Filed: Jul. 11, 2008
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 7-11-2008 Jesensky v. A Best Products Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 06-3102 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 Recommended Citation "Jesensky v. A Best Products" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 854. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/854 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the O
Summary: Opinions of the United 2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 7-11-2008 Jesensky v. A Best Products Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 06-3102 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 Recommended Citation "Jesensky v. A Best Products" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 854. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/854 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Op..
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Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
7-11-2008
Jesensky v. A Best Products
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 06-3102
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008
Recommended Citation
"Jesensky v. A Best Products" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 854.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/854
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-3102
KAREN JESENSKY and ANTHONY JESENSKY her husband,
Appellants
v.
A-BEST PRODUCTS, in its own right and as
successor-in-interest to Asbestos Products Company;
NICHIAS CO.; SAFETY-FIRST INDUSTRIES, INC.
in its own right and as successor-in-interest to Safety First Supply, Inc.;
ALLIED GLOVE CORP.; NORTH AMERICAN REFRACTORIES;
GENERAL REFRACTORIES COMPANY;
DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC. and its division Harbison-Walker Refractories;
CHICAGO FIREBRICK COMPANY; PLIBRICO COMPANY;
*THIEM CORPORATION and its division, Universal Refractories;
OGLEBAY NORTON COMPANY and its division, Ferro Engineering;
FOSECO, INC.; SEEGOTT, INC.; HEDMAN MINES, LTD;
INSUL COMPANY, INC; PITTSBURGH METALS PURIFYING COMPANY;
PETERSON CANVAS PRODUCTS; ANCHOR PACKING; GARLOCK, INC.;
ARGO PACKING COMPANY; DURAMETALLIC CORP.;
DURABLA MANUFACTURING COMPANY in its own right
and as successor to Durabla Canada, Ltd.;
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, INC.;
UNIROYAL, INC. also known as
THE UNIROYAL GOODRICH TIRE COMPANY;
BIGELOW-LIPTAK CORPORATION;
BEAZER EAST, INC. in its own right and as successor to
Koppers Co., Inc., and other related companies including
Thiem Corp., Beazer USA, Inc., and Beazer, PLC;
GRANT WILSON, INC; PITTSBURGH CORNING CORPORATION;
OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS CORPORATION;
THE ROCKWOOL MANFACTURING COMPANY;
ADIENCE, INC. sucessor-in-interest to
Adience Company, LP, as successor to BMI, Inc.;
THE MARMON GROUP, INC. in its own right and successor-in-interest to
the Cerro-Marmon Corp., Cerro Corp., Cerro Wire & Cable Co., Inc.,
The Rockbestos Co. and The Rockbestos Products Corp.;
*GATEWAY INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY; F.B. WRIGHT COMPANY, INC.;
RAPID-AMERICAN CORP. in its own right and as successor-in-interest to
The Philip Carey Manufacturing Company, Philip Carey Corporation, Briggs
Manufacturing Company, Panacon Company and Glen Alden Corporation;
GEORGE V. HAMILTON, INC.; TOWNSEND & BOTTUM, INC.;
AC&S, INC.; SAUER, INC.; HINCHLIFFE & KEENER, INC.;
ROBERTSON CECO CORPORATION,
formerly known as H.H. ROBERTSON COMPANY;
H.B. FULLER COMPANY in its own right
and its division Foster Products Corporation;
ASBESTOSPRAY CORPORATION;
UNITED STATES MINERAL PRODUCTS COMPANY;
W.R. GRACE COMPANY in its own right
and as successor to Zonolite Company;
ATLAS INDUSTRIES, INC.;
EARL B. BEACH COMPANY also known as
THE EARL B. BEACH CO. OF PHILADELPHIA also known as
THE EARL B. BEACH CO. OF PHILADELPHIA, PLC;
FLINTKOTE COMPANY; GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION;
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY and its Wire & Cable Division;
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION;
GREENE TWEED & COMPANY; INGERSOLL-RAND;
M.H. DETRICK COMPANY subsidiary of Detrick Companies, Inc.;
QUAKER STATE CORPORATION; RILEY STOKER CORPORATION;
UNION BOILER COMPANY; FOSTER WHEELER CORPORATION;
SEPCO CORPORATION; McCARLS, INC.;
PENNSYLVANIA ELECRIC COMPANY;
INDUSTRIAL INSULATION SALES, INC.;
CONGOLEUM CORPORATION a subsidiary of American Biltrite, Inc.;
THE CARBORUNDUM COMPANY; DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY;
FAIRMONT SUPPLY COMPANY; RUTLAND FIRE CLAY SUPPLY COMPANY;
COOPER INDUSTRIES, INC. in its own right and as successor-in-interest to
McGraw-Edison, Co., Wagner Electric Corp., Studebaker Worthington, Inc.,
Edison International, Inc., and Tung Sol Electric, Inc.;
PENNSYLVANIA INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES COMPANY;
J.H. FRANCE REFRACTORIES COMPANY
2
*Per Clerk's Order of 1/5/07
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Civil Action No. 96-cv-0680
(Honorable Ila Jeanne Sensenich)
Argued April 17, 2008
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, AMBRO and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed July 11, 2008 )
David B. Rodes, Esquire (Argued)
Jason T. Shipp, Esquire
Goldberg, Persky & White
1030 Fifth Avenue, Third Floor
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219
Attorneys for Appellants
David P. Helwig, Esquire (Argued)
Marks, O'Neill, O'Brien & Courtney
2600 Gulf Tower
707 Grant Street
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219
Attorney for Appellee McCarl’s, Inc.
