Filed: Feb. 18, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: ALD-105 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 10-4048 _ DEBRA-ANN WELLMAN, Appellant v. DUPONT DOW ELASTOMERS L.L.C. t/a, Dupont High Performance Elastomers L.L.C. _ DEBRA-ANN WELLMAN, Appellant v. THE DUPONT COMPANY _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (D.C. Civil Nos. 05-cv-00278 and 05-cv-00279) District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson _ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Su
Summary: ALD-105 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 10-4048 _ DEBRA-ANN WELLMAN, Appellant v. DUPONT DOW ELASTOMERS L.L.C. t/a, Dupont High Performance Elastomers L.L.C. _ DEBRA-ANN WELLMAN, Appellant v. THE DUPONT COMPANY _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (D.C. Civil Nos. 05-cv-00278 and 05-cv-00279) District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson _ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Sum..
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ALD-105 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-4048
___________
DEBRA-ANN WELLMAN,
Appellant
v.
DUPONT DOW ELASTOMERS L.L.C.
t/a, Dupont High Performance Elastomers L.L.C.
____________________________________
DEBRA-ANN WELLMAN,
Appellant
v.
THE DUPONT COMPANY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil Nos. 05-cv-00278 and 05-cv-00279)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 3, 2011
Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 18, 2011)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Debra-Ann Wellman, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court‟s order
granting summary judgment in favor of Dupont Dow Elastomers LLC (“DDE”) and
DuPont Company (“DuPont”) (collectively, “defendants”). For the reasons below, we
will affirm.
I.
DuPont employed Wellman as an administrative assistant from 1978 to 1988 and
from 1992 to 1996 when she accepted an offer of employment with DDE. In 2001,
Wellman claimed that her supervisor, Paul Graves, and an administrative assistant, Mary
Ann Price, began harassing her and created a hostile work environment. She claimed that
Graves sexually harassed her, and that she was subjected to threats and abuse. She
stopped working on February 11, 2002. DDE investigated Wellman‟s claims and
determined that she had not been the victim of harassment or abuse. It did warn Graves
to avoid showing Price any favoritism and to “closely monitor [his] remarks.”
Wellman sought psychological treatment beginning on February 11, 2002, until
November 2002. Wellman was diagnosed with adjustment disorder and stress about her
work. The psychologist also determined that Wellman was capable of returning to work,
but that she should be moved and be assigned a different supervisor. Another doctor
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prescribed her Ambien and Klonopin for adjustment disorder with depressed and anxious
mood. A neurologist determined that she did not have any neuropsychological
impairments and that she could return to work.
Wellman‟s Employee Assistance Counselor (“EAC”) requested that she undergo
an independent psychological and psychiatric evaluation. The doctors concluded that she
exhibited “traits of borderline, hysterical, and narcissistic personality,” but that she was
“not psychologically disabled.” The psychiatrist recommended that she not return to her
position at DDE.
DDE‟s human resources met with Wellman in August 2002, after she was cleared
to return to work. DDE informed her that she could continue in her current position or
apply for an incapability pension. After an extension, Wellman failed to attend her
return-to-work meeting, and on August 26, 2002, she left a voicemail stating that she was
unwilling to return to work. DDE terminated her employment.
Wellman filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) against DuPont and DDE based on retaliation, gender, and
disability. The EEOC dismissed the charges in February 2005 and informed her of her
right to sue. She then filed two identical complaints in the District Court pursuant to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, and the Americans with
Disability Act (“ADA”), one each against DuPont and DDE. DuPont and DDE filed
motions for summary judgment, which the District Court granted on September 14, 2010.
Wellman filed a timely notice of appeal.
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II.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In reviewing a
District Court order granting summary judgment, we apply the same test that the District
Court applied. Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2001). Summary
judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party and drawing all inferences in that party‟s favor, there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Id. at 232;
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of the . . . pleading,” but “must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (citing Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574 (1986)).
III.
A. DuPont
In the employment discrimination context, a parent corporation will be held
responsible as an employer only where it and the subsidiary are “„so interrelated and
integrated in their activities, labor relations and management‟ that we should pierce the
corporate veil.” Marzano v. Computer Sci. Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 514 (3d Cir. 1996)
(citation omitted). Wellman conceded that DDE was her employer during the time the
alleged conduct occurred. However, she argued that DuPont is liable for the actions of its
subsidiaries, and that it was responsible, through the EAC, for her termination. The
District Court concluded that there was no evidence showing that DuPont‟s and DDE‟s
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operations were interrelated. It noted that Wellman did not claim that Dupont and DDE
shared common management, ownership, or financial management. DDE alone paid her
wages, and DuPont was not consulted about her termination. Finally, the District Court
considered that the National Labor Relations Board has determined that DuPont and DDE
are not alter egos of each other. In re DuPont Dow Elastomers L.L.C., 332 N.L.R.B.
