Filed: Jan. 21, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 10-2261 _ SAMIR M. MOUSSA, Appellant v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE; STACY GEYER, an agent and employee of the PA Department of Public Welfare _ APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA (D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-00009) District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin _ Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) January 11, 2011 _ Before: SCIRICA, BARRY and VANASKIE, Circu
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 10-2261 _ SAMIR M. MOUSSA, Appellant v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE; STACY GEYER, an agent and employee of the PA Department of Public Welfare _ APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA (D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-00009) District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin _ Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) January 11, 2011 _ Before: SCIRICA, BARRY and VANASKIE, Circui..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 10-2261
____________
SAMIR M. MOUSSA,
Appellant
v.
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE;
STACY GEYER, an agent and employee of the
PA Department of Public Welfare
____________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-00009)
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 11, 2011
____________
Before: SCIRICA, BARRY and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: January 21, 2011)
____________
OPINION
____________
BARRY, Circuit Judge
Samir Moussa was terminated as a staff physician at the Polk Center, a medical
facility operated by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (“DPW”), after an
investigation revealed his repeated sexual harassment of female co-workers. Moussa
brought suit in the District Court, alleging that his termination resulted from
discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and sex, and that it was in retaliation
for an earlier lawsuit. The Court granted Defendants’ summary judgment motions in a
thorough opinion. We will affirm for substantially the reasons articulated by the Court.
I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and we
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, viewing the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion. Pa. Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995). A
district court’s grant of summary judgment is proper only if “the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
II. Background
Because we write primarily for the parties, we recite only those facts essential to
our disposition of this appeal. Moussa, who is of Egyptian origin, began employment at
the Polk Center on February 10, 1986. In 1999, his employment was terminated based on
allegations that he had been suturing patients without anesthesia. After the charges were
dismissed and he was reinstated, he brought a lawsuit alleging race and national-origin
discrimination and received a settlement following a favorable jury verdict.
2
Years later, on August 4, 2005, a physical therapist named Colleen Dahl filed an
Equal Employment Opportunity Discrimination Complaint alleging that Moussa had tried
to kiss her both (1) earlier that day, and (2) shortly before Memorial Day. The complaint
sparked an investigation, during the pendency of which Moussa was suspended without
pay. In sending a letter confirming Moussa’s suspension, Michael Hanwell, a
Supervisory Analyst with the Bureau of Human Resources, Labor Relations, suggested to
his supervisor that he “may recall Dr. Moussa” from the earlier lawsuit. (App. 281.)
The investigation revealed two other female co-workers who claimed that Moussa
had sexually harassed them: Ellen Leakes alleged that Moussa had once “slammed her
against the wall” and “had his tongue down her throat while he attempted to remove her
clothing,” and that the encounter left her bruised (id. 212), and Julianna Lewis alleged
that Moussa had once “grabbed [her] and kissed [her] on [the] lips.” (Id. 252.) Moussa
consistently denied these allegations, suggesting that they were motivated by greed or
jealousy.
During the investigation, on November 5, 2005, Defendant Stacey Geyer was hired
as the director of the Polk Center. On December 20, 2005, a conference call was held
among Geyer; Hanwell; and Nancy Murray, Geyer’s direct supervisor, during which the
investigation was discussed. The following day, Hanwell wrote to Geyer, stating that
Polk would need to submit a “request to remove” to effectuate Moussa’s termination, and
Geyer confirmed that it would be done. On December 23, 2005, DPW issued a Request
3
to Effect Action, concluding that “the three employees are credible and that the conduct
described by them actually occurred.” (Id. 232.)
On December 29, 2005, Moussa was informed that he was terminated effective
January 4, 2006. The termination letter was signed by Geyer, who testified at her
deposition that she had no direct involvement with the investigation and was unfamiliar
with the accusations against Moussa but signed the letter because she was instructed to do
so by Murray.
Moussa filed suit on January 19, 2007. The District Court entered summary
judgment in favor of Defendants on March 31, 2010, and Moussa timely appealed.
