Filed: Mar. 01, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: ALD-161 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 15-3807 _ RAPHAEL MOSES SPEARMAN, Appellant v. LIEUTENANT ALAN MORRIS; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER W. HOLLOWOOD _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 2-14-cv-01751) District Judge Mark R. Hornak _ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 February 25, 2016 Befor
Summary: ALD-161 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 15-3807 _ RAPHAEL MOSES SPEARMAN, Appellant v. LIEUTENANT ALAN MORRIS; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER W. HOLLOWOOD _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 2-14-cv-01751) District Judge Mark R. Hornak _ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 February 25, 2016 Before..
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ALD-161 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-3807
___________
RAPHAEL MOSES SPEARMAN,
Appellant
v.
LIEUTENANT ALAN MORRIS; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER W. HOLLOWOOD
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-14-cv-01751)
District Judge Mark R. Hornak
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 25, 2016
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 1, 2016)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Pro se appellant Raphael Spearman appeals from the judgment of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in his § 1983 action. As
the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the decision
of the District Court.
I.
Spearman initiated this § 1983 action in 2014 against Lieutenant Alan Morris and
Correctional Officer W. Hollowood, both employees at SCI-Waynesburg, asserting a
variety of constitutional claims based on their alleged involvement in the destruction of
his legal documents and subsequent threats they directed at him.
According to Spearman’s complaint, on February 2, 2014, Hollowood threatened
to move him to a “hard cell” if Spearman did not stop filing grievances related to his lost
legal documents,1 and also allegedly advised Spearman that “he thr[ew] [Spearman’s]
legal work in the trash” to ensure he would lose his case.2 On February 3, 2014,
Spearman filed grievance number 49606, listing the above allegations against
Hollowood. On February 11, 2014, the grievance office denied Spearman’s grievance,
citing a lack of evidence. Spearman appealed this decision on February 18, 2014, and on
1
Hollowood’s threat regarding the filing of grievances appears to be related to a request
Spearman filed to library staff on January 27, 2014 concerning lost legal documents.
2
Though it is not clear from the complaint, state court records indicate that Spearman
was charged in June of 2014 with criminal homicide and related charges for an incident
that occurred at SCI-Waynesburg. Spearman appears to suggest in his complaint that
Hollowood destroyed his legal work to handicap Spearman’s defense in this matter.
2
March 6, 2014, the facility manager upheld the initial denial, also citing a lack of
evidence.
On April 21, 2014, the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals
declined to exercise final review over Spearman’s appeal of the facility manager’s
decision because Spearman did not attach the required documentation with his appeal,
including a copy of the initial grievance and subsequent responses. The Secretary’s
response advised Spearman, in an “action required” notice, that if he did not submit these
forms within fifteen days, his appeal would be dismissed.
Meanwhile, on February 12, 2014, Spearman filed grievance number 497318
against Defendant Morris, alleging that Morris “blackmailed” and threatened him into
withdrawing a previously filed grievance concerning his lost legal documents. The
grievance officer denied this grievance on February 24, 2014, citing a lack of evidence.
Spearman appealed on February 26, 2014, and on March 3, 2013, the facility manager
upheld the initial denial. On March 28, 2014, the Secretary’s office again declined to
exercise final review over Spearman’s appeal because Spearman failed to attach the
required documentation. The office advised him that his appeal would be dismissed if he
did not attach the required documents within fifteen days.
Spearman acknowledges that he received both “action required” notices from the
Secretary’s office, but “swear[s] under oath” that he “filed all copies of my initial
grievance; all responses and all appeals, as well as a brief appeal to the (S.O.I.G.A.) [for
both grievances] within the time frame.” He further indicates that he “sent the copies to
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the central office for forwarding because of threats [he’s] been receiving.” Curiously,
Spearman also contends that his “failure to comply properly with the exhaustion
requirement [for both grievances] was caused by illegal actions by the name[d]
Defendants by threatening; retaliation & wrongdoing to prevent the plaintiff from
properly completing the exhaustion requirements.” The District Court record does not
contain any of Spearman’s appeals to the Secretary’s office, only the “action required”
notices sent to Spearman.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on August 5, 2015, arguing that Spearman
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he never properly appealed to final
review. The District Court treated this as a motion for summary judgment, and in an
October 7, 2015 Report and Recommendation, recommended that Defendants’ motion be
granted. On October 29, 2015 the District Court granted Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment and adopted the Report and Recommendation as the opinion of the
Court. Spearman filed a timely notice of appeal from this order on November 19, 2015.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a
district court award of summary judgment and apply the same test the district court
should have applied – whether the record “shows that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Giles
v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009). In applying this test, we must accept
evidence presented by the non-movant as true and draw all justifiable factual inferences
4
in his favor. Id. We may summarily affirm the District Court’s award of summary
judgment where “it clearly appears that no substantial question is presented or that
subsequent precedent or a change in circumstances warrants such action.” 3d Cir. I.O.P.
10.6 (2015).
The District Court correctly granted Defendants motion for summary judgment
because Spearman failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).
Section 1997e of the PLRA provides, in part, that “[n]o action shall be brought
with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title . . . until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” This exhaustion requirement is
an affirmative defense, and entry of summary judgment on such a ground is appropriate
only when the moving party presents “evidence that would entitle [it] to a directed verdict
if not controverted at trial.” In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 237 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986)).
DC-ADM 804, which governs the grievance and appeals process in Pennsylvania
correctional institutions, provides for a three-step process, with final review of grievances
performed by the Secretary’s office. This Court has frequently observed that a plaintiff
must follow each of these steps to exhaust his administrative remedies under the PLRA.
Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 299 (3d Cir. 2000) (2001) (plaintiff “did not take full
advantage of the administrative procedures available to him” in failing to use steps two
and three of DC–ADM 804); Jenkins v. Morton,
148 F.3d 257, 259 (3d Cir.1998)
5
(discussing California and Illinois grievance procedures similar to DC–ADM 804 and
concluding that exhaustion occurs only after completion of final step). In addition,
“[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical
procedural rules.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). Because Spearman never
perfected his appeal for final review according to applicable procedures, he has failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies.
Spearman adopted seemingly inconsistent positions to oppose Defendants’
motion. In his response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, he “swear[s] under oath [that
he] filed all copies of [his] initial grievance; all responses and all appeals as well as a
brief appeal to the (S.O.I.G.A.) [for both grievances] within the time frame,” and
concludes that “I believe that I exhausted all my administrative remedies.” But in his
objections to the Report and Recommendation, he states that his “failure to comply
properly with the exhaustion requirement [for both grievances] was caused by illegal
actions by the name[d] Defendants by threatening; retaliation & wrongdoing to prevent
the plaintiff from properly completing the exhaustion requirements.” These bare,
contradictory allegations are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 914 (3d Cir. 1980). (“Denials in the form of
legal conclusions, unsupported by documentation of specific facts, are insufficient to
create issues of material fact that would preclude summary judgment.”).
Accordingly, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.
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