Filed: Jul. 28, 2010
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 09-1983 _ JENNIFER STASUL, as Administratrix of the Estate of Carlos Vladimir Rodriguez, deceased; R. C. S., an infant by his mother and natural guardian, JENNIFER STASUL, Appellants v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY; NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; MACK TRUCKS, INC. _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. No. 2-06-cv-05781) District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton _ Submit
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 09-1983 _ JENNIFER STASUL, as Administratrix of the Estate of Carlos Vladimir Rodriguez, deceased; R. C. S., an infant by his mother and natural guardian, JENNIFER STASUL, Appellants v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY; NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; MACK TRUCKS, INC. _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. No. 2-06-cv-05781) District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton _ Submitt..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 09-1983
____________
JENNIFER STASUL, as Administratrix
of the Estate of Carlos Vladimir Rodriguez, deceased;
R. C. S., an infant by his mother
and natural guardian, JENNIFER STASUL,
Appellants
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY;
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION;
MACK TRUCKS, INC.
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2-06-cv-05781)
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 15, 2010
Before: FISHER and COWEN, Circuit Judges, and DITTER,* District Judge.
(Filed: July 28, 2010)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
*
Honorable J. William Ditter, Jr., Senior United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Jennifer Stasul, as administratrix of the estate of Carlos Vladimir Rodriguez and
natural guardian of R.C.S., an infant, appeals the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment on her various claims against the State of New Jersey and the New Jersey
Department of Transportation under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (“NJTCA”). The
District Court found as a matter of law that the NJTCA confers immunity from liability
on the State defendants. We will affirm.
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
On the night of December 2, 2004, Carlos Vladimir Rodriguez, a professional
trucker, was operating a trucking rig on Interstate 95, near Fort Lee, New Jersey. While
exiting Interstate 95 onto New Jersey State Route 4, Mr. Rodriguez’s truck rolled over
and his head struck the base of a damaged light pole. He was fatally wounded.
Mr. Rodriguez is survived by one son. The child’s mother, Jennifer Stasul
(“Stasul”), as natural guardian and administratrix of the estate, brought suit in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey for wrongful death against the State of
New Jersey and the New Jersey Department of Transportation (collectively “the State”),
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and Mack Trucks, Inc. The Complaint alleged, as to the State defendants, that the State
had failed to post appropriate speed limits on the highway exit, that the statutory default
speed limit was too fast, that the State had failed to post emergency warning signs to warn
of a dangerous road condition, and that a road resurfacing project in 1999 and 2000 had
caused a dangerous condition on the road. The State moved for summary judgment.
The District Court granted summary judgment for the State on all claims, holding
that various immunity provisions of the NJTCA insulated the State from all liability. The
District Court held that, under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:4-5, the State is not liable “for an
injury caused by the failure to provide ordinary traffic signals, signs, markings or other
similar devices,” disposing of any claim based on the alleged failure to provide
emergency signs and the failure to post a speed limit sign. (Dist. Ct. Slip Op. 7-8.) The
Court further held that, under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:2-3(b), the State is “immune from any
suit based on either enactment of [a] speed-limit statute or [a] speed limit regulation,”
disposing of Stasul’s claim that the statutory default speed limit was too fast. (Id. at 8-9.)
Next, the Court reasoned that the liability created in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:4-2 for
“dangerous conditions” was precluded by the aforementioned immunities “regardless of
whether a dangerous condition existed on the Route 4 Westbound ramp at the time of the
Decedent’s accident.” (Id. at 11.) Finally, the Court concluded that, to the extent Stasul’s
dangerous condition claim alleged an omission other than the failure to post signs or enact
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a lower speed limit, “[t]he vague allegations that Defendants are potentially liable for not
doing more cannot defeat summary judgment.” (Id. at 11-12.)
Stasul filed this timely appeal, limited to the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment on her dangerous condition claim.
II.
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Union Pac. R.R.
v. Greentree Transp. Trucking Co., 293 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2002). “Summary
judgment is appropriate when ‘there is no genuine issue of material fact and . . . the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)). On motion for summary judgment, a court “must view the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in that
party’s favor.” N.J. Transit Corp. v. Harsco Corp.,
497 F.3d 323, 326 (3d Cir. 2007).
III.
