Filed: Nov. 13, 2013
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 12-3756 _ JANIS STACY, Appellant v. LSI CORPORATION; AGERE SYSTEMS, INC. _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 5-10-cv-04693) District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno _ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) October 29, 2013 Before: FISHER, JORDAN and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges. (Filed: November 13, 2013) _ OPINION OF THE COURT _ FISHER, Circuit Ju
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 12-3756 _ JANIS STACY, Appellant v. LSI CORPORATION; AGERE SYSTEMS, INC. _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 5-10-cv-04693) District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno _ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) October 29, 2013 Before: FISHER, JORDAN and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges. (Filed: November 13, 2013) _ OPINION OF THE COURT _ FISHER, Circuit Jud..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 12-3756
____________
JANIS STACY,
Appellant
v.
LSI CORPORATION; AGERE SYSTEMS, INC.
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 5-10-cv-04693)
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 29, 2013
Before: FISHER, JORDAN and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: November 13, 2013)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Janis Stacy appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment in favor of Agere Systems,
Inc. ("Agere Systems") and its parent company, LSI Corporation ("LSI Corp."),
(collectively "Defendants") and denying as moot Stacy's motion for partial summary
judgment. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
Defendants employed Stacy as an engineer from 1998 through 2008. When Stacy
was hired, she had a traditional masculine appearance, wore male clothing, and went by
the name "Jim." In 2002, Stacy was diagnosed with a medical condition known as
gender identity disorder ("GID"), which arises from a profound divergence between an
individual's assigned birth sex and the person's inner gender identity. Upon being
diagnosed with GID, Stacy began undergoing treatment, which included, among other
things, psychological counseling and hormonal therapy.
In 2005, as part of her treatment, Stacy proceeded to full-time participation in
what she refers to as the "real world experience," which involved making a full transition
to one's gender identity. A35. Pursuant to this treatment, Stacy disclosed her gender
identity at work through a series of conversations and group presentations under the
2
supervision of Human Resources.1 By mid-2005, Stacy had fully transitioned her
appearance at work from male to female, at which time she became known as "Janis" and
wore feminine attire. She also had multiple surgeries to change her physical appearance.2
In 2006, following a return from one of her GID-related surgeries, Stacy was
reassigned to a different group. There, Stacy reported directly to Bob Radaker, who in
turn reported to Mr. Lawrence. Soon after her transfer, Stacy complained to Mr.
Lawrence that she believed she had been rated unfairly on her performance review and
unfairly compensated by Mr. Stasak, in 2005. Mr. Lawrence investigated the allegations,
the results of which revealed that Stacy had received the exact same performance rating
in 2004, prior to her GID disclosure, and that she received a salary increase as a result of
her 2005 performance evaluation that placed her in the top ten percent of the highest paid
engineers in the entire company.
In 2007, Agere Systems merged with LSI Corp. Agere Systems, the company for
which Stacy worked, had a policy expressly prohibiting gender identity discrimination,
1
Stacy testified that Norm Lawrence, the director of another group, made negative
comments toward her during one of her gender identity presentations. She contends that
Mr. Lawrence invited her to make the presentation to his group and stated that:
"[Y]esterday he would have been considered a bigot, and today knowing [Stacy] he is
rethinking things." A58-60.
2
Stacy provided testimony that it was at this time that she began to experience
rejection and backlash at work. A38-46, A68-69, A81-83. She alleges that her director,
George Stasak, suddenly became non-interactive towards her, A35-36, that another
supervisor referred to her in the male pronoun, even after her transition, A45-46, and that
other employees made similar negative comments, A68.
3
but LSI Corp. did not.3 Following the merger, Defendants engaged in a series of layoffs,
known as the Force Management Program ("FMP"), in response to the declining
economy. Pursuant to the FMP, Defendants eliminated approximately 3,770 positions
between April 2007 and December 2007. In December 2007 or January 2008, Mr.