Cathy R. Gordon, Esquire (Argued)
Swartz Campbell, LLC
4750 U.S. Steel Tower
600 Grant Street
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219
Attorney for Appellee Duquesne Light Company
Mark A. Behrens, Esquire
Shook, Hardy & Bacon
600 14th Street, N.W., Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20005
Attorney for Amici Curiae-Appellee
3
The Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc.,
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America,
National Association of Manufactures,
American Insurance Association,
Property Casualty Insurers Association of America,
American Chemistry Council
OPINION OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
Appellant Karen Jesensky1 asserts claims for injuries allegedly suffered as a result
of exposure to asbestos fibers her father inadvertently carried home from his workplace.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants McCarl’s, Inc. and
Duquesne Light Company. We will affirm.
Eugene Schirra, a union steam fitter and pipe fitter for nearly thirty years, worked
as a contractor at several industrial sites. During that time period, his daughter, Karen
Jesensky, regularly loaned her car to him for a work carpool, picked him up from his bus
stop after work, and washed his work clothes. In late 1994 or early 1995, Jesensky was
diagnosed with mesothelioma, seriously impairing her health.
Jesensky filed claims against sixty-nine defendants in the Pennsylvania Court of
Common Pleas. She alleged her mesothelioma was caused by secondhand exposure to
1
Jesensky’s husband also asserts claims relating to the injuries sustained by Karen
Jesensky.
4
asbestos products present at her father’s workplaces. Most of the defendants were
manufacturers or suppliers of asbestos products.2
Two defendants – McCarl’s and Duquesne Light – were neither manufacturers
nor suppliers of asbestos products. Jesensky’s claims against McCarl’s allegedly arise out
of a four-month period during which McCarl’s employed Schirra at Babcock & Wilcox’s
steel mill in Koppel, Pennsylvania. Jesensky’s claims against Duquesne Light Company
arise out of a four-year period in which Schirra worked at the Shippingport Atomic Power
Station. The Shippingport power plant, which used a nuclear reactor as a source for
generating commercial electricity, was overseen by the Atomic Energy Commission
(“AEC”) in exercise of its authority under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. Duquesne Light Company contracted with the AEC to
participate in the construction and operation of the power plant. Schirra worked at the
Shippingport power plant as an independent contractor of Duquesne Light Company.
Jesensky’s complaint, originally filed in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas,
was removed by Duquesne Light under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. §
2
Jesensky’s claims against most of these defendants were either settled or dismissed in
state court for Jesensky’s failure to proffer evidence showing that her father was in
contact with particular products. See Eckenrod v. GAF Corp., 544 A.2d 50, 52 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988) (to survive a motion for summary judgment in an asbestos case, a
plaintiff must establish that injuries were caused by the product of a particular
manufacturer or supplier and must present evidence to show that he/she inhaled asbestos
fibers shed by the specific product).
5
1442(a)(1).3 In District Court, Duquesne Light moved for summary judgment,
contending that Jesensky’s complaint failed to properly plead a claim, and if a claim had
been properly pleaded, that it owed no duty to Jesensky under Pennsylvania law. The
Magistrate Judge interpreted Jesensky’s complaint as asserting a claim of negligence,
predicated on a premises liability theory, without discussing the sufficiency of the
pleadings. Reaching the merits, the Magistrate Judge recommended granting Duquesne
Light’s motion, finding the company owed Jesensky no duty under Pennsylvania law.
