Filed: Jan. 13, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 13-4715 _ BRAVERMAN KASKEY, P.C. v. MAYA TOIDZE, Appellant _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-09-cv-03470) District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe _ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) October 2, 2014 Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges (Filed: January 13, 2015) _ OPINION* _ VANASKIE, Circuit Judge Appellant Maya
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 13-4715 _ BRAVERMAN KASKEY, P.C. v. MAYA TOIDZE, Appellant _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-09-cv-03470) District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe _ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) October 2, 2014 Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges (Filed: January 13, 2015) _ OPINION* _ VANASKIE, Circuit Judge Appellant Maya ..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 13-4715
_____________
BRAVERMAN KASKEY, P.C.
v.
MAYA TOIDZE,
Appellant
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-09-cv-03470)
District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe
__________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
October 2, 2014
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 13, 2015)
_____________
OPINION*
_____________
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge
Appellant Maya Toidze appeals the District Court’s order denying her motion to
vacate a default judgment. Toidze, a Russian national who previously resided in Canada,
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
claims that Appellee Braverman Kaskey, P.C., (“BK”) failed to properly serve process on
her and the District Court erred by allowing service by publication in the area of her last
known address. Moreover, she argues that the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction
over her. We conclude that the District Court correctly authorized BK to make service
via publication and properly exercised personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, we will affirm.
I.
The genesis of this matter was a battle for control of “Maya’s Meals,” a company
owned by Toidze, Peter Cooke, and other investors that produced a dough product
developed by Toidze. In April 2007, Cooke sued Toidze (among others) in the Superior
Court at Stamford, Connecticut (the “Connecticut Action”). That suit was removed to the
District Court in Connecticut on May 4, 2007. Later that month, Toidze met with
representatives of BK, a law firm and professional corporation incorporated in
Pennsylvania and located in Philadelphia. During that meeting, Toidze signed a retainer
agreement authorizing BK to represent her in the Connecticut Action. In return, Toidze
agreed to pay one percent of all equity interests in Maya’s Meals for each $20,000 of
billable time incurred by BK. The agreement further required that Toidze reimburse BK
for all out-of-pocket litigation expenses advanced within 30 days of billing.
Between May 2007 and July 2008, BK represented Toidze in the Connecticut
Action, incurring $350,324.50 in billable time and $26,951.45 in out-of-pocket costs, for
a total of $377,275.95. During this time, BK negotiated two possible settlement
agreements, one in June 2007 and a second in late spring 2008; however, Toidze refused
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to sign off on either. After Toidze rejected the second proposed settlement, BK perceived
an irreconcilable conflict and moved to withdraw as counsel. On July 21, 2008, BK’s
motion to withdraw was granted.
In July 2009, the instant case commenced when BK filed suit against Toidze in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania for non-payment of legal fees and costs. The complaint
alleged that Toidze was a citizen of Canada and that she resided in Markham, Ontario.
However, unbeknownst to BK, Toidze had returned to Russia. Between August and
November 2009, BK attempted to serve original process of the summons and complaint
by hand delivery at her Canadian address, but those efforts were unsuccessful. The
individual living at the residence claimed Toidze had moved. BK then tried to serve
process at her son’s address in Richmond Hill, Ontario, a town adjacent to Markham.
Her son confirmed that Toidze had moved approximately three months earlier, but did
not disclose her new address. Nonetheless, as late as October 8, 2010, Toidze, then
proceeding pro se in the Connecticut Action, filed a “Reply to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Entry of Default,” indicating that she lived at her son’s address in Richmond Hill. Cook
v. Toidze, 950 F. Supp. 2d 386, 394 (D. Conn. 2013). That filing also specified two email
addresses for Toidze: moriland@rogers.com and mayatoidze@rogers.com.
Id.
BK next sought to serve process on Toidze by registered mail, return receipt
requested, via the U.S. Postal Service and the Canada Post Corporation, but that method
was unsuccessful as well. After contacting Canadian Post authorities, BK learned that
Toidze had moved and her mail forwarding account had expired. Due to the expiration of
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the forwarding account, the Canadian Post authorities could not disclose any information
concerning her new address because of security protocols. BK then sought to locate
Toidze by utilizing several internet phone and address record databases based in both the
United States and Canada. Additionally, BK endeavored to contact Toidze using a cell
phone number and the email addresses she provided during the course of the Connecticut
Action. All of these efforts failed to uncover Toidze’s new address or location.