Section 59:4-2 of the NJTCA establishes state liability for dangerous conditions
that exist on public property. See Manna v. State, 609 A.2d 757, 760 (N.J. 1992). The
statute defines a “dangerous condition” as “a condition of property that creates a
substantial risk of injury when such property is used with due care in a manner in which it
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is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:4-1(a). A public
entity will be liable for a dangerous condition on its property
if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous condition at
the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the
dangerous condition, [and] that the dangerous condition created a
reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred . . .
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:4-2. The plaintiff must also establish that an agent of the State
created the dangerous condition or that the State had actual or constructive knowledge of
the condition and time to take measures to protect against the condition. Id.
As the District Court correctly noted, “any immunity provision in the act or by
common law will prevail over the liability sections.” Pico v. New Jersey,
560 A.2d 1193,
1197 (N.J. 1989). Thus, a court’s first inquiry is “whether a specific provision affords
immunity to the public entity for the tortious act or omission.” (Dist. Ct. Slip Op. at 6.)
The District Court reasoned that, because Stasul’s dangerous condition claim necessarily
alleged a failure of the State to enact a speed limit and post signs, the statutory immunities
for those liabilities precluded suit under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:4-2. We agree.
Stasul alleges that the interstate exit ramp was in a dangerous condition at the time
of Mr. Rodriguez’s accident. In Plaintiff’s Supplemental Statement of Facts, Stasul
alleged that a “maintenance resurfacing project” took place on the exit ramp in 1999 and
2000, during which two inches of asphalt were removed and replaced. (App. 55a.)
Carlos Ulloa, Principal Transportation Engineer with the New Jersey Department of
Transportation, was involved in that resurfacing project and testified that the resurfacing
5
was a significant change to the roadway and that it may have resulted in cars traveling
faster on the exit ramp. (App. 353a, 358a.) Stasul’s expert report indicated that the
resurfacing was conducted in the area of the accident. (App. 42a-26.)
Even if we assume arguendo that this evidence demonstrates that the maintenance
project resulted in a faster exit ramp, Stasul’s claim still does not survive. Stasul
repeatedly argues that the State should have rectified this condition by posting speed limit
signs. In other words, Stasul alleges it is the driver’s lack of knowledge of the
appropriate speed limit, and not the condition of the road itself, that is dangerous. (See
App. 68a (Stasul arguing that the road was in a dangerous condition because it “is
important for the driver to know [the speed] before he begins to travel on the road.
Otherwise, he has no way of knowing what the safe speed is for the roadway”).) This
places Stasul’s dangerous condition claim squarely within the immunities of N.J. Stat.
Ann. §§ 59:2-3(b) and 59:4-5.
Stasul argues that she falls within the reasoning in Daniel v. State, 571 A.2d 1329
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), where the court held that the State could be liable for
injuries resulting from a road maintenance project that created a dangerous condition. In
Daniels, the plaintiff brought a claim against the State of New Jersey for wrongful death
resulting from an automobile accident after a car hit a road median and catapulted into
oncoming traffic.
Id. at 1332-33. The plaintiff alleged that the accident was caused by
maintenance work on the median which had the effect of reducing the curb height of the
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median from its original eight inches to two inches. Id. at 1332. The State asserted its
immunity under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:4-6, which immunizes the State for “improvements”
to public property pursuant to a “plan” or “design.” The court rejected the State’s
argument that road maintenance was an “improvement” within the statutory meaning and
held that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:4-6 “does not immunize a governmental body from
responsibility for dangerous conditions created by its careless or negligent affirmative
acts arising out of its maintenance as distinguished from improvements to its
property.”
571 A.2d at 1346.
Daniels, however, stands for the limited proposition that immunity under N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 59:4-6 for “improvements” does not immunize the State from negligent road
maintenance claims. Daniels does not preclude application of the myriad other statutory
immunities if a specific claim alleges a State act or omission that falls within those
immunities. Here, Stasul’s dangerous condition claim is inextricably linked to her claims
that the State failed to post speed limit or emergency signs and failed to enact a lower
default speed limit. (See App. 69a (Stasul alleging the road was in a dangerous condition
because the State “fail[ed] to post this speed for the roadway”).) The record is devoid of
any evidence, or even an allegation, that a faster exit ramp is itself a dangerous
condition.1
1
For this reason, we alternatively hold that the dangerous condition claim cannot
survive summary judgment because Stasul has not demonstrated that a dispute of material
fact exists as to whether a faster ramp is a dangerous condition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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Because any claim premised on the State’s alleged failure to post signs or enact a
lower default speed limit are clearly immunized under N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 59:2-3(b) and
59:4-5, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment on immunity
grounds.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.
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