The District Court, adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, granted
summary judgment in favor of Duquesne Light Company without further comment.
McCarl’s also moved for summary judgment in District Court, contending that it
had not been identified as a source of any asbestos exposure that allegedly injured
Jesensky. The Magistrate Judge, finding that Jesensky had not alleged any facts to
support a negligence claim against McCarl’s and indicating that no such claim could be
3
Removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) is proper if the moving party: (1) demonstrates
that it acted under the direction of an officer of the United States; (2) demonstrates a
causal nexus between Plaintiffs’ claims and the acts it performed under color of federal
office; and (3) raises a colorable federal defense. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121,
124-35 (1989). Duquesne Light Company contends removal was proper here because, in
constructing and operating the Shippingport power plant, it: (1) acted under the
supervision and specific direction of Rear Admiral H.G. Rickover, Director of the
Division of Naval Reactors of the AEC and his assigned officers; (2) followed Admiral
Rickover’s express orders in designing, constructing and operating the plant; and (3)
indicated its intent to pursue the “government contractor defense” articulated in Boyle v.
United Techs. Corp.,
487 U.S. 500 (1988). Jesensky contends removal was improper and
seeks remand to state court.
6
found in the pleadings, recommended granting McCarl’s summary judgment motion.4
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of McCarl’s without further
comment.
The District Court was correct to dismiss Jesensky’s claims against McCarl’s
based on the insufficiency of the pleadings, and the same reasoning is dispositive as to the
claims against Duquesne Light. In the briefs, Jesensky characterizes the complaint as
asserting a claim for negligence based on the company’s “failure to warn” of the dangers
of the asbestos products used at its facility. See, e.g., Jesensky Br. at 11 (“Although the
Complaint in the present action is couched in terms principally applicable to product
defendants, the essential claim against Duquesne Light is predicated on its failure to warn
or otherwise protect Mr. Schirra, and thus derivatively Ms. Jesensky, against off-premises
transportation of asbestos fibers.”). At oral argument, Jesensky noted “the essence of our
theory was that it was a negligence premises liability case.”
These state law claims are absent from Jesensky’s complaint. On its face, the
complaint is void of any reference to a premises liability claim or “failure to warn”
theory.5 At oral argument, Jesensky conceded the complaint’s deficiency, stating: “it’s
4
The Magistrate Judge issued a Supplemental Report and Recommendation on the
motion by McCarl’s following Jesensky’s filing of objections to the Magistrate Judge’s
initial Report and Recommendation.
5
The complaint alleges, in part:
[¶] 7. Defendants, at all times relevant and pertinent hereto, were
engaged in the business of mining and/or milling and/or
(continued...)
7
true that that’s not how we pled it; it was an inartful pleading.” Moreover, Jesensky
admitted at oral argument that the complaint “should have been amended . . . .”
Even so, Jesensky has not submitted a proposed amended complaint on this appeal.
And there is no record of her having ever prepared or submitted a proposed amended
complaint in the past. In a lawsuit that now dates back twelve years, we decline to permit
5
(...continued)
manufacturing and/or fabricating and/or supplying and/or
selling asbestos-containing products to which plaintiff was
exposed. Specifically, in the case of defendant Foster
Wheeler Corporation, this includes the utilization of asbestos-
containing products in the construction and/or reconstruction
and/or repair of boilers in powerhouses, industrial facilities
and elsewhere.
...
[¶] 10. Plaintiff’s diseases [sic] as set forth herein with associated
complications was [sic] directly and proximately caused by
the acts of the defendants acting through their agents, servants
and employees and the defendants are liable therefore, jointly
and severally, to the plaintiff for their negligence, breach of
warranty and as a result of the strict duty and liability imposed
under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
[¶] 11. The defendants mined and/or milled and/or manufactured
and/or fabricated and/or supplied and/or sold products which
they knew were defective and/or unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer, such as plaintiff, and acted in such a
manner which was willful, wanton, gross and in total
disregard for the health and safety of the user or consumer,
i.e., plaintiff.
8
amendment of the pleadings where the plaintiff has never moved to amend her complaint
nor offered any explanation for her failure to do so.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Duquesne Light Company and McCarl’s. Accordingly, the
Jesenskys’ claims against both defendants are dismissed without leave to amend.
9
