Filed: Sep. 28, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 16-1190 _ THOMASON WOODSON, Appellant v. COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D. N.J. No. 2-14-cv-06129) District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) September 16, 2016 Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. (Filed: September 28, 2016) _ OPINION* _ CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 16-1190 _ THOMASON WOODSON, Appellant v. COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D. N.J. No. 2-14-cv-06129) District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) September 16, 2016 Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. (Filed: September 28, 2016) _ OPINION* _ CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. *..
More
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 16-1190
_____________
THOMASON WOODSON,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D. N.J. No. 2-14-cv-06129)
District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 16, 2016
Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: September 28, 2016)
____________
OPINION*
____________
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Thomason Woodson appeals a District Court order affirming the Commissioner of
Social Security’s denial of his application for disability benefits under 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I.
We write solely for the parties and therefore recite only the facts necessary to our
disposition. Woodson filed an application for disability insurance on June 21, 2011,
alleging disability beginning on June 23, 2009. An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
held a hearing on January 30, 2013 and on March 1, 2013, held that Woodson “has not
been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from June 23, 2009,
through the date of this decision.” Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 18. The ALJ
determined that Woodson suffered from severe impairments of alcohol dependence in
remission (secondary cocaine abuse in remission), asthma, sleep apnea, congestive heart
failure, obesity, back disorder, and arthritis in the knees. A.R. 14. But the ALJ found
that none of these impairments, or a combination of the impairments, meets or equals any
of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. Subpt. P. App. 1. The ALJ found that
Woodson has residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the full range of sedentary
work, even if this RFC is insufficient to allow Woodson to perform his previous relevant
work as a bridge operator. After considering Woodson’s circumstances, the ALJ found
there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that he can perform. On
July 31, 2014, the Appeals Council denied Woodson’s request for review. Woodson filed
suit, and the District Court affirmed the Commissioner’s final decision in an order dated
December 2, 2015. Woodson filed a timely appeal.
2
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we have
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “Our review is limited to
determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s
decision to deny benefits. Substantial evidence has been defined as more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 633 (3d Cir.
2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
III.
On appeal, Woodson makes the same four arguments he made to the District
Court: (1) the Commissioner’s step three finding is beyond judicial review;1 (2) the RFC
1
We have previously explained that:
The Social Security Administration has promulgated a five-step process for
evaluating disability claims. First, the Commissioner considers whether the
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, then the
Commissioner considers in the second step whether the claimant has a ‘severe
impairment’ that significantly limits his physical or mental ability to perform basic
work activities. If the claimant suffers a severe impairment, the third inquiry is
whether, based on the medical evidence, the impairment meets the criteria of an
impairment listed in the ‘listing of impairments,’ which result in a presumption of
disability, or whether the claimant retains the capacity to work. If the impairment
does not meet the criteria for a listed impairment, then the Commissioner assesses
in the fourth step whether, despite the severe impairment, the claimant has the
residual functional capacity to perform his past work. If the claimant cannot
perform his past work, then the final step is to determine whether there is other
work in the national economy that the claimant can perform. The claimant bears
the burden of proof for steps one, two, and four of this test. The Commissioner
bears the burden of proof for the last step.
3
determination at step four was not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the ALJ did not
evaluate Woodson’s subjective complaints; and (4) the Commissioner did not sustain her
burden at step five.
The District Court focused in on two “principal defects” in Woodson’s action: (1)
Woodson failed to deal with his burden of proof at the first four steps of the evaluation
process, see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987), and (2) his failure to
address the harmless error doctrine, see Shinseki v. Sanders,
556 U.S. 396, 409-10
(2009).
We have considered Woodson’s arguments, and for the following reasons, we will
affirm the District Court’s determination.
A.
Woodson first argues that Commissioner’s step three finding is beyond judicial
review. He believes the ALJ did not consider whether his impairments in combination
are medically equivalent to a listed impairment. In particular, Woodson argues that the
ALJ’s analysis was not individualized, especially with respect to his obesity. We
disagree.
“At step three, an ALJ is charged with determining whether a claimant’s
impairment or combination of impairments meets, or medically equals, the criteria of an
impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d) and 416.920(d).” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 502 (3d Cir. 2009). For meaningful judicial review, the ALJ must
Sykes v. Apfel,
228 F.3d 259, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
4
provide a discussion of the evidence and an explanation of reasoning, id. at 504, but we
do not “require the ALJ to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in
conducting his analysis,” Jones v. Barnhart,
364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004).
Woodson contends that the ALJ’s analysis was merely “mentally assessed,”
Woodson Br. 8, because there was limited written analysis comparing his impairments
with those in the listings. The ALJ, however, did conclude that Woodson did not satisfy
the requirements of the Listing of Impairments, specifically 1.00 (Musculoskeletal
System), 3.00 (Respiratory System), and 12.00 (Mental Disorders). Further, the ALJ
repeatedly considered the role of Woodson’s obesity, evaluating it within the context of
the overall record, consistent with the appropriate guidelines.
