Filed: Jul. 19, 2013
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 12-2766 _ STEVEN BRODIE, JR., Appellant v. GLOUCESTER TOWNSHIP; CINDY RAU-HATTON, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Former Mayor, Gloucester Township, NJ; DAVID MAYER, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Mayor, Gloucester Township, NJ; TOM CARDIS, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Business Administrator; GABRIEL BUSA, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Former Director of Public Wo
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 12-2766 _ STEVEN BRODIE, JR., Appellant v. GLOUCESTER TOWNSHIP; CINDY RAU-HATTON, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Former Mayor, Gloucester Township, NJ; DAVID MAYER, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Mayor, Gloucester Township, NJ; TOM CARDIS, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Business Administrator; GABRIEL BUSA, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Former Director of Public Wor..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________________________
No. 12-2766
__________________________
STEVEN BRODIE, JR.,
Appellant
v.
GLOUCESTER TOWNSHIP; CINDY RAU-HATTON, Individually and in Her Official
Capacity as Former Mayor, Gloucester Township, NJ; DAVID MAYER, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Mayor, Gloucester Township, NJ; TOM CARDIS,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Business Administrator; GABRIEL BUSA,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Former Director of Public Works; LEN
MOFFA, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Director of Public Works and
Former Supervisor of Parks and Recreation; DENISE WOLF, Individually and in Her
Official Capacity as a member of the Human Relations Commission; DAVID
MCMURRAY, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a member of the Human
Relations Commission; MARY DORAZO, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as a
member of the Human Relations Commission; CHERYL SPANGLE, Individually and in
Her Official Capacity as a member of the Human Relations Commission; PAULETTE
RAPPA, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as a member of the Human Relations
Commission; CRYSTAL EVANS, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as a
member of the Human Relations Commission; EUGENE LAWRENCE, Individually and
in His Official Capacity as a member of the Human Relations Commission Gloucester
Township, NJ; STEVEN HIRSCHBUL, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a
member of the Human Relations Commission; VIRGINIA VARRELL, Individually and
in Her Official Capacity as a member of the Human Relations Commission; SHELLEY
LOVETT, Individually and in Her Capacity as a member of the Human Relations
Commission; HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION OF GLOUCESTER TOWNSHIP;
DAVID T. POMIANEK; MICHAEL DORAZO, JR.
______________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 1-11-cv-01914)
District Judge: Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 8, 2013
______________
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SLOVITER, and BARRY, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: July 19, 2013)
______________
OPINION
______________
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
Steven Brodie, Jr., (“Brodie”) seeks review of two decisions from the District
Court — the first disposing of his complaint 1 and the second denying his motion for an
extension of time to file a notice of appeal of that decision. For the reasons set forth
below, we will affirm the decision denying the motion for an extension of time and will
dismiss the appeal of the order disposing of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
I. Background
The facts relevant to our decision are limited to the timing of the District Court’s
decision and Brodie’s efforts to file a notice of appeal. On February 1, 2012, the District
Court entered an order granting the motions to dismiss and the motion for summary
judgment. On March 30, 2012, Brodie filed a motion, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P.
1
All but one of the defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The remaining defendant, David T. Pomianek, filed a motion
seeking summary judgment. All of the motions, including the motion seeking summary
judgment, argued that Brodie’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
2
4(a)(5), seeking an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. The motion was filed
beyond the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal set forth in Fed. R. App. P.
(4)(a). However, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) allows a party to file a motion seeking an
extension of time so long as the motion is filed “no later than 30 days after the time
prescribed by [Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)] expires; and . . . that party shows excusable neglect
or good cause.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5). While the motion was timely under this rule,
Brodie still needed to demonstrate excusable neglect or good cause. 2
On May 30, 2012, the District Court denied the motion for an extension of time,
concluding that Brodie failed to establish excusable neglect. Specifically, the District
Court found “Plaintiff’s counsel had reasonable control over the ability to file a timely
appeal, and elected not to do so.” (App. 7A.) On June 20, 2012, Brodie filed a notice of
appeal of both the February 1, 2012 and May 30, 2012 orders. 3
2
“The good cause standard ‘applies in situations in which there is no fault—
excusable or otherwise.’” Ragguette v. Premier Wines & Spirits, 691 F.3d 315, 323-24
n.2 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 4 (Advisory Committee’s Notes on 2002
Amendments)). Good cause is not applicable here. We only address the excusable
neglect standard.
3
On June 26, 2012, the Clerk’s Office issued an order “addressing the scope of the
appeal, specifically addressing this Court’s authority to review the February 1, 2012
order.” According to Brodie’s counsel, “Appellant is primarily seeking review of the
District Court’s February 1 Order dismissing his Complaint as untimely. . . . Appellant
recognizes that unless and until he receives an extension of time, any appeal of the
February 1, 2012 Order would be untimely.” (July 10, 2012 letter from William B.
Hildebrand.)
3
II. Analysis 4
“It is uncontested that this Court generally reviews a district court’s decision
whether or not to grant an extension of time to file a notice of appeal for an abuse of
discretion.” Ragguette v. Premier Wines & Spirits, 691 F.3d 315, 322 (3d Cir. 2012).
“The district court abuses its discretion if its decision rests upon a clearly erroneous
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or the improper application of law to fact.”
Id.
Similar to the test we established in Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del. v. Larson,
827 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1987), the Supreme Court, “in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v.
Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership,
507 U.S. 380 (1993), established an equitable
approach to the ‘excusable neglect’ determination.”
Ragguette, 691 F.3d at 319. The
Pioneer test includes four factors: “the danger of prejudice to the [non-movant], the
length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the
delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether
the movant acted in good faith.”
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395.
The District Court, after weighing the relevant factors, concluded that “[t]his is not
a case where, ‘as the result of some minor neglect, compliance was not achieved.’”
(App. 7A (quoting Consol. Freightways, 827 F.2d at 920)). Instead, the District Court
4
We have jurisdiction to review the May 30, 2012 decision, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, since the notice of appeal of that decision was filed in a timely manner. As
discussed below, we conclude we lack jurisdiction to review the February 1, 2012 order.
4
found that Brodie’s counsel could have filed a notice of appeal, but chose not to do so.
This conclusion was not an abuse of discretion. The District Court applied the
correct legal standard, and its factual findings were not erroneous. The affidavit provided
by Brodie in support of the motion for extension of time did not provide any reason for
his counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal. In fact, as the District Court noted, counsel
simply chose not to file an appeal. The email Dennis Young, Brodie’s trial counsel, sent
to Brodie on March 15, 2012 supports the District Court’s conclusion. In that email,
counsel explained to Brodie that “the court found [the] claims barred by the statute of
limitations,” and suggested that “[i]n the future, if you ever believe you are the subject of
discrimination please contact me immediately and do not wait to move forward.” (App.
75A.) These statements imply a recognition of the statute of limitations problem and a
resignation to the outcome of the case.
Both the Supreme Court and our Court have long “held that clients must be held
accountable for the acts and omissions of their attorneys.” Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 396. The
Supreme Court has indicated that the question is not whether the client “did all [he]
reasonably could in policing the conduct of [his] attorney,” but rather if the “attorney, as
[his] agent, did all he reasonably could to comply” with the deadline.
Id. Here, it is clear
that counsel did not take any action to file a notice of appeal.
Given a record that indicates counsel chose not to file a notice of appeal, we
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for an
extension of time.
5
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the decision of the District Court
denying the motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. Since the motion
for an extension of time was denied, the appeal of the order disposing of the case was
untimely. We will therefore dismiss the appeal of the February 1, 2012 order for lack of
jurisdiction.
6
