Filed: Aug. 27, 2008
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 8-27-2008 Kant v. Seton Hall Univ Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 08-1101 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 Recommended Citation "Kant v. Seton Hall Univ" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 619. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/619 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions
Summary: Opinions of the United 2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 8-27-2008 Kant v. Seton Hall Univ Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 08-1101 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 Recommended Citation "Kant v. Seton Hall Univ" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 619. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/619 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions o..
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Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
8-27-2008
Kant v. Seton Hall Univ
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 08-1101
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008
Recommended Citation
"Kant v. Seton Hall Univ" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 619.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/619
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-1101
___________
CHANDER KANT,
Appellant
v.
SETON HALL UNIVERSITY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 03-CV-06135)
District Judge: Honorable William H. Walls
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 26, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
Opinion filed: August 27, 2008
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Chander Kant, a male of Indian origin, brought a suit against Seton Hall University
alleging employment discrimination on the basis of race and national origin in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), and the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq. (“NJLAD”). He also claimed
the University retaliated against him for filing a charge of discrimination and a previous
lawsuit against the University, and he asserted claims for breach of his employment
contract. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted Seton
Hall’s motion for summary judgment on all counts but the one claiming a breach of the
employment contract.1 Kant now appeals the decision. For the following reasons, we
will affirm the judgment of the District Court.2
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Kant has been employed in the Department of Economics at Seton Hall
University’s W. Paul Stillman School of Business since 1989. Kant filed charges of
national origin discrimination and retaliation against the University with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging that the University
discriminated against him when it denied him promotion to full professor during the
1998-99 academic year. Kant filed a lawsuit against the University based on those
1
That count was dismissed without prejudice to Kant raising the employment contract
claims in state court within 30 days of the dismissal. Kant has not appealed this aspect of
the ruling.
2
We read the District Court opinion as implicitly denying Kant’s motion for summary
judgment, and we construe his notice of appeal to challenge this aspect of the decision as
well. We find that the District Court properly granted Seton Hall’s summary judgment
motion, as explained below, and therefore find that the District Court also properly denied
summary judgment to Kant.
2
charges on October 23, 2000 .3 While that suit was pending, Kant filed new charges of
national origin discrimination and retaliation with the EEOC. After receiving a Right to
Sue letter, he filed the current suit, based on a number of incidents occurring between
January 2001 and June 2004. Kant alleges that during this period, the University denied
his requests for fringe benefits, his requests for partial pay while on leaves of absence, his
request for a sabbatical, his request for an unpaid leave of absence, denied him
opportunities to present papers at professional conferences, and denied his requests for
reimbursements of travel expenses. Kant apparently alleges that at least some of the
incidents were discriminatory in their own right, and that the incidents all occurred in
retaliation for the first lawsuit.4
II. Analysis
We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment. McGreevey v.
Stoup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate when the
“pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
3
Kant prevailed after a jury trial on his retaliation claim in that suit. Both parties
appealed, but this Court affirmed the District Court in all respects. Kant v. Seton Hall
University, Nos. 06-4448 and 06-4464, slip op. (3d Cir. May 29, 2008).
4
Kant has not disputed the District Court’s finding that, although it is not entirely
clear, some of Kant’s claims appear to have been pled to support allegations of both
discrimination and retaliation, while others appeared to only support an allegation of
retaliation. Dist. Ct. Op. at 6.
3
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A court reviewing a summary
judgment motion must evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Brewer v. Quaker State Oil
Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1995). However, a party opposing summary
judgment “must present more than just ‘bare assertions, conclusory allegations or
suspicions’ to show the existence of a genuine issue.” Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
409
F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 325
(1986)).
As Kant did not submit direct evidence of discriminatory behavior, the District
Court appropriately analyzed his Section 1981, Title VII and NJLAD discrimination
claims under the familiar burden-shifting framework established by McDonnell Douglas
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See also Jones v. School Dist. of Philadelphia,
198 F.3d
403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to § 1981 claim);
Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance,
130 F.3d 1101, 1114 n.5 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(applying McDonnell Douglas framework to claim brought under NJLAD). Under that
framework, a plaintiff challenging an adverse employment decision has the initial burden
of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at
802. To set forth a prima facie case of disparate treatment a plaintiff must show that he or
she: 1) belongs to a protected class; 2) was qualified for the employment benefit he
sought, and that 3) nonmembers of the protected class were treated more favorably. See
4
Id.; see also Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 318 (3d Cir. 2000);
see also Williams v. Pemberton Twp. Public Schools,
733 A.2d 571, 575-76 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1999). The burden then shifts to the employer to proffer a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the decision. See
Keller, 130 F.3d at 1108. Once that
burden is met, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
nondiscriminatory reasons articulated by the employer are pretextual. See
Jones, 198
F.3d at 410. To defeat summary judgment, “the plaintiff must point to some evidence,
direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the
employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory
reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s
action.” Fuentes v. Perskie,
32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). More particularly, the
plaintiff must demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its
action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence’ and
hence infer ‘that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.’”
Id. at 765 citing Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen,
983 F.2d 531, 533 (3d Cir.
1992).
We conclude that the District Court’s analysis and entry of summary judgment on
the discrimination claims are fully supported by the record. The District Court thoroughly
examined each claim, and we agree that even assuming that Kant met his prima facie case
5
of showing discrimination against him on account of his race or nationality, in each case,
Seton Hall established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the alleged adverse
actions. See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763 (noting that the employer’s burden to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is “relatively light”). We further agree that Kant did
not meet his burden of showing that these reasons were unworthy of credence. Although
Kant disagreed with the University’s decisions, he did not demonstrate that the reasons
for those decisions were invidious.5
To advance a prima facie case of retaliation under section 1981, Title VII, or the
NJLAD, a plaintiff needs to show that: 1) he engaged in a protected employee activity; 2)
the employer took an adverse employment action after or contemporaneous with the
protected activity; and 3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the
employer’s adverse action. See Abramson v. William Paterson College of New Jersey,
260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 2001). We agree with the District Court that with some of
Kant’s retaliation claims, the action alleged to have been taken by the employer was not a
materially adverse employment action.6 We further agree that Kant’s remaining
5
Kant has not challenged the District Court’s holding that some of his Title VII and
NJLAD claims are time-barred because the incidents occurred more than 300 days before
the filing of his EEOC charge.
6
For example, Kant alleges that the University unreasonably issued him a letter
finding that he had falsified his credentials and warning him that if such an infraction
occurred again, he could face disciplinary action, up to and including dismissal. As the
District Court noted, the letter was simply a warning and no adverse action was taken
against Kant.
6
retaliation claims fail because he did not establish a causal link between his protected
activity and the University’s actions.
After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the District Court
properly determined that Kant did not demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact with regard to his discrimination and retaliation claims. Accordingly, we
will affirm the judgment of the District Court.7
7
Kant’s motion for Leave to File a Reply Supplementary Appendix is granted. The
University’s motion for oral argument is denied as moot.
7
