Filed: Feb. 14, 2008
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 2-14-2008 USA v. Headen Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 06-3965 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 Recommended Citation "USA v. Headen" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1600. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1600 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United Stat
Summary: Opinions of the United 2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 2-14-2008 USA v. Headen Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 06-3965 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 Recommended Citation "USA v. Headen" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1600. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1600 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United State..
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Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
2-14-2008
USA v. Headen
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 06-3965
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008
Recommended Citation
"USA v. Headen" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1600.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1600
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 06-3965
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ALLEN HEADEN,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 06-cr-00036-1)
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 10, 2008
Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: February 14, 2008)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
On May 9, 2006, Defendant Allen Headen entered a conditional guilty plea to one
count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). In accordance with the terms of his plea, Headen now appeals the District
Court’s conviction and sentence. Headen challenges the District Court’s denial of his
motion to suppress the introduction of the firearm that was seized from him during a frisk
on December 3, 2005. In light of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the
police officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct the frisk. We will, therefore, affirm
the judgment of the District Court.
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
Prior to December 3, 2005, Special Agent Robert Wescoe, a 15-year veteran of the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and Detective Robert McDermott,
a 10-year veteran of the Southwest Detective Division of the Philadelphia Police
Department, had been investigating a year-long series of shootings and other violent
crimes in Southwest and West Philadelphia. On December 2, 2005, at around 6:30 p.m.,
Special Agent Wescoe, in the presence of Detective McDermott, received a telephone call
from a confidential informant who had previously provided reliable information to
Wescoe and McDermott on shootings in the area. On this occasion, the informant told
Wescoe that Headen and a fellow gang member, Dorian Thompson, were planning a
retaliatory shooting against an opposing gang member who had been shooting at Headen
and Headen’s friends.
2
During the initial phone call, the informant told Wescoe that Headen and
Thompson were in a blue minivan in the area, were armed, and were “looking for another
guy to shoot at.” Later that evening, between 7:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m., Wescoe again
spoke to the informant, who told Wescoe to check the area of 47 th and Parrish Streets.
Between 9:00 p.m. and 9:30 p.m., Wescoe and McDermott found the blue minivan,
unattended, in the area described by the informant. After he found the van, Wescoe spoke
to the informant, who told the officers to wait as Headen would be returning to the
minivan.
While waiting for Headen to return to the minivan, Wescoe and McDermott
noticed that the minivan had an expired registration sticker. Upon checking the
registration with the Pennsylvania Bureau of Motor Vehicles, they learned that the
minivan was registered to Rodney Smith and that the registration was expired. Wescoe
again contacted the informant and learned that Smith was an acquaintance of Thompson.
At approximately midnight, McDermott saw Headen, with whom McDermott was
familiar prior to this incident, get into the front passenger seat of the minivan and saw
another male, later identified as Thompson, get into the driver’s seat. Wescoe and
McDermott, each in separate vehicles, followed the minivan as it drove away and each
noticed that a right rear light on the minivan was not working. Philadelphia police
officers, who had been summoned as a backup team, also noticed that the right rear light
was not functioning and that the registration was expired.
3
After noticing these motor vehicle code violations, the officers attempted to stop
the minivan. Despite Thompson’s attempt to evade the officers, McDermott was able to
block the minivan from leaving the area. Police removed Thompson from the van,
frisked him, and found that he was wearing a ballistic vest. At the same time, Wescoe
opened the passenger door and conducted a quick frisk of Headen’s waist area. During
that frisk, Wescoe felt a large, thick, L-shaped object in the right pocket of Headen’s coat.
Because of the feel of the object, along with the informant’s tips, Wescoe suspected that
the object was a handgun. Consequently, Wescoe ordered Headen out of the minivan and
searched Headen’s pockets wherein he found a fully loaded handgun, with one round in
the chamber, as well as an additional magazine for the gun. The officers issued traffic
violations for the expired registration and the malfunctioning tail light and arrested
Headen and Thompson.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
the District Court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying
facts, and exercise plenary review of the District Court’s application of the law to those
facts. United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002). In the Fourth
Amendment context, a defendant who challenges a search or seizure typically bears the
burden of proving that it was illegal. However, the government bears the burden of
4
proving that a search was reasonable where, as here, that search was conducted absent a
warrant. United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995).
