Filed: Jun. 17, 2010
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 09-1221 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JONATHON LEE CABALLERO, Appellant _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal No. 1-08-cr-00073-005) District Judge: The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo _ Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) May 20, 2010 BEFORE: FUENTES, HARDIMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. (Filed: June 17, 2010) _ OPINION OF THE COURT _ NYGAARD, Circuit
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 09-1221 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JONATHON LEE CABALLERO, Appellant _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal No. 1-08-cr-00073-005) District Judge: The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo _ Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) May 20, 2010 BEFORE: FUENTES, HARDIMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. (Filed: June 17, 2010) _ OPINION OF THE COURT _ NYGAARD, Circuit J..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-1221
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JONATHON LEE CABALLERO,
Appellant
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-08-cr-00073-005)
District Judge: The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 20, 2010
BEFORE: FUENTES, HARDIMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 17, 2010)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Jonathon Caballero appeals the District Court’s judgment of conviction and
sentence. Counsel for Caballero has filed a brief, pursuant to Anders v. State of
California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), claiming that this appeal presents no non-frivolous
issues, and seeking permission to withdraw as counsel in this case. Caballero also
submitted a pro se letter brief. For the reasons that follow we will affirm the District
Court’s judgment of conviction and sentence, and we will grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw.
On September 2, 2008, Caballero pleaded guilty to attempted robbery, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and to possessing, brandishing, and discharging a firearm during
a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). The District Court
sentenced Caballero to a total of 177 months of imprisonment: 57 months for the
attempted robbery charge, and a consecutive term of 120 months for the firearm charge.
Finally, the District Court fined Caballero $1,500 and assessed him $200.
Our examination of an Anders brief focuses upon whether counsel has both
thoroughly scrutinized the record for issues that could be appealed, and properly
explained why all such issues are wholly frivolous. We also review the record ourselves
to make an independent evaluation. United States v. Youla,
241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir.
2001).
On appeal, counsel notes that Caballero challenges the reasonableness of his
sentence. Yet, as counsel states, the record makes clear that the District Court considered
the plea agreement, the presentence report, and the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a). Pursuant to the joint stipulation of the parties, the District Court did not apply a
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five-level weapon enhancement, resulting in a total offense level of nineteen rather than
twenty-four. This was done to avoid a sentencing disparity among the defendants, which
was an unintended result of Caballero’s plea to attempted robbery. Moreover, the District
Court varied from the guidelines due to Caballero’s cooperation and his acceptance of
responsibility for the crime. The District Court sentenced him to 57 months, the low end
of the guideline range after the variance, for the attempted robbery charge and 120
months, the mandatory minimum, for the firearm violation. We conclude that the District
Court properly calculated the sentences. Finally, the District Court ordered Caballero to
pay $1,700, which included a $1,500 fine that was below the guideline range. From this
record, we agree with counsel that the District Court was reasonable.
Counsel next addressed Caballero’s contention that, by sending him back to state
prison to complete previous sentences, the federal prison relinquished jurisdiction over
him. Caballero does not challenge the judgment or sentence against him here, but rather
asserts improper administration of the sentence. As a result, we agree with Caballero’s
counsel that the issue is improperly raised in this direct appeal.
Finally, after counsel filed the Anders brief, Caballero filed a pro se letter brief.
Caballero appears to take issue with the 120-month sentence because he did not discharge
the firearm during the crime. Rather, it was an accomplice who shot the gun. While this
issue is essentially a reiteration of Caballero’s fairness arguments already articulated by
counsel, out of an abundance of caution we review it separately.
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The record shows that the District Court explained, and Caballero acknowledged,
his criminal liability for the discharge of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence,
even though an accomplice shot the gun. Moreover, Caballero admitted to carrying a
firearm, and did not object to the prosecutor’s recitation of facts, which included a
statement that Caballero pointed a gun to the head of a bank teller and demanded money.
Finally, the District Court plainly stated to Caballero, more than once, that his plea of
guilty to discharging a firearm during a crime of violence carried a mandatory term of no
less than ten years of imprisonment. To the extent that Caballero is asserting that the 120-
month sentence is unreasonable, or that he was unaware of the consequences of his plea,
we conclude in light of the record that such claims are completely unsupported.
After our review of counsel’s brief, Caballero’s pro se brief, and our independent
examination of the entire record we conclude that there are no non-frivolous appealable
issues in this case. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of
conviction and sentence and, in a separate order, grant counsel's motion to withdraw.
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