Filed: Jul. 13, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 16-3343 _ JOSEPH SMITH, Appellant v. SUSQUEHANNA UNIVERSITY; SCOTT A. MOYER, individually and in his official capacity as officer of Susquehanna University Department of Public Safety; CURT BROWN, individually and in his official capacity as officer of Susquehanna University Department of Public Safety; THOMAS A. RAMBO, individually and in his official capacity as Assistant Vice President for Student Life and Director of
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 16-3343 _ JOSEPH SMITH, Appellant v. SUSQUEHANNA UNIVERSITY; SCOTT A. MOYER, individually and in his official capacity as officer of Susquehanna University Department of Public Safety; CURT BROWN, individually and in his official capacity as officer of Susquehanna University Department of Public Safety; THOMAS A. RAMBO, individually and in his official capacity as Assistant Vice President for Student Life and Director of ..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 16-3343
____________
JOSEPH SMITH,
Appellant
v.
SUSQUEHANNA UNIVERSITY; SCOTT A. MOYER, individually and in his
official capacity as officer of Susquehanna University Department of
Public Safety; CURT BROWN, individually and in his official capacity
as officer of Susquehanna University Department of Public Safety;
THOMAS A. RAMBO, individually and in his official capacity as Assistant
Vice President for Student Life and Director of Public Safety at Susquehanna University
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 4-14-cv-00116)
District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on March 24, 2017
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, JORDAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 13, 2017)
________________
OPINION*
________________
ROTH, Circuit Judge
Joseph Smith appeals the District Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of
appellees Scott Moyer, Curt Brown, and Thomas Rambo on Smith’s claims for alleged
violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. For the reasons set forth below, we will
affirm.
I.1
Smith was a student at the private college, Susquehanna University, where he
lived in a dormitory building on campus. Pursuant to University policy,2 dormitory
buildings “may be searched and items seized if there is reasonable cause to believe that a
student(s) is using his or her room for a purpose in violation of federal, state, or local law
or of university regulations.” On the evening of January 23, 2012, a resident advisor in
Smith’s dormitory building called the University’s Department of Public Safety and
spoke with Public Safety Officer (PSO) Patty McGee to report an odor of marijuana
outside Smith’s door. McGee sent an email to Brown and Moyer, two other PSOs,
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
As Smith’s claims were decided at summary judgment, we view all facts in the light
most favorable to Smith and make all reasonable inferences in his favor. American Eagle
Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009).
2
The policy is contained in a student handbook which was given to Smith at the time of
his enrollment at Susquehanna.
2
reporting her observations. Nothing further was done that evening. The next morning,
Brown and Moyer approached Rambo, the Director of the Department of Public Safety,
with McGee’s report. Rambo determined that McGee’s observations were sufficient to
establish reasonable cause,3 and authorized a search of Smith’s room. Brown and Moyer
proceeded to Smith’s room and announced their presence, but Smith did not consent to a
search of the room.
What happened next is disputed. Smith testified that Brown and Moyer “pushed
the door open” and “forced [their] way into the room.” According to Smith, Brown said
he was a cop. Smith also stated that both PSOs wore clothing that looked very much like
a police uniform. Smith acknowledged, however, that “it said Susquehanna University
on the uniform” and that neither PSO had a gun, handcuffs, or a baton. Brown and
Moyer denied forcing their way into the room, and denied that either of them stated that
they were police officers. Smith then called his father, who remained on the line for the
remainder of the encounter.4 Smith told his father that two “security people” had
“[p]ushed into his room,” after which his father requested to be put on speaker phone. At
this point, Smith told his father that he was speaking to two security people.
The PSOs proceeded to search Smith’s room for fifteen minutes while Smith was
present. Smith and his father both testified that the officers found nothing during this
3
The parties do not dispute that any use of marijuana violates “federal, state, or local law
or [] university regulations” for purposes of the administrative search provision of the
university policy.
4
Smith testified that he only called his father after Brown and Moyer began searching his
room. Brown and Moyer, on the other hand, testified that Smith called his father before
they began the search.
3
period. Then Smith was allowed to leave. According to the PSOs the search continued
after Smith left, lasting for approximately an hour. Brown testified that their search
recovered marijuana, hallucinogenic mushrooms, crack cocaine, and various drug
paraphernalia. Smith has denied possessing or using any drugs in his room. The PSOs
documented and confiscated the contraband drugs, removing them to a secure area on
campus and notifying the local police department. Police officers then took custody of
the drugs and commenced drug possession charges against Smith. Smith does not
suggest that the police themselves took part in the search of his room, or were otherwise
involved before being contacted by Brown and Moyer.