The issue on appeal is whether the officers seized the firearm from Headen
pursuant to a valid stop and frisk. Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and
subsequent cases, “‘an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a
brief, investigatory stop when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot.’” United States v. Valentine,
232 F.3d 350, 353 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)). An officer may also conduct a
limited search for weapons when he reasonably believes that the subject of an
investigatory stop is armed and dangerous.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
Reasonable suspicion is “‘a less demanding standard than probable cause and
requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.’” Valentine,
232 F.3d at 353 (quoting
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123). In determining whether the officers
had reasonable suspicion, “we must consider ‘the totality of the circumstances-the whole
picture.’” United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (quoting United States v.
Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). Moreover, we have recognized “that a reasonable
suspicion may be the result of any combination of one or several factors: specialized
knowledge and investigative inferences
[Cortez, 449 U.S. at 419], personal observation of
suspicious behavior
[Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, and] information from sources that have
proven to be reliable.” United States v. Nelson,
284 F.3d 472, 478 (3d Cir. 2002).
5
In order for an informant’s tip to be the basis for reasonable suspicion, however,
that tip must be reliable both in its assertion of illegality and in its tendency to identify a
determinate person. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000). Nevertheless,
predictive information “can reflect particularized knowledge,”
Nelson, 284 F.3d at 484,
and it provides police the “means to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility.”
J.L.,
529 U.S. at 271. However, the reliability of the informant must also be taken into
consideration when determining whether reasonable suspicion existed. See
Valentine,
232 F.3d at 354.
III.
The District Court properly held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop
the minivan with Headen and Thompson inside.1 The District Court also correctly held
that under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion to frisk
Headen. Because of their participation in the Violent Crime Impact team in the
neighborhood in which the stop occurred, Wescoe and McDermott both had specialized
knowledge of the geographic area, the criminal activity in that area, and the individuals
involved in that criminal activity. Despite Headen’s argument that the District Court
erred in finding that Headen had been involved in gang activity, Wescoe and McDermott
had previously investigated shootings in the area involving Headen and Mark Lawrence
1
We apply the Supreme Court’s “bright line rule that any technical violation of the
traffic code legitimizes a stop, even if the stop is merely a pretext for an investigation of
some other crime.” See United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2006).
6
and the families and acquaintances of each. Furthermore, the officers were aware of
Headen’s involvement in violent activity.
In addition to the officers’ specialized knowledge, we must also take into
consideration the reliability of the confidential informant’s tip. While Headen argues that
the informant’s tips were general in nature and not corroborated, the informant, who had
given the officers trustworthy information in the past, provided Wescoe with accurate and
detailed information. For example, the informant specifically named Headen and
Thompson and recounted that they were armed, in a blue minivan and were seeking to
carry out a retaliatory shooting against Lawrence. These facts enhance the credibility of
the informant. Moreover, the informant continued to provide Wescoe reliable and
predictive information throughout the evening including the area in which the blue
minivan was located, and later found, and the fact that Headen would be returning to the
minivan. The informant also provided corroborating information about Rodney Smith, to
whom the minivan was registered.
The evasive actions by the minivan’s driver also added to the basis for the
reasonable suspicion that justified frisking Headen. The officers’ personal observations
of these evasive actions, combined with their experience in that specific high crime area,
along with the fact that they possessed specific information that Headen might be armed,
all suggest that the frisk was warranted based on the totality of the circumstances.
7
Accordingly, the officers’ suspicion that Headen was armed and dangerous was
reasonable, and a protective frisk was justified. Consequently, the District Court properly
denied Headen’s motion to suppress the firearm seized from him during the search. We
will therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court.
8