Lawrence was instructed by a superior to reduce his workforce by eight employees. In
making his decision, Mr. Lawrence testified that he first determined which job positions
and functions would be impacted by the FMP. A132-33. He then consulted with human
resources personnel, who provided him with the names of the affected groups of
employees so that he could conduct a skills assessment.
One of the groups selected for the FMP was Stacy's group, which supported a
certain product line in which Defendants decided to no longer invest. Stacy was the lead
engineer in the three-member group. In evaluating the group, Mr. Lawrence testified that
he selected five particular skills critical for the function of his team moving forward:
execution, teamwork, communication, technical versatility, and customer focus. A357.
In this assessment, Mr. Lawrence ranked Stacy the lowest of the three. He presented his
findings to his superiors and discussed his rationale. After the majority of the managers
agreed with his findings, he made the decision to terminate Stacy. Stacy was notified of
3
Stacy provided a statement that she approached Mr. Lawrence on several
occasions inquiring as to the potential effect of the merger on Agere Systems' existing
anti-discrimination policy. She alleges that Mr. Lawrence made no attempt to calm her
fears and failed to provide her with a direct response as to whether or how the policy
would be changing. A35.
4
her termination on January 16, 2008. She testified that, during a conversation regarding
her termination, Mr. Lawrence informed her that she "was being freed from [her]
negative history with [Mr. Stasak] and the corporation."4 A520.
On September 14, 2013, Stacy filed a complaint alleging that Defendants
committed unlawful discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"); sex and disability discrimination and retaliation in
violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"); and unlawful gender-
identity, sex, and disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Allentown
Human Relations Act ("AHRA"). The District Court approved of partial dismissal of
Stacy's claims relating to certain allegations of post-termination discrimination. Stacy
then moved for partial summary judgment on her AHRA claim and Defendants moved
for summary judgment on all of Stacy's claims. Defendants conceded, for purposes of
summary judgment, that Stacy established a prima facie case of discrimination. The
District Court then found that Defendants proffered sufficient evidence that Stacy was
terminated based upon a legitimate non-discriminatory reason (Mr. Lawrence's skills
assessment). After concluding that Stacy failed to show that Defendants' proffered
reason for her termination was a pretext for unlawful discrimination, the Court granted
Defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied Stacy's motion for partial
summary judgment as moot.
4
Stacy testified that she was not certain of the exact wording of Mr. Lawrence's
alleged statement and there were no witnesses present when it was made. A520.
5
Stacy's timely notice of appeal followed.
II
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same standard as the district court. Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 413
(3d Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate only where the moving party has
established "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To meet this burden, "the
moving party must show that the non-moving party has failed to establish one or more
essential elements of his or her case." Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of
Higher Educ.,
470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006). The reviewing court should "view the
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and make all reasonable
inferences in that party's favor."
Id.
III.
Defendants do not dispute Stacy's prima facie case of sex, disability, or gender
identity discrimination and Stacy does not dispute the District Court's finding that
Defendants proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her termination.
Accordingly, the only issue presented on appeal is whether a reasonable jury could find
6
that Defendants' articulated explanation for Stacy's termination was a pretext for
discrimination.
Where a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case of employment
discrimination, courts undertake the burden shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Under this analysis, once a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production switches to the defendant to
provide a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its employment decision. See Sempier
v. Johnson & Higgins,
45 F.3d 724, 728 (3d Cir. 1995). If the defendant provides such
justification, the burden of persuasion is on the plaintiff to show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the employer's proffered justification is pretextual. Fuentes v. Perskie,
32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994). To meet this burden, the plaintiff must either: (1)
discredit the proffered reason through circumstantial or direct evidence; or (2) adduce
evidence "that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative
cause of the adverse employment action."
Id. at 764.
To support her position that Defendants' proffered justification for her termination
was pretext, Stacy first points to the facts as presented. Second, she argues that she
submitted evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that discrimination
motivated her termination. Third, she argues that reversal of the District Court's grant of
summary judgment requires reversal of its denial of her motion for partial summary
judgment. We address each of these contentions in turn.
7
A.