III. Discussion
Moussa’s primary contention on appeal is that the District Court erred in
dismissing his claims of race and national origin discrimination. Specifically, he argues
that the different discipline that two other employees received for workplace misconduct
would allow a jury to conclude that he was discriminated against because of his race and
national origin.1
In the absence of direct evidence, claims of discrimination under Title VII and
Section 1983 are analyzed pursuant to a familiar burden-shifting framework.2 See
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Stewart v. Rutgers,
120 F.3d
1
Moussa abandoned his claim of sex discrimination at oral argument before the District
Court.
2
Although Moussa had also brought claims of discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
Moussa does not appeal the District Court’s conclusion that there is no private right of
4
426, 432 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Our application of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework
is applicable to Stewart’s allegation of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § . . . 1983.”
(footnote omitted)). Under that framework, if a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima
facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The plaintiff must then respond by showing that
the defendant’s proffered reason was pretextual. To prove that an explanation is
pretextual, a plaintiff must “cast sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate reasons
proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that each reason
was a fabrication or allow the factfinder to infer that discrimination was more likely than
not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action.” Wishkin v.
Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2007) (alterations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
In this case, the District Court presumed that Moussa had established a prima facie
case of discrimination but held both that (1) Defendants had articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for his termination (namely, his repeated sexual harassment of
his co-workers), and (2) he had failed to raise an issue of fact with respect to whether this
reason was pretextual.
In an attempt to show pretext, Moussa had pointed to two white males who were
disciplined less harshly after also receiving complaints of workplace misconduct. See
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994) (providing that a plaintiff may show
action against a state actor under that statute.5
pretext by demonstrating “that the employer treated other, similarly situated persons not
of his protected class more favorably”). The District Court, however, ruled that neither
comparator was similarly situated. We agree.
The first comparator identified by Moussa, Michael Winger, was accused of
discussing his sexual experiences in the office and once placing his hands on a female co-
worker’s hips and pulling her towards him. After an investigation that included eleven
witness interviews, DPW concluded that the allegations were unsubstantiated, and the
complaint was dismissed. The second comparator, Curt Anderson, was found to have
been engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with a subordinate employee. Although
he was suspended during the investigation, his suspension was limited to thirty days after
he brought a union grievance. He was ultimately demoted but not terminated.
The District Court correctly concluded that neither comparator was “similarly
situated,” such that the difference in the discipline that they received could support a
jury’s finding of pretext. As it observed, the allegations against Winger were
substantially less serious than the allegations against Moussa, and a thorough
investigation concluded that they were unfounded. And while Anderson’s relationship
with a subordinate may have been improper, there is no suggestion that it was
involuntary, and certainly no suggestion that it involved the application of physical force.
Insofar as DPW’s investigation concluded that Moussa had repeatedly approached
women and forcibly attempted to kiss them against their will, the Court correctly held that
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the comparators were insufficiently similar to permit a jury to conclude that Defendants’
proffered reason for terminating him was pretextual.3
IV. Conclusion
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
3
Moussa raises two other arguments on appeal, neither meritorious. First, he suggests
that Geyer’s “mendacity” at her deposition would allow a fact finder to conclude that she
acted out of retaliatory intent. In our judgment, a jury could only interpret Geyer’s
deposition transcript as evidence of retaliatory intent by engaging in rank speculation;
Geyer was hired late in the investigation that led to Moussa’s termination, and it is
unsurprising that she recalls few of its details. Second, Moussa argues that Geyer is liable
under Section 1983 as the “cat’s paw” because, even if she did not have discriminatory
intent, she was the vehicle through which the discriminatory intent of others was realized.
Insofar as Moussa has failed to proffer evidence from which a fact finder could conclude
that anyone at DPW acted with discriminatory or retaliatory intent, we need not consider
whether the cat’s paw theory is cognizable under Section 1983.
7