On December 29, 2009, BK filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) for
alternative service by publication upon Toidze. The District Court granted that motion on
March 4, 2010, finding that BK “has made a good faith and practical effort to locate and
serve Defendant Maya Toidze in the regular course.” (App. at 1.) In March 2010, the
appropriate notices were printed on two different days in the Markham Economist & Sun,
a newspaper of general circulation at Toidze’s last known address, and once in The Legal
Intelligencer, a newspaper of general circulation in Philadelphia. Again, Toidze failed to
respond to BK’s complaint.
In May 2010, BK requested entry of Toidze’s default, which the Clerk of Court
granted on May 11, 2010. In August 2010, BK moved for entry of default judgment
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). As relief, BK sought transfer of a 17.52% equity
interest in Maya’s Meals or, in the alternative, $377,275.95 in damages based upon a
quantum meruit theory. In a Memorandum and Order dated November 4, 2010, the
District Court found that the still-pending Connecticut Action presented “questions
regarding the appropriateness of . . . compelling Toidze to transfer a 17.52% equity
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interest in Maya’s Meals to BK.” (App. at 5.) Accordingly, the District Court ordered
BK to file a memorandum addressing, inter alia, the nature of the relief requested in the
Connecticut Action and whether any of the parties to the Connecticut Action were
necessary parties to this litigation. Notably, the District Court also directed BK to file a
copy of its November 4th Order in the Connecticut Action and to provide a copy of that
order to all parties to that action, including Toidze. BK complied with this directive by
sending the Order, along with its complaint in this action, the summons, and its motion
for default judgment to Toidze at both the physical and email addresses that Toidze had
provided in the pro se brief she had filed in the Connecticut Action in October of 2010.
On October 11, 2011, the District Court denied BK’s claim to an equity interest in
Maya’s Meals, but granted default judgement on BK’s quantum meruit theory. On
February 22, 2012, after referring the case to a Magistrate Judge to conduct a hearing on
the amount of damages to be awarded, the District Court entered judgment in BK’s favor
in the full amount sought, $377,275.95.
Almost a year later on February 14, 2013, Toidze filed a Motion to Vacate
Judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) and 60(b) claiming that: (1) publication in
Canada was improper and conducted either in error or bad faith; (2) service in Russia,
where she resided at the time this suit initiated, is governed by the Hague Convention and
must be executed by the Russian Ministry of Justice; (3) the District Court lacked
personal jurisdiction over her; and (4) if jurisdiction was proper, then the judgement
should be vacated and service completed as per the requirements of the Hague
5
Convention. The motion was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who recommended it be
denied. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation over
Toidze’s objections, finding that it had personal jurisdiction over Toidze, that service was
proper and complied with due process, and that she had failed to present sufficient
evidence to justify vacating the default judgment. This appeal followed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Where, as here, a party claims that the District Court lacked
personal jurisdiction over her and that an entry of default judgment is void pursuant to
Rule 60(b)(4) because the complaint was never properly served, our review is plenary.
See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008); Pinker v. Roche
Holdings Ltd.,
292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. One Toshiba Color
Television,
213 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 2000). In all other respects, we review the District
Court’s denial of Toidze’s Rule 55(c), 60(b)(3), and 60(b)(6) motions for abuse of
discretion. Budget
Blinds, 536 F.3d at 251; Farnese v. Bagnasco,
687 F.2d 761, 765 (3d
Cir. 1982).
III.
Toidze first contends the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over her.
Because BK relies on specific jurisdiction only, we must determine whether BK’s “claim
is related to or arises out of [Toidze’s] contacts with the forum.” Dollar Sav. Bank v.
First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A., 746 F.2d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 1984).
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This breach of contract action stems from Toidze’s retainer agreement with, and
year-long legal representation by, a Philadelphia law firm. We agree with the District
Court that personal jurisdiction is proper because Toidze met with BK’s lawyers in
Philadelphia on multiple occasions, signed a retainer agreement with BK knowing it was
a Philadelphia law firm, and communicated extensively with BK in connection with the
Connecticut Action. Accordingly, the District Court properly exercised personal
jurisdiction over Toidze.
