Filed: Dec. 17, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: BLD-069 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 15-2407 _ NATHAN JOSEPH REIGLE, Appellant v. RALPH RIESH, Warden (in his individual capacity); MARY JO CRISTIANO, in her individual capacity; DR. HYNICK, in his individual capacity; NURSE PATTY; LT JIM SMINK _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 1-11-cv-00052) District Judge Honorable Yvette Kane _ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28
Summary: BLD-069 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 15-2407 _ NATHAN JOSEPH REIGLE, Appellant v. RALPH RIESH, Warden (in his individual capacity); MARY JO CRISTIANO, in her individual capacity; DR. HYNICK, in his individual capacity; NURSE PATTY; LT JIM SMINK _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 1-11-cv-00052) District Judge Honorable Yvette Kane _ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U..
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BLD-069 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-2407
___________
NATHAN JOSEPH REIGLE,
Appellant
v.
RALPH RIESH, Warden (in his individual capacity); MARY JO CRISTIANO, in her
individual capacity; DR. HYNICK, in his individual capacity; NURSE PATTY; LT JIM
SMINK
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 1-11-cv-00052)
District Judge Honorable Yvette Kane
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 3, 2015
Before: FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed December 17, 2015)
_________
OPINION*
__________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Nathan Joseph Reigle (“Reigle”) appeals from the judgment of
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in his civil rights
case. As the appeal does not present a substantial question of law, we will summarily
affirm the decision of the District Court.
I.
Reigle is a state prisoner housed at SCI-Mahanoy. Reigle was previously
incarcerated at the Northumberland County Prison (“NCP”) from January 2007 until
August 2007, and then again from April 2008 until June 2008. Reigle has alleged that
during his first period of incarceration at NCP, he was denied dental treatment and
treatment for Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (“MRSA”). He also alleged
that he was retaliated against for complaints he made and for obtaining the assistance of
an attorney to pursue enforcement of his civil rights.
By his appointed counsel, Reigle filed an amended complaint against defendants
Warden Riesh, Doctor Hynick, mental health counselor Mary Jo Cristiano, Nurse Patty,
and Lieutenant Smink.1 He raised deliberate indifference medical claims under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments against defendants Riesh, Cristiano, Hynick, and
Patty. He also raised a First and Fourteenth Amendment retaliation claim against
defendant Riesh.
1
All claims against Smink were dismissed in September 2011.
2
During discovery, Defendant Hynick filed a motion to compel the production of
Reigle’s medical records from NCP after Reigle’s attorneys were unable to contact
Reigle. After Reigle’s attorneys were able to contact him, both sides began to take a
deposition of Reigle. The deposition was stopped after Reigle stated “he had documents
relevant to his claims that he could not access until his release from prison, which [was]
scheduled to occur on August 21, 2012.” Dkt. # 56, pg. 2, ¶ 11. The District Court
granted two enlargements of discovery during this time period.
On October 2, 2012, Reigle’s attorneys filed a motion for leave to withdraw as
counsel pursuant to Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16(b)(4). They asked to withdraw
because of fundamental disagreements about the course of action to pursue in the case.
In an August 2013 order, the District Court granted the motion to withdraw and denied
Reigle’s motion to file a second amended complaint. Defendants filed two motions to
compel documents from Reigle, which the District Court granted. Reigle does not appear
to have complied with these motions and did not respond to communications from
defendants’ attorneys.2 In May 2015, at the request of the defendants, the District Court
dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Reigle appeals, and asks for leave to amend his complaint.
2
Reigle appears to have been released from NCP prior to the fire, and left no forwarding
address for the District Court, his former attorneys, and counsel for the defendants.
3
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court dismissed the complaint
with prejudice under Rule 41(b), which is an adjudication on the merits. See Kuzma v.
Bessemer & L.E.R.R., 259 F.2d 456, 457 (3d Cir. 1958). We review dismissals for
failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b) for abuse of discretion. See Emerson v. Thiel Coll.,
296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002). Dismissals with prejudice are only appropriate in
limited circumstances, and any doubts should be resolved in favor of reaching a decision
on the merits.
Id.
In determining whether the District Court abused its discretion, we examine six
factors which the District Court must have balanced, and whether the record supports
those findings. See Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir.
1984). We consider “the extent of the party’s personal responsibility;” prejudice to the
opposing party, caused by “the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to
discovery;” and whether the party has been repeatedly dilatory.
