Filed: Oct. 23, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 14-1751 _ BILL H. DOMINGUEZ, on behalf of himself And all others similarly situated, Appellant v. YAHOO, INC. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-01887) District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson _ Argued November 21, 2014 Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA, and ROTH, Circuit Judges (Filed: October 23, 2015) James A. Francis, Esq. [Argued] David A.
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 14-1751 _ BILL H. DOMINGUEZ, on behalf of himself And all others similarly situated, Appellant v. YAHOO, INC. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-01887) District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson _ Argued November 21, 2014 Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA, and ROTH, Circuit Judges (Filed: October 23, 2015) James A. Francis, Esq. [Argued] David A. S..
More
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 14-1751
________________
BILL H. DOMINGUEZ, on behalf of himself
And all others similarly situated,
Appellant
v.
YAHOO, INC.
________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-01887)
District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson
________________
Argued November 21, 2014
Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 23, 2015)
James A. Francis, Esq. [Argued]
David A. Searles, Esq.
John Soumilas, Esq.
Francis & Mailman
100 South Broad Street
Land Title Building, 19th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19110
Counsel for Appellant
Ian C. Ballon, Esq. (Argued)
Lori Chang, Esq.
Greenberg Traurig
1840 Century Park East, Suite 1900
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Brian T. Feeney, Esq.
Greenberg Traurig
2001 Market Street
Suite 2700 Two Commerce Square
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Appellee
Brian Melendez, Esq.
Dykema Gossett
90 South Seventh Street
4000 Wells Fargo Center
Minneapolis, MN 55402
David H. Kramer, Esq.
David J. Strandness, Esq.
Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati
Professional Corporation
650 Page Mill Road
Palo Alto, CA 94304
Tonia Ouellette Klausner, Esq.
Brian M. Willen, Esq.
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich Rosati
Professional Corporation
1301 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor
New York, NY 10019-6002
Counsel for Amicus Appellees
________________
OPINION*
________________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Bill Dominguez appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of Yahoo!, Inc. on his claim that Yahoo violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(the “TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, by sending him approximately 54 unsolicited text
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
2
messages per day over the course of 17 months. We decide whether the District Court
correctly concluded that no reasonable juror could find Yahoo’s text-messaging system to
qualify as an “automatic telephone dialing system” under the statutory definition. In light
of the intervening statutory interpretation by the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”), we vacate and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
In December 2011 Dominguez bought a cell phone that came with a reassigned
telephone number. The previous owner of the number had subscribed to an email-
notification service offered by Yahoo. That service sent a text message to the owner’s
phone number every time an email was sent to the owner’s linked Yahoo email account.
Because the previous owner never cancelled his subscription when the number was
reassigned, Dominguez inherited the prior owner’s text-message notifications when he
bought his new phone. Each time a new email reached the previous owner’s inbox,
Yahoo’s system sent a text-message notification to Dominguez’s phone.
In short order the messages began piling up. Dominguez first unsuccessfully tried
to put a halt to them by unsuccessfully replying “stop” and “help” to some texts. Then he
sought out Yahoo’s customer service for help but was told that the company could not
stop the messages and that, as far as Yahoo was concerned, the number would always
belong to the previous owner. Having exhausted the company route, Dominguez called a
representative from the FCC, who then participated in another call (with Dominguez on
the line) to Yahoo’s customer service. When this too failed to stop the messages,
3
Dominguez filed complaints with the FCC and the Federal Trade Commission, yet again
to no avail.
Having received 27,809 text messages over 17 months, Dominguez filed a
putative class action under the TCPA, which forbids “any person within the United States
. . . to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the
prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system
[‘autodialer’] . . . to any telephone number assigned to a . . . cellular telephone service.”
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). A successful plaintiff under the TCPA is entitled to $500
in damages per violation. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). Therefore, Dominguez stands to win
$13,904,500. Yahoo moved for summary judgment. It argued that the statute requires an
“autodialer” to have “a random or sequential number generator,” Id. § 227(a)(1)(A) &
(B), and its text-messaging system did not generate numbers at all; instead, it dialed
numbers from a compiled list.
In response, Dominguez argued that, while one meaning of “sequential” is “in
numerical sequence,” an autodialer might also meet the statutory definition if it dials non-
sequential numbers in a sequential manner (i.e., by placing them in a queue and dialing
them one at a time). Alternatively, he argued that the FCC has interpreted the statute to
cover “any equipment” with the capacity to “generate numbers and dial them without
human intervention regardless of whether the numbers called are randomly or
sequentially generated or come from calling lists.” In the Matter of Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“2003 FCC
Ruling”), 18 FCC Rcd. 14,014, 14,092 (July 3, 2003) (emphasis added).
4
The District Court sided with Yahoo on both issues. First, the Court agreed that
the phrase “random or sequential” refers to the types of numbers (random or sequential
ones), not the manner they are dialed. Second, it rejected the FCC’s interpretation as
contrary to the TCPA’s plain language and inapplicable outside the narrow context of
“predictive dialers.” Finding no evidence that Yahoo’s system could generate random or
sequential numbers, the Court awarded summary judgment in Yahoo’s favor, and
Dominguez appealed.
Finally, after briefing and oral argument and while this case was under
submission, the FCC issued a declaratory ruling and order in July 2015 further clarifying
the meaning of an autodialer. In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 2015 WL 4387780, at *5–*6 (F.C.C. July
10, 2015) (“2015 FCC Ruling”). Both parties submitted letters under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 28(j) apprising us of this ruling.
