Filed: Jun. 21, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 10-2526 _ DAVID JAHN, Appellant v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE _ On Appeal from the United States Tax Court (T.C. No. 08-24302) Tax Court Judge: Honorable Thomas B. Wells _ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) June 21, 2011 Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and COWEN, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: June 21, 2011 ) _ OPINION _ PER CURIAM David Jahn appeals from a decision of the Tax Court, arguing that the
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 10-2526 _ DAVID JAHN, Appellant v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE _ On Appeal from the United States Tax Court (T.C. No. 08-24302) Tax Court Judge: Honorable Thomas B. Wells _ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) June 21, 2011 Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and COWEN, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: June 21, 2011 ) _ OPINION _ PER CURIAM David Jahn appeals from a decision of the Tax Court, arguing that the C..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-2526
___________
DAVID JAHN,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States Tax Court
(T.C. No. 08-24302)
Tax Court Judge: Honorable Thomas B. Wells
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 21, 2011
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 21, 2011 )
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
David Jahn appeals from a decision of the Tax Court, arguing that the
Commissioner should have been required to account for certain itemized deductions in
calculating his tax deficiency and challenging the Tax Court’s imposition of a penalty
pursuant to Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) § 6673. For the following reasons, we will
affirm.
I.
This is the second time that Jahn is before us due to his failure to pay taxes. In the
first proceeding, which arose out of Jahn’s failure to file a tax return for the 2004 tax
year, Jahn filed a petition in Tax Court arguing that the Commissioner should have been
required to account for itemized deductions in the substitute return he prepared on Jahn’s
behalf. The Tax Court held that Jahn was not entitled to itemize deductions because he
did not file a return relating to 2004. Jahn v. Comm’r, T.C. Mem. 2008-141, 2008 WL
2128229, at *1 (T.C. May 21, 2008). On appeal, we affirmed the Tax Court’s holding
that a taxpayer must file a return in order to itemize deductions. Jahn v. Comm’r, 392 F.
App’x 949, 950 (3d Cir. 2010).
While that appeal was pending, Jahn was served with a notice of deficiency
relating to the 2006 tax year. Since Jahn had also failed to file a tax return for the 2006
tax year, the Commissioner calculated Jahn’s deficiency by preparing a substitute return
for him pursuant to I.R.C. § 6020(b). As with the 2004 tax year, the Commissioner only
allowed Jahn the standard deduction.
Jahn filed a petition in Tax Court, challenging the calculated deficiency as he did
with the 2004 tax year because the substitute return did not account for itemized
deductions. In response, the Commissioner sent Jahn a letter requesting that he submit a
return for the 2006 tax year in order to resolve the matter. Jahn took the position that he
“shouldn’t be required to prepare and sign under penalty of perjury documents which [he]
2
lack[s] the education and training to comprehend, and then potentially suffer fines and
penalties or imprisonment due solely to [his] inability to understand and apply the
complex tax laws to [his] situation.” (Ex. 6-J.) Accordingly, instead of preparing a
return, Jahn submitted documentation of the deductions he sought and indicated that the
Commissioner should prepare the return for him, taking those deductions into account.
The matter eventually proceeded to trial. Jahn’s case rested on the premise that
the government should not be able to “compel you to do something you really don’t have
the education or training to do,” i.e., file a tax return. (Trial Tr. 8.) He also reiterated his
assertion that he should be entitled to itemize deductions. The Tax Court concluded that
Jahn’s failure to file a return precluded his eligibility for itemized deductions, and held
that the Commissioner had established a deficiency and additions to tax in the amounts
reflected in the substitute return. Additionally, the Tax Court imposed a $10,000 penalty
on Jahn, pursuant to I.R.C. § 6673, for advancing frivolous arguments despite several
warnings that his positions lacked merit.
Jahn timely filed a motion to vacate, which the Tax Court denied. He then filed a
timely appeal.
II.
Our appellate jurisdiction arises under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a). We exercise plenary
review over the Tax Court’s legal conclusions, see PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r, 212
F.3d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 2000), and review its imposition of a penalty under § 6673 for
abuse of discretion. See Pollard v. Comm’r,
816 F.2d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 1987) (per
3
curiam).
In this appeal, Jahn continues to maintain that he is entitled to itemize deductions
despite his failure to file a return.1 Jahn argues that I.R.C. § 63(e) allows a taxpayer to
itemize regardless of who makes the return. And since the substitute return prepared by
the Commissioner constitutes a return for purposes of establishing tax liability and
imposing additions to tax, Jahn argues that it constitutes a return for the purpose of
electing to itemize under § 63(e). We reject those arguments.
“Unless an individual makes an election under [§ 63(e)] . . . , no itemized
deduction shall be allowed for the taxable year.” I.R.C. § 63(e)(1). That election “shall
be made on the taxpayer’s return.” § 63(e)(2). Given the I.R.C.’s clear statutory
language, it is fairly obvious that, unless a taxpayer files a return and makes the
appropriate election, he is not entitled to itemize. See Maxwell v. United States, 80 F.
Supp. 2d 1352, 1353-54 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
1
The Commissioner asserts that collateral estoppel bars Jahn’s challenge because
Jahn unsuccessfully pursued the same argument with respect to the 2004 tax year.
Collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that must be raised initially in tax
court. See Shades Ridge Holding Co. v. United States, 888 F.2d 725, 727 (11th
Cir. 1989); Sundstrand Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 96 T.C. 226, 349 (1991).
Since the Commissioner never raised the issue of collateral estoppel before the
Tax Court, we decline to consider the matter for the first time on appeal. See In re
Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 261 (3d Cir. 2009). We note,
however, that we find the Commissioner’s position to be somewhat disingenuous
since he opposed Jahn’s motion to stay the instant case pending our ruling in the
earlier appeal on the basis that “the outcome of [the appeal in the prior case] will
not have affect [sic] on the instant case” since “[e]ach taxable year stands alone.”
(Comm’r’s Notice of Objection ¶ 4.)
4
Furthermore, although a substitute return prepared pursuant to I.R.C. § 6020(b) is
treated like a return for certain purposes, it is not the equivalent of a return filed by the
taxpayer. Section 6020(b) authorizes the Secretary to prepare a substitute return for a
taxpayer who has failed to file, which is “good and sufficient for all legal purposes except
insofar as any Federal statute expressly provides otherwise.” Treas. Reg. § 301.6020-
1(b)(3). Among those valid purposes are assessing the taxpayer’s deficiency and
determining addition to tax. See I.R.C. §§ 6201(a)(1), 6651(g); United States v. Silkman,
220 F.3d 935, 936 (8th Cir. 2000). But the substitute return does not relieve the non-
filing taxpayer of his duty to file, see United States v. Lacy,
658 F.2d 396, 397 (5th Cir.
1981) (per curiam), and does not equate to a filed return unless signed by the taxpayer.
See In re Bergstrom,
949 F.2d 341, 343 (10th Cir. 1991).
Thus, a substitute return prepared under § 6020(b) is not a “taxpayer’s return”
within the meaning of § 63(e)(2). Jahn contends that, if a substitute return qualifies as a
return for some purposes, due process and equal protection require that it constitute a
return for every purpose. We find no basis for Jahn’s constitutional challenge.2 The
Commissioner gave Jahn the standard deduction to which he was entitled. If Jahn wanted
to itemize deductions, he should have filed his own return and made the appropriate
election as he was invited to do by the Commissioner. Since he did not do so, he is not
entitled to itemize deductions for the 2006 tax year.
2
Furthermore, we reject Jahn’s suggestion that he was unconstitutionally
threatened by the Tax Court.
5
Jahn also argues that the Tax Court abused its discretion in imposing a penalty
under § 6673. “When taxpayers are on notice that they may face sanctions for frivolous
litigation, the tax court is within its discretion to award sanctions under section 6673,” so
long as the sanction does not exceed $25,000. Wolf v. Comm’r, 4 F.3d 709, 716 (9th Cir.
1993); see I.R.C. § 6673(a)(1). An argument is frivolous “if it is contrary to established
law and unsupported by a reasoned, colorable argument for change in the law.” Coleman
v. Comm’r,
791 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1986).
First, Jahn’s contention that he was never warned that his positions lacked merit is
flatly controverted by the record. The Commissioner specifically notified Jahn in a
pretrial letter that he intended to seek penalties under § 6673 if Jahn persisted in arguing
that he was entitled to itemize deductions without filing a return. Furthermore, the
Commissioner clearly stated in his pretrial memorandum and in his opening argument at
trial that he sought penalties in light of that argument as well as Jahn’s argument that the
complexity of the tax code prevented him from filing a return. Indeed, when directly
questioned by the Tax Court on the issue, Jahn acknowledged receiving notice that his
positions were meritless.
Second, we do not believe that the Tax Court abused its discretion in penalizing
Jahn for advancing groundless positions. The Tax Court found Jahn’s argument that he
should not be compelled to file a tax return given the complexity of the tax code akin to
tax protester-type arguments wholly lacking in merit. The Tax Court also noted that Jahn
continued to pursue arguments that he had unsuccessfully advanced with respect to the
6
2004 tax year, i.e., that he should be entitled to itemize. We agree that Jahn’s arguments
have no support in the law and conclude that the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion in
penalizing Jahn $10,000.3 See Jenkins v. Comm’r, 483 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2007)
(upholding penalty for argument that, while not foreclosed by precedent, was
representative of arguments that had been universally rejected, especially since petitioner
“previously raised a similar unsuccessful challenge in Tax Court”); Stearman v. Comm’r,
436 F.3d 533, 537-38 (5th Cir. 2006) (upholding $12,500 penalty per case when taxpayer
advanced arguments “characteristic of tax-protester rhetoric”) (quotations omitted).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Tax Court.
3
Jahn argues that he should not have been penalized because he did not advance
any of the arguments posted on the Internal Revenue Service’s website, which
provides a list of arguments that have repeatedly found by courts to be frivolous.
Frivolous Tax Arguments in General, Internal Revenue Service (Jan. 1, 2011),
www.irs.gov/taxpros/article/0,,id=159932,00.html. While that list may provide
useful guidance to taxpayers, it is by no means exclusive and does not preclude
imposition of a penalty for arguments that are not specifically identified.
7