Id. We also consider
whether the party’s conduct was willful or in bad faith; “the effectiveness of sanctions
other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions;” and the merits of
the party’s claim.
Id. A district court should discuss all six factors. See United States v.
$8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency,
330 F.3d 141, 161 (3d Cir. 2003); In re Asbestos Prods.
Liab. Litig. (No. VI),
718 F.3d 236, 247 (3d Cir. 2013). Where a district court does not
4
have all the facts needed to conduct a full Poulis analysis, it should not dismiss a
plaintiff’s case sua sponte. See Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 264 (3d Cir. 2008).
The District Court weighed all six factors and applied the Poulis test correctly.
First, the District Court found that Reigle assumed personal responsibility for litigation
after withdrawal of his attorneys. See Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d
912, 920 (3d Cir. 1992) (applying Poulis in a Rule 55 default judgment case). The
District Court next found that Reigle had prejudiced the defendants by prolonging the
litigation in delaying and failing to adequately respond to their discovery requests.
Review of the record shows that the defendants waited for Reigle to produce the
documents for over two years. See, e.g., dkt. # 48, Motion to Compel (dated Oct. 6,
2011); dkt. # 56, Second Unopposed Motion for Enlargement of Time to Complete
Discovery (stating that “Plaintiff represented he had documents relevant to his claims that
he could not access until his release from prison”); dkt. # 57 (Order granting in part dkt. #
48, dated Aug. 17, 2012). The District Court next correctly found that Reigle had
established a “history of dilatoriness” because of his delays in responding.
Regarding the fourth factor, the District Court stated that “it appears that at least
some of this dilatory behavior was performed willfully and in bad faith, as Plaintiff has
offered no explanation for his continuing inability to produce the requested documents,
despite his repeated statements that he would be able to obtain them.” After examination
of the record, we agree with the District Court’s conclusions regarding both Reigle’s
history of dilatoriness and the manner in which he conducted himself. As noted in the
5
Second Unopposed Motion for Enlargement of Time, Reigle represented that he had
relevant documents that he could not produce until his release. It does not appear that he
ever produced them. In his “petition to block dismissal and amended complaint”
(“Petition”), Reigle stated his documents were destroyed when NCP burned down.
However, these same documents had been sought by defendants nearly two years before
NCP burned down, and their motion to compel regarding these documents was granted in
August 2014. Regarding the fifth factor, the District Court stated that no lesser penalty
could be imposed, because there was no way to obtain Reigle’s whereabouts after his
apparent release. It also noted that monetary sanctions would likely be ineffective where
a plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. While the lapse in communication
could have been due to the aforementioned fire, at least in part, efforts to contact Reigle
before the fire were unsuccessful. Reigle did not file anything in the District Court
between March 21, 2014, and June 1, 2015, when he filed his notice of appeal. There is
also no indication that Reigle attempted to notify the District Court or the defendants of
his release before or after NCP burned down.
The District Court acknowledged that Reigle’s remaining claims had survived a
motion to dismiss, and that the sixth factor therefore weighed somewhat against
dismissal. According to the District Court, however, this factor was “mitigated by the
cogent arguments Defendants have made in their motions for summary judgment, and
Plaintiff has failed to respond to any of these arguments.” Given the District Court’s
analysis of the record, we agree with this conclusion.
6
In his memorandum in support of his appeal, Reigle claims to introduce new
evidence and makes a number of statements not presented to the District Court. Some of
Reigle’s “new” evidence is already in the record. To the extent that Reigle has presented
any new evidence, we may only consider the record as established in the District Court.
See Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 1973); see also Fed. R. App. P. 10(a).
Reigle argues in his memorandum, first, that he was not dilatory, but for the reasons
discussed above, this argument is unavailing. He also states that he sent a letter to the
defendants’ attorneys and to the Court with his new address. Reigle argues that if the
“attorney and court didn’t receive” this letter, it must have been destroyed in the same
fire that burned down NCP. As we are bound by the record before us, we cannot
pronounce on his speculations.
The only potential issue is that the District Court did not expressly afford Reigle
an opportunity to be heard regarding his failure to comply with the court’s orders. This
Court requires district courts to provide that opportunity before dismissing a case for
failure to prosecute sua sponte. See Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 258. However, this case was
dismissed upon the request of the defendants, and the District Court balanced the Poulis
factors appropriately in rendering its decision only after it had not received anything from
Reigle for over a year. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the
case with prejudice.
For the reasons stated above, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s
decision. Accordingly, we deny Reigle’s request for leave to amend his complaint.
7