II. DISCUSSION
The only issue on appeal is whether a reasonable trier of fact could find Yahoo’s
system qualifies as an “automatic telephone dialing system” (the term “ATDS” or
“autodialer” for short). We start with the statute itself. The TCPA defines an
“autodialer” as “equipment which has the capacity (A) to store or produce telephone
numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial
such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) (emphasis added). The statute’s reference to a
“random or sequential number generator” reflects that, when the statute was enacted in
1992, telemarketers typically used autodialing equipment that either called numbers in
5
large sequential blocks or dialed random 10-digit strings. Thus, the FCC initially
interpreted the statute as specifically targeting equipment that placed a high volume of
calls by randomly or sequentially generating the numbers to be dialed.
That interpretation changed as telemarketers’ dialing technology evolved. Around
the turn of this century, the FCC took note that “the evolution of the teleservices industry
ha[d] progressed to the point where . . . [it was] far more cost effective” to dial from
stored databases of numbers rather than generate them randomly or sequentially. 2003
FCC Ruling, 18 FCC Rcd. at 14,093. In light of these advancements, the FCC sought
comment on whether to update its interpretation. In re Rules & Regulations
Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 17 FCC Rcd. 17,459,
17,474 (2002). The reaction was mixed. While some commenters argued that the
statutory text plainly defined an autodialer by its capacity to generate random or
sequential numbers, others contended that limiting the statute to antiquated technology
would gut the statute and eviscerate its protections.
In a series of declaratory rulings—the most recent being the one referred to above
in July 2015, see 2015 FCC Ruling, 2015 WL 4387780, at *5–*6—the FCC appeared to
take a middle-of-the road view. Although hardly a model of clarity, its orders (as we
interpret them) hold that an autodialer must be able to store or produce numbers that
themselves are randomly or sequentially generated “even if [the autodialer is] not
presently used for that purpose.”
Id. at *5. But importantly, in the most recent ruling the
FCC also clarified that neither “present ability” nor the use of a single piece of equipment
6
is required. Thus, so long as the equipment is part of a “system” that has the latent
“capacity” to place autodialed calls, the statutory definition is satisfied.
Turning to our case, we apply the normal burden-shifting framework applicable at
the summary-judgment stage of litigation. “Summary judgment is appropriate only
where, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Lexington Ins. Co. v. W. Pa. Hosp., 423 F.3d 318, 322 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of production. See Celotex
Corp v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (White, J., concurring) (plurality opinion). It is
only once this showing is made that the burden shifts to the non-moving party, who must
then demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to each
element of the cause of action for which it bears the burden of proof.
Id. at 324.
Although we agree with the District Court’s definition of “random or sequential”
number generation (i.e., the phrase refers to the numbers themselves rather than the
manner in which they are dialed)1 and its holding that the statutory definition does in fact
include such a requirement,2 we disagree that the record supports the entry of summary
1
To the extent the District Court held otherwise, we clarify that the statutory definition is
explicit that the autodialing equipment may have the capacity to store or to produce the
randomly or sequentially generated numbers to be dialed. We acknowledge that it is
unclear how a number can be stored (as opposed to produced) using a “random or
sequential number generator. To the extent there is any confusion between the parties on
this issue (or whether Yahoo’s equipment meets this requirement in Dominguez’s case),
the District Court may address it on remand.
2
Because we reject Dominguez’s claim that the FCC has interpreted the autodialer
definition to read out the “random or sequential number generator” requirement, we need
7
judgment in Yahoo’s favor. The only evidence Yahoo can point to that is probative of
whether its equipment has the requisite capacity is the conclusory affidavit of its expert
Ajay Gopalkrishna, who states that “[t]he servers and systems affiliated with the Email
SMS Service did not have the capacity to store or produce numbers to be called, using a
random or sequential number generator, and to call those numbers.” Not only does this
restating of the statutory definition amount to nothing more than a legal conclusion
couched as a factual assertion, compare with 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) (“The term
‘automatic telephone dialing system’ means equipment which has the capacity (A) to
store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number
generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.”), it begs the question of what is meant by the
word “capacity.” Because this is an issue of heightened importance in light of the 2015
FCC Ruling, and the District Court did not previously have the benefit of the FCC’s
ruling in addressing the issue,3 remand is appropriate to allow that Court to address more
fully in the first instance whether Yahoo’s equipment meets the statutory definition.
Finally, in remanding for further briefing and factual development (if appropriate),
we recognize that Yahoo asserts in a footnote of its brief that both parties agree it is the
not reach his argument regarding the Hobbs Act, which gives “[t]he court of
appeals . . . exclusive jurisdiction to . . . determine the validity of . . . all final orders of
the [FCC].” 28 U.S.C. § 2342.
3
The meaning of capacity is only very briefly addressed in a footnote of the District
Court’s decision. See Dominguez v. Yahoo!, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 3d 637, 641 n.8 (E.D. Pa.
2014) (“Recently, courts and commentators have observed that many modern
technological devices, including smartphones, could store or produce numbers and dial
such numbers without human intervention if outfitted with the requisite software. Thus,
they have drawn a distinction between a system's present capacity (as currently designed)
and its potential capacity.”).
8
equipment’s “present capacity” that is relevant to the statutory definition. Despite the
significant clarification on the meaning of “capacity” provided by the FCC, we believe
remand is still the appropriate course of action. Moreover, the District Court may
consider on remand whether Dominguez properly preserved this issue (and how any
“waiver” might be affected by the intervening 2015 FCC Ruling).
* * * * *
For the above reasons, we vacate the opinion of the District Court and remand for
further proceedings.
9
