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and, for reasons that
follow, we will affirm.
I.
We write only for the parties, who are familiar with the background of this case,
and will therefore forgo a lengthy recitation of the facts. The U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) initiated an investigation in the summer of 2003 of a large-scale marijuana
distribution network in Pittsburgh with ties to New York, Mexico and Jamaica. In June
of 2003, agents obtained authorization to place pen register devices on the telephone of
Erik Jackson, alleged to be the driving force behind the conspiracy. Information obtained
from the pen register revealed that defendant Jones placed approximately one-hundred
calls to Jackson’s telephones between June and August of 2003. Jackson, in turn, placed
twenty-five calls to two telephone lines used by Jones in the same time period. In late
June of 2003, the Government’s lead investigator applied for and received permission to
wiretap Jackson’s cellular telephone.
On August 23, 2003, Jones and Jackson had a coded conversation apparently
related to the delivery of 150 pounds of marijuana to a “stash house” in Forest Hills, a
suburb of Pittsburgh. Jackson informed Jones that “a friend . . . might come through
today or tomorrow.” Jones, in turn, told Jackson that “tomorrow would be perfect” and
that he would “take half, like five at least.” Jones also used the words “regs” and “mids”
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during the conversation. A courier for Jackson testified that these were code words for
regular-grade marijuana and mid-grade marijuana, respectively.
Surveillance was established at the stash house and during the surveillance, a van
occupied by three males and a car occupied by a male and a female arrived. The
occupants of both vehicles entered the residence and shortly thereafter exited the house,
entered the van, and drove away. Officers then stopped and seized the individuals who
had made the delivery, arrested the individuals at the residence, and secured the residence
and applied for a search warrant. During the ensuing search, agents discovered three
large bags of marijuana in the garage weighing a total of 150 pounds.
In order to establish that Jones was engaged in the criminal conspiracy alleged and
had possession of marijuana with intent to deliver the same for sale, the Government
called numerous witnesses. These witnesses testified that they knew of, had dealt with,
and had made actual sales or delivery of marijuana for several years prior to the events
which occurred in August 2003. Aside from presenting several character witnesses, Jones
did not present any substantive evidence in his defense. He did, however, assert that the
references he had made to marijuana during his conversations with Jackson related to
ounces as opposed to kilograms of marijuana. The jury’s May 19, 2005 verdict, finding
Jones guilty on two counts, both of which related to at least fifty kilograms of marijuana,
establishes that it did not credit this assertion.
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On September 1, 2005, Jones was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a period
of 121 months, to be followed by a five year term of supervised release. Jones filed a
timely notice of appeal.
II.
Jones presents two arguments on appeal, both of which are unpersuasive. First, he
argues that the verdict in this case was against the sufficiency of the evidence. Second, he
argues that the District Court erred in determining his offense level under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines. Ordinarily, a challenge to the sufficiency of the Government’s
evidence requires us to construe the evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom in the Government’s favor. However, because Jones failed to move for a
timely judgment of acquittal, we review sufficiency of the evidence for plain error.
United States v. Gaydos, 108 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Fed. R. Crim. P.
52(b) (“Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they
were not brought to the attention of the court.”). Under plain error review, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government and sustain a jury’s verdict if “a
reasonable jury believing the government’s evidence could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the government proved all the elements of the offenses.” United States v.
Salmon,
944 F.2d 1106, 1113 (3d Cir. 1991).
Jones’ claim that Government evidence was insufficient to establish that he was a
member of a marijuana distribution conspiracy is meritless. In order to establish a
conspiracy, the Government must prove: “(1) a shared ‘unity of purpose,’ (2) an intent to
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achieve a common goal, and (3) an agreement to work together toward the goal.” United
States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 90-91 (3d Cir. 1988). “This proof incorporates a
demonstration that a defendant has ‘knowledge of the illegal objective contemplated by
the conspiracy.’”
Id. at 91. The Government is not required to prove that the defendant
knew all of the conspiracy’s details, goals or other participants. See United States v.
Theodoropoulos,
866 F.2d 587, 593 (3d Cir. 1989).
The Government presented testimony to establish that, from 1999 through 2003, as
a result of his participation in the marijuana distribution conspiracy, Jones received
approximately twenty to eighty pounds of marijuana per week, which he distributed in the
Pittsburgh area. The Government also presented evidence to establish that Jones
interacted with various members of the conspiracy over those years, including drug
couriers and other intermediaries. Jones’ recorded conversations further established his
knowledge of the conspiracy, its members, an intent to achieve its goals, and an
agreement to work together with other co-conspirators toward the goal. The jury’s
verdict is therefore supported by substantial evidence and we will not reverse it.
Jones next argues that the District Court erred in its calculation of his base offense
level under the advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. We review factual findings relevant
to calculations of the Guidelines for clear error. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570
(3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). A finding of fact will only be clearly erroneous when, although
there may be some evidence to support the finding, “the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
5
Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). Jones challenges the District
Court’s finding that he was responsible for more than 1,000 but less than 3,000 kilograms
of marijuana. This finding was based upon the evidence presented at trial. Specifically,
the District Court credited testimony given by various members of the conspiracy as to
the drug amounts distributed to Jones. The fact that these witnesses were testifying
pursuant to plea agreements and expecting sentence reductions does not undermine the
District Court’s credibility determination. See United States v. Henley,
360 F.3d 509, 516
(6th Cir. 2004) (“Testimonial evidence from a coconspirator may be sufficient to
determine the amount of drugs for which a defendant should be held accountable, even
where the coconspirator has reasons to believe that he may receive a reduced sentence
. . . .”). Under these circumstances, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made and the District Court’s drug quantity determination is
therefore not clearly erroneous.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.
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