Turning to Toidze’s claim of deficient service of process, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)
governs the service of individuals located outside of the United States. It permits service
of process to be accomplished “by any internationally agreed means of service that is
reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention
on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents [in Civil and Commercial
Matters]”, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163. When a defendant’s address
is unknown, as is the case here, the Hague Convention “shall not apply.” Id. In this
context, Rule 4(f)(2) dictates that service may be effectuated “by a method that is
reasonably calculated to give notice . . . as prescribed by the foreign country’s law for
service.” Both under the Federal Rules of Canada and the Rules of Civil Procedure for
Ontario Courts, service upon an individual is satisfied by personal service. Can. Fed. Cts.
R. 128; Ontario Sup. Ct. J. R. Civ. P. 16.02. Nevertheless, when personal service “cannot
practicably be effected,” the court may order substitute service. Can. Fed. Cts. R. 136;
see Ontario Sup. Ct. J. R. Civ. P. 16.04 (when “it is impractical for any reason to effect
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prompt service of an originating process or any other document required to be served
personally or by an alternative to personal service under these rules,” a court may order
alternative service). Such service has been explained by Ontario courts to “include
publication in a newspaper in the defendant’s locality.” CGC Holding Co., LLC v.
Hutchens, No. 11-CV-01012, 2011 WL 2559807, *3 (D. Colo. June 28, 2011) (quoting
Niemi v. W. Assurance Co., 2011 ONSC 958, para. 9 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)); Chambers
v. Muslim (2007), 87 O.R. 3d 784, para. 13 (Sup. Ct.).
In this case, service of process by publication was reasonably calculated to provide
Toidze notice. She has failed to produce any evidence that would indicate BK knew or
reasonably should have known she had moved to Russia. BK attempted to personally
serve her at her last known Canadian address and her son’s address. Toidze represented
in the Connecticut Action that she lived at her son’s address in Richmond Hill, Canada.
Additionally, queries to the Canadian Post authorities, internet searches, emails, and cell
phone calls all yielded negative results.
At oral argument before the District Court, Toidze’s counsel conceded that BK,
“in good faith, thought that [Toidze] resided in Canada. Otherwise, they wouldn’t have
attempted to serve process in Canada.” (App. at 73-74.) Although Toidze argues that
several individuals knew she had moved to Russia, no credible evidence, save for her
bare assertions, has been presented to support this claim. We agree with the District
Court that BK made good faith and practical efforts to personally serve Toidze, and the
8
alternative service by publication at her last known address, authorized by Canadian law,
was reasonably calculated to provide her notice.
Toidze also argues that the default judgment should be vacated under Rule 55(c).
As recognized by the District Court, we consider that argument in light of the factors
announced in Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., 756 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir. 1985),
which include “(1) whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced; (2) whether the defendant has
a meritorious defense; and (3) whether the default was the result of the defendant's
culpable conduct.” We agree that vacating the judgment would prejudice BK given the
age of this case. We also agree that Toidze does not have a meritorious defense. Finally,
we do not discern error in the District Court’s finding that her default was intentional. In
finding her conduct in ignoring this action to be culpable and not merely negligent, the
District Court noted that BK emailed Toidze at mayatoidze@gmail.com in an attempt to
notify her of the pending litigation. Despite her claim that this email address was
“abandoned,” her present counsel used that address to communicate with her in
September 2012, long after BK had emailed Toidze at the same address in November of
2010. (App. at 119.) The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Toidze’s
Rule 55(c) motion to vacate the default judgment.
Toidze further contends that she is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(3). That rule
allows the court to vacate a judgment that has been obtained through fraud or other
misconduct and such misconduct “prevented [her] from fully and fairly presenting [her]
case.” Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 207 (3d Cir. 1983). We agree with the
9
District Court that she did not demonstrate “that the alleged problems with [BK]’s
representation in the Connecticut [Action] in any way impacted her ability to participate
in and present her case.” (App. at 118.)
Toidze’s final argument is that the default judgment will result in a significant
hardship because BK’s services “had negative value” and “judgments by default are not
favored.” (Appellant’s Br. at 46-47.) “Rule 60(b)(6) relief from judgment is only
granted in extraordinary circumstances. It is available where the party seeking relief
demonstrates that extreme and unexpected hardship will result absent such relief.”
Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations and quotations
omitted). No extraordinary circumstances exist in this case to justify vacating the default
judgment. We are satisfied that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Toidze’s motion to vacate pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(6).
IV.
For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying
Toidze’s motion to vacate the default judgment.
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