Stacy first argues that a reasonable jury could find that Defendants' proffered
reason for her termination was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. In support of her
argument, she alleges that: (1) she was replaced by another employee from outside of her
work group; (2) she was selected for termination prior to Mr. Lawrence's skills
assessment; (3) the skills assessment suffered from serious weaknesses; (4) Mr. Lawrence
chose her group for the purpose of targeting her; and (5) Mr. Lawrence's explanation for
her termination has changed over time.
We are unpersuaded by Stacy's allegations. First, Stacy attacks Defendants'
decision to replace her with another employee, which she believes discredits their
reduction-in-force argument. However, Stacy does not argue that Defendants hired
another individual to replace her; rather, she argues only that another current employee
assumed her responsibilities. We find that action to be consistent with Defendants'
reduction-in-force argument.
Stacy also attacks the skills assessment conducted by Mr. Lawrence. She argues
that she was selected for termination prior to the skills assessment, that the assessment
was biased, and that her group was chosen only for the purpose of terminating her. We
find these arguments lacking in record support. The record demonstrates that Mr.
Lawrence was directed by a superior to reduce his workforce. Based upon this
instruction, he selected several groups of employees that would be impacted. Mr.
8
Lawrence then chose the skills to be evaluated based upon those he believed would be
most beneficial to Defendants moving forward. Out of the members in her group, Stacy
was ranked the lowest. Because Stacy failed to put forth any evidence to contradict these
facts, her allegations must fail.
Finally, Stacy challenges Mr. Lawrence's alleged inconsistent explanations for her
termination. She points to four allegedly different explanations provided by Mr.
Lawrence, including: (1) to give her a "fresh start;" (2) because of her low ranking in his
performance evaluation; (3) because another employee who "rated higher" than her in the
skills assessment assumed her responsibilities; and (4) based upon the skills assessment.
According to Stacy, these arguments contradict one another and would make Mr.
Lawrence less believable to a jury. We disagree. The explanations to which Stacy points
are consistent with one another and with Defendants' proffered reason for her
termination. Because the allegations upon which Stacy's argument hinges lack record
support and fail to demonstrate the weaknesses or inconsistencies necessary to place
doubt upon Defendants' proffered legitimate justification for her termination, Stacy's first
argument fails.
B.
Stacy next argues that she submitted evidence from which a reasonable jury could
find that discrimination motivated her termination. Stacy points to: (1) the fact that her
termination coincided with a change in corporate policy removing the prohibition on
9
gender identity discrimination; (2) the alleged negative comments made by Mr.
Lawrence; (3) the backlash she experienced under Mr. Stasak and other employees; and
(4) the alleged discriminatory reason Mr. Lawrence provided her for her termination.
We find these arguments lacking in record support. As previously mentioned,
Defendants have set forth a legitimate explanation for Stacy's termination, which she
does not dispute. Therefore, in order to prevail, she must either discredit Defendants'
reason or prove that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating factor in her
termination. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. Here, the record reveals that Defendants were
engaging in a series of layoffs due to the declining economy and, as a result, had already
laid off more than three thousand employees prior to Stacy's termination. The record also
indicates that Stacy supported a product line in which Defendants decided to no longer
invest and it was only at that point that Stacy's group was selected for the FMP. Stacy's
argument in support of her pretext claim appears to consist of nothing more than baseless
allegations. We find no discriminatory connection between the merger, the alleged
changes in policy, and her termination. We also find no evidence in the record, beyond
her own testimony, to support any of the assertions she makes regarding discriminatory
comments and backlash. Accordingly, we find Stacy's argument insufficient to rebut
Defendants' justification for her termination.
Because Stacy is unable to point to any inconsistencies or contradictions in
Defendants' proffered reason and has failed to adduce any other evidence that would
10
permit a reasonable factfinder to find that this explanation was a pretext, she has failed to
meet her burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Thus, the District Court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants was proper.
C.
Finally, Stacy argues that reversal of the District Court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Defendants requires reversal of the District Court's denial of her
motion for partial summary judgment. Because we conclude above that the District
Court's grant of summary judgment was proper, Stacy's final argument fails.
V.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
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