Filed: Aug. 02, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 08-3949 _ CHARLES J. GUARNIERI, JR., v. DURYEA BOROUGH; DURYEA BOROUGH COUNCIL; ANN DOMMES, Individually and in her Official Capacity as Council President; LOIS MORREALE, Individually and in her Official Capacity as Borough Secretary; FRANK GROBLEWSKI, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Councilman; EDWARD ORKWIS, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Councilman; ROBERT WEBB, Individually and in his Offic
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 08-3949 _ CHARLES J. GUARNIERI, JR., v. DURYEA BOROUGH; DURYEA BOROUGH COUNCIL; ANN DOMMES, Individually and in her Official Capacity as Council President; LOIS MORREALE, Individually and in her Official Capacity as Borough Secretary; FRANK GROBLEWSKI, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Councilman; EDWARD ORKWIS, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Councilman; ROBERT WEBB, Individually and in his Offici..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 08-3949
_____________
CHARLES J. GUARNIERI, JR.,
v.
DURYEA BOROUGH; DURYEA BOROUGH COUNCIL;
ANN DOMMES, Individually and in her Official Capacity as
Council President; LOIS MORREALE, Individually and in her
Official Capacity as Borough Secretary; FRANK GROBLEWSKI,
Individually and in his Official Capacity as Councilman;
EDWARD ORKWIS, Individually and in his Official Capacity as
Councilman; ROBERT WEBB, Individually and in his Official Capacity
as Councilman; AUDREY YAGER, Individually and in her Official
Capacity as Councilwoman; JOAN ORLOSKI, Individually and in her
Official Capacity as Councilwoman; AKULONIS, Individually
and in his Official Capacity as Councilman,
Appellants
_____________
No. 08-4428
_____________
CHARLES J. GUARNIERI, JR.,
Appellant
v.
DURYEA BOROUGH; DURYEA BOROUGH COUNCIL;
ANN DOMMES, Individually and in her Official Capacity
as Council President; LOIS MORREALE, Individually and
in her Official Capacity as Borough Secretary;
FRANK GROBLEWSKI, Individually and in his Official
Capacity as Councilman; EDWARD ORKWIS, Individually
and in his Official Capacity as Councilman; ROBERT WEBB,
Individually and in his Official Capacity as Councilman;
AUDREY YAGER, Individually and in her Official Capacity
as Councilwoman; JOAN ORLOSKI, Individually and in her
Official Capacity as Councilwoman; AKULONIS, Individually
and in his Official Capacity as Councilman
_______
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 3-05-cv-01422)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
_______
Argued October 27, 2009
Not Precedential Opinion filed February 4, 2010
Certiorari granted June 20, 2011
On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES and HARDIMAN Circuit Judges.
___________
Cynthia L. Pollick (Argued)
The Employment Law Firm
Pittston, PA 18640
Attorney for Appellant in No. 08-4428
Appellee in No. 08-3949
Karoline Mehalchick (Argued)
Joseph A. O‟Brien
Oliver, Price & Rhodes
Clarks Summit, PA l8411
Jennifer Walsh
Ufberg & Associates
2
Scranton, PA l8503
Attorneys for Appellees in No. 08-4428
Appellants in No. 08-3949
(Filed : August 2, 2011)
______
OPINION
_____
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
The Supreme Court has vacated our opinion and judgment in this matter and
remanded to this court. See Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488
(2011), reversing Guarnieri v. Duryea Borough, 364 F. App‟x 749 (3d Cir. 2010).
Charles Guarnieri filed a grievance challenging his termination as Chief of Police
of the Borough of Duryea (“Borough”). The matter proceeded to arbitration pursuant to
the police union‟s collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator found, inter alia, that
Guarnieri engaged in misconduct, but ordered his reinstatement after disciplinary
suspension. Thereafter, the Borough Council issued eleven directives instructing
Guarnieri in the performance of his duties, but he challenged those directives in a second
union grievance and filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming the directives
were in retaliation for prior activity that he claimed was protected under the Petition
Clause of the United States Constitution. Following a jury trial, the jury awarded
Guarnieri compensatory and punitive damages which the District Court sustained. The
3
Borough appealed to this court, arguing that Guarnieri‟s actions were not protected under
the Petition Clause.
Bound by its prior published opinions,1 this court rejected the Borough‟s position,
which was contrary to our precedent holding that “a public employee who has petitioned
the government through a formal mechanism such as the filing of a lawsuit or grievance
is protected under the Petition Clause from retaliation for that activity, even if the petition
concerns a matter of solely private concern.” Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 236
(3d Cir. 2007) (citing San Filippo v. Bongiovanni,
30 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 1994)). That
holding has now been definitively rejected by the Supreme Court in this case where it
held that a government employee‟s claim under the Petition Clause is subject to the
public concern test applicable to a government employee who files a Free Speech Clause
claim.
Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2501 (citing Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138 (1983)).
On receipt of the Supreme Court‟s opinion, we asked the parties to file
simultaneous memoranda regarding the effect of the Supreme Court‟s decision on the
remaining issues in this case. Both parties urge this court to determine whether
Guarnieri‟s Petition Clause claims relate to a matter of public concern. In the alternative,
1
See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1:
It is the tradition of this court that the holding of a panel in a
precedential opinion is binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no
subsequent panel overrules the holding in a precedential
opinion of a previous panel. Court en banc consideration is
required to do so.
4
the Borough asks this court to vacate the judgment of the District Court and to remand
this matter to the District Court for its reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court‟s
decision.
As the Supreme Court stated, and the parties agree, whether something is a matter
of public concern is a question of law for the court. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7. In
its supplemental memorandum the Borough notes the language in the Supreme Court‟s
Guarnieri opinion where the Court stated that a “petition that involves nothing more than
a complaint about a change in the employee‟s own duties does not relate to a matter of
public concern.”
Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2501 (quotations omitted). Guarnieri responds
that his dismissal was a matter of great actual concern to the residents of Duryea, and he
refers to newspaper reports of the dispute. The Supreme Court stated that “whether an
employee‟s petition relates to a matter of public concern will depend on „the content,
form, and context of [the petition], as revealed by the whole record.‟”
Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 n.7). We are not prepared to hold on this
meager record that the dismissal of a police chief in a small town can never be a matter of
public concern in that community.2 It might be, for example, if the Chief were dismissed
because he disfavored one race over another, or because he overlooked actions of a
sexual predator. We do not suggest that there is any such issue lurking in this matter, but
2
Guarnieri has filed a motion to expand record and file supplemental
appendix. Counsel is aware that this court is not the forum to decide questions of
fact in the first instance. On remand, the parties may raise that issue with the
District Court. We express no view on that motion.
5
merely note that not all dismissals of government employees would necessarily fall on
one side or another of the rule. As the Supreme Court itself recognized, it would depend
on the circumstances.
This is a matter more appropriately to be decided by the District Court. We will
therefore allow the District Court the opportunity to consider the issue in the first
instance.
Accordingly, we will vacate the order of the District Court and remand for
consideration in light of the Supreme Court‟s opinion.
6