Woodson simply speculates about how his obesity might exacerbate other
impairments — his back disorder, complaints of pain, arthritic knees, congestive heart
failure, asthma attacks, or sleep apnea, Woodson Br. 16. But Woodson never points to
specific medical evidence in the record to demonstrate that his obesity, in combination
with other impairments, is sufficiently disabling. Instead, the evidence before the ALJ
suggests otherwise. For instance, Dr. Rambhai Patel noted that Woodson walked without
assistive devices and had a normal gait. A.R. 17. Dr. Patel also noted that Woodson had
no acute distress, and the ALJ placed great emphasis on Dr. Patel’s report. A.R. 17. Dr.
Patel noted that the use of a CPAP machine has helped Woodson’s sleep apnea. A.R.
262.
Woodson argues that the ALJ never explicitly addressed congestive heart failure
under Listing 4.02. But the record evidence undercuts Woodson’s position. It is true that
5
Woodson claimed a history of congestive heart failure and that he has been hospitalized
twice. A.R. 262. But Dr. Patel found that a chest x-ray demonstrated cardiomegaly
without congestive heart failure. A.R. 263. Woodson never received consistent
treatment for any of these impairments. A.R. 17.
Woodson repeatedly states that his circumstances were not compared to the
listings. But he never explains how, even if the ALJ’s analysis was lacking, the
deficiency was harmful to his claims. Woodson only says in very vague terms that an
actual discussion of his impairments would lead to the conclusion that he was disabled at
step three. This is unconvincing. Woodson has not affirmatively pointed to specific
evidence that demonstrates he should succeed at step three. In other words, any error
would be harmless. See Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 409 (“[T]he burden of showing that an
error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.”); see
also Rutherford v. Barnhart,
399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A] remand is not
required here because it would not affect the outcome of the case.”).
We hold that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination at step three,
but even if any error occurred, it would be harmless.
B.
Next, Woodson challenges the ALJ’s RFC determination at step four, arguing that
it is not supported by substantial evidence. Woodson says there is no evidence to support
the determination that he could perform “the full range of sedentary work.” Woodson Br.
28. The ALJ is responsible for making the RFC finding based on all relevant medical
and other evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 404.1546(c).
6
The ALJ provided sufficient analysis for its RFC finding, which was supported by
substantial evidence. As already explained, the ALJ cited to Dr. Patel’s report, on which
it placed “great weight.” A.R. 17. Dr. Patel noted that Woodson walked with a normal
gait. A.R. 17. Dr. Patel’s report further explained: “He can do both fine and gross
movements in both hands and the grip was normal. Gait, he was walking without any
walking device and there was no[t] any gross sensory or motor deficit.” A.R. 263. The
ALJ explained that notes from rehab indicated few physical complaints. A.R. 16. It is
true that Woodson claimed that he could not sit at a table packing two pound items
because repetitive movement causes shortness of breath and chest pains. A.R. 16. But
the ALJ did not find Woodson entirely credible, A.R. 16, even though Dr. Patel’s report
did explain that Woodson experiences shortness of breath with exertion, A.R. 262.
Woodson has not pointed to any other specific medical evidence to support his position.
In sum, the ALJ’s analysis was supported by substantial evidence.
C.
Woodson also contends that the ALJ never seriously evaluated his subjective
complaints about pain, but dismissed them with boilerplate language questioning
Woodson’s credibility. We disagree. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
determination that Woodson’s statements were “not entirely credible,” A.R. 16, because
Woodson’s claims were contradicted by the medical evidence in the record. See
Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Allegations of pain and other
subjective symptoms must be supported by objective medical evidence.”). As already
mentioned, Dr. Patel’s report stated that Woodson walked with a normal gait. Dr. Patel
7
reported that Woodson had no motor or sensory deficits, nor any acute distress. Other
evidence reasonably supports the ALJ’s credibility finding, including Woodson’s daily
routines, including doing household chores, and driving locally, A.R. 16-17. Substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s decision regarding the credibility of Woodson’s subjective
statements.
D.
Finally, Woodson argues that the Commissioner did not sustain its burden at step
five because he had non-exertional impairments, such as respiratory impairments, which
required the ALJ use a vocational expert. The ALJ found that Woodson has the RFC to
perform a full range of sedentary work even though he must avoid environmental irritants
and temperature extremes. Woodson is quite vague about what his specific non-
exertional impairments are, referring again to respiratory issues and congestive heart
failure. The District Court found that Woodson failed to establish a predicate non-
exertional limitation that was omitted from the RFC analysis in step four. But even if he
does have a non-exertional impairment, Woodson’s argument that the Commissioner
must use a vocational expert is not correct. Allen v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 396, 407 (3d Cir.
2005) (“[W]e hold that if the Secretary wishes to rely on an SSR [Social Security Ruling]
as a replacement for a vocational expert, it must be crystal-clear that the SSR is probative
as to the way in which the nonexertional limitations impact the ability to work, and thus,
the occupational base.”). Even if the ALJ could have better relied on a SSR or used a
vocational expert, we hold that any error is harmless. See
Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 553.
8
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that significant numbers of jobs
exist in the national economy that Woodson can perform.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
9