Smith was prosecuted for the drug offenses in the Court of Common Pleas for
Snyder County. During the course of his criminal prosecution, Smith moved to suppress
the evidence recovered from his room as violative of the Fourth Amendment. After
hearing testimony from Smith, his father, and the PSOs, the judge made the following
findings:
Based on the testimony presented, the Court does not
find that state action was involved in the search of Mr.
Smith’s room . . ..
The Court further finds that the search was conducted
in accord with the Susquehanna University policy . . ..
The Court finds that the search conducted by DPS
officers was based on reasonable belief that there were – the
room was being used in violation of the law.5
Thereafter, Smith entered a plea of nolo contendere to possession of a controlled
substance and was sentenced to time served.
5
JA 227.
4
Smith brought suit under against Susquehanna University,6 Brown, Moyer, and
Rambo, alleging that the search of his room violated the Fourth Amendment’s
proscription on unreasonable searches and seizure and its state law analog. He sought
damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to
Pennsylvania state law. Following discovery, the District Court adopted a magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation, granted summary judgment to the defendants on
Smith’s Fourth Amendment claims, and closed the case.
II.7
Smith appeals the entry of summary judgment on his claims against the three
defendants, arguing that the District Court failed to appropriately consider his testimony
and that of his father in finding that Brown, Moyer, and Rambo were not state actors and
that the search was conducted in accordance with the University’s policy. We exercise
plenary review of a district court’s grant of summary judgment,8 and may affirm on any
basis that is supported by the record.9
Our obligation to “give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as
would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was
rendered”10 precludes Smith from relitigating the question of whether Brown, Moyer, and
6
All claims against Susquehanna University were dismissed for insufficient allegations
as to the existence of a formal policy or custom.
7
The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and
we have jurisdiction over Smith’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
8
Nat’l Amusements Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra, 716 F.3d 57, 62 (3d Cir. 2013).
9
Murray v. Bledsoe,
650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011).
10
Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). Thus, rulings on
federal constitutional questions in state proceedings may continue to have preclusive
5
Rambo were state actors. Under Pennsylvania law, “when an issue of fact or of law is
actually litigated and determined by a valid final judgment, and determination of the issue
was essential to judgment, the determination on that issue is conclusive in a subsequent
action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.”11 Smith does not
contest that the question of state action was actually litigated or was essential to the
denial of his suppression motion; rather, he argues only that the suppression ruling
followed by his plea of nolo contendere was not a “valid final judgment.”
Pennsylvania courts have squarely held that collateral estoppel can block civil
actions “once a criminal defendant has been convicted and sentenced . . ..”12 In
Pennsylvania, therefore, a trial court’s interlocutory orders become final, and entitled to
preclusive effect, upon a defendant’s conviction, even if there is no admission or finding
of guilt.13 Thus, while Smith correctly notes that a nolo plea is not an admission of guilt,
we have held that such pleas are indisputably “tantamount to a conviction,” and may be
relied upon where the “fact of conviction, not the plea, . . . [is] the operative fact . . ..”14
Here, therefore, acceptance of Smith’s nolo plea and his subsequent conviction rendered
effect in federal civil rights litigation. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and Cty. of San
Francisco, California, 545 U.S. 323, 343-44 (2005).
11
McNeil v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
680 A.2d 1145, 1147-48 (Pa. 1996)
(citation omitted).
12
Shaffer v. Smith,
673 A.2d 872, 875 (Pa. 1996) (emphasis added).
13
See Lapcevich v. Erie Ins. Exchange,
3 Pa. D. & C.4th 115, 120 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pl.
1988) (“In civil rights actions the decision of the trial court on a suppression motion
followed by a conviction is the final judgment which by collateral estoppel prevents
recovery in a civil suit for damages.”) (citations omitted).
14
United States v. Poellnitz,
372 F.3d 562, 569 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
6
the denial of the suppression motion a final judgment entitled to preclusive effect.15
Accordingly, we must give conclusive effect to the Court of Common Pleas’
determination that Brown, Moyer, and Rambo were not state actors in conducting the
search of Smith’s room. As claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may only lie against
state actors,16 this determination mandates judgment in favor of the appellees on all of
Smith’s federal constitutional claims.17
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Smith is precluded from relitigating the
question of whether Brown, Moyer, and Rambo were state actors in conducting a search
of his dormitory room. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of
summary judgment.
15
The record makes abundantly clear that the Court of Common Pleas believed the
suppression motion turned entirely on whether Brown and Moyer were state actors. See
JA. 227 (“The suppression issue rises or falls on whether what took place on January
24th, 2012 constitutes state action.”). Thus, the Court of Common Pleas’ resolution of
the state action question was essential to its denial of the suppression motion.
16
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Thus, a plaintiff seeking to hold an
individual liable under § 1983 must establish that she was deprived of a federal
constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.”) (emphasis added).
17
As such, we need not address any of Smith’s other contentions.
7