1071 (2000). We agree that Wellman failed to set forth facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial regarding DuPont‟s status as her employer. See
Saldana, 260 F.3d
at 232. Accordingly, the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
DuPont.
B. DDE
1. Retaliation
Wellman first claims that DDE terminated her in retaliation for filing harassment
complaints. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Wellman must present
sufficient evidence to establish that: (1) she was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an
adverse action was taken; and (3) there is a causal link between the protected conduct and
the adverse action. Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997). Once
a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to DDE to present a non-retaliatory
explanation for terminating Wellman.
Id. at 920 n.2. Wellman must then establish that
there is sufficient evidence for the factfinder to “(1) disbelieve the employer‟s articulated
legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely
than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer‟s action.” Fuentes v.
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Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).
The District Court concluded that Wellman failed to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation because she could not demonstrate a causal link between her filing of the
harassment charges with the EEOC and her termination. Wellman never filed an internal
sexual harassment charge, and filed her EEOC charge only eleven days before her
termination. Wellman maintains that even if DDE did not have notice of her EEOC
charge, she had expressed her concerns about Graves and Price to human resources
before her termination. However, DDE paid her short-term disability benefits for seven
months after she spoke to human resources. At her August 2002 meeting with the EAC
and human resources, she was offered her previous position or the option of applying for
an incapability pension. She admits the parties also discussed her being moved to a
different supervisor within a few months of her return to work. DDE also gave her an
extension of one week to make her decision, but she did not respond, nor did she attend
her final return-to-work meeting, and was eventually terminated for job abandonment.
The record shows that she was aware that if she did not return to work, she would be
terminated. Contrary to her retaliation claim, DDE also informed DuPont that it did not
object to her applying for a new position with DuPont. Accordingly, we agree with the
District Court that Wellman failed to show facts supporting a prima facie case of
retaliation.
Even assuming that Wellman established a prima facie case of retaliation, DDE
offered a non-discriminatory reason for terminating Wellman, namely that she refused to
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attend her return-to-work meeting. The District Court found that Wellman failed to rebut
DDE‟s legitimate reason. She admitted that she had received disability benefits for
almost seven months and refused to attend her scheduled meetings. Accordingly, the
District Court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact, and,
as such, did not err in granting summary judgment on the retaliation claim.
2. Hostile Work Environment
Wellman also claims that she was subjected to a hostile work environment in
violation of Title VII. To establish such a claim, Wellman must prove that: (1) she
suffered intentional discrimination based on her membership in a protected class; (2) the
discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected
her; (4) a reasonable person in the same position and protected class would have been
detrimentally affected; and (5) respondeat superior liability exists. See West v. Phila.
Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 753 (3d Cir. 1995). Courts are to consider the frequency and
severity of the discriminatory conduct, and determine whether it is “physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance.” Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998). “Teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents
(unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory” behavior.
Id. at 788.
The District Court acknowledged the evidence showing that Wellman found her
workplace to be hostile. However, it concluded that her unsupported allegations alone
did not establish a hostile work environment claim based on gender. Furthermore, the
court properly held that, even if true, Graves‟ alleged conduct does not constitute
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harassment pervasive enough to “alter the condition of [her] employment and create an
abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). She
alleged sporadic incidences over six months; she did not allege or establish a pattern of
conduct and the alleged conduct was not consistently related to her gender. The District
Court thus correctly concluded that summary judgment was warranted on Wellman‟s
hostile work environment claim.
3. ADA
Finally, Wellman claims that she was discriminated against in violation of the
Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”). To bring a claim under the ADA, Wellman
must show that she: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities; (2) has a history of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as
having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). First, Wellman‟s treating
psychologist noted that she did not have any serious mental illness or a history of such.
Second, there is no indication that her condition limits a major life activity. Finally, there
is no evidence that DDE considered Wellman as having a disability. She had been
cleared to return to work, and DDE offered her her former position. Accordingly, we
agree with the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment on Wellman‟s claim under the
ADA.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment.
Wellman‟s motion for counsel is denied.
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