Filed: Oct. 24, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 17-1577 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. KETISHA ILES, Appellant _ On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands (D.C. No. 1-14-cr-00051-001) District Judge: Honorable Raymond L. Finch _ Argued May 24, 2018 Before: KRAUSE, ROTH and FISHER, Circuit Judges. (Filed: October 24, 2018) Anthony R. Kiture, Esq. [ARGUED] Kiture Law Firm 1009 North Street, Suite B Christiansted, VI 00820 Counsel for Appellant Rami S. Badaw
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 17-1577 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. KETISHA ILES, Appellant _ On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands (D.C. No. 1-14-cr-00051-001) District Judge: Honorable Raymond L. Finch _ Argued May 24, 2018 Before: KRAUSE, ROTH and FISHER, Circuit Judges. (Filed: October 24, 2018) Anthony R. Kiture, Esq. [ARGUED] Kiture Law Firm 1009 North Street, Suite B Christiansted, VI 00820 Counsel for Appellant Rami S. Badawy..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 17-1577
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
KETISHA ILES,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the District Court
of the Virgin Islands
(D.C. No. 1-14-cr-00051-001)
District Judge: Honorable Raymond L. Finch
____________
Argued May 24, 2018
Before: KRAUSE, ROTH and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 24, 2018)
Anthony R. Kiture, Esq. [ARGUED]
Kiture Law Firm
1009 North Street, Suite B
Christiansted, VI 00820
Counsel for Appellant
Rami S. Badawy, Assistant United States Attorney
Rhonda Williams-Henry, Assistant United States Attorney [ARGUED]
Joycelyn Hewlett, Acting United States Attorney
Office of United States Attorney
1108 King Street, Suite 201
Christiansted, VI 00820
Counsel for Appellee
____________
OPINION*
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Ketisha Iles was convicted of conspiracy and Hobbs Act robbery. She appeals her
convictions, arguing that the District Court erroneously denied her motions to suppress
and for judgment of acquittal or new trial. Additionally, she appeals her sentence, arguing
that her sentencing hearing was procedurally unreasonable. For the reasons that follow,
we will affirm the District Court.
I.
In 2013, Iles participated in a jewelry store robbery on St. Croix, U.S. Virgin
Islands. Police Detective Leon Cruz began investigating the robbery and quickly came to
suspect a man named Ajani Plante. A few days after the robbery, Detective Cruz spotted
Plante driving in a car with Iles. Later in the day, he saw Iles driving the same car—alone
this time—and told area police to “traffic stop” her car if they saw it. Iles was pulled over
a few minutes later. Detective Cruz introduced himself and asked Iles if she could drive
to the police station to answer some questions.
Iles drove to the station. Detective Cruz did not lead, transport, or follow her. As
Iles drove, she called her mother and said that the police had stopped her and that she had
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
2
to go to the station. She asked her mother to meet her there. When Iles arrived at the
station, she was escorted into Detective Cruz’s office. Detective Fieulleteau came in and
out of the office while Iles was answering questions. Iles initially denied any involvement
with the robbery. When Iles’ mother and stepfather arrived, she spoke with them in
Detective Cruz’s office.1 After these conversations, Detective Cruz gave Iles a Miranda
waiver, which he read to her and she signed. Iles then confessed that she knew about the
robbery in advance and helped execute it. Her confession was videotaped.
The testimony of Detectives Cruz and Fieulleteau, which was uncontroverted at
the suppression hearing, was that the atmosphere in which they questioned Iles was
“calm” and “nice[,] . . . no pressure.”2 They did not make threats or promises, show their
weapons, or restrain Iles. The office door was closed but unlocked, and Detective Cruz
informed her that she was not under arrest prior to reading Iles her rights.
After a jury trial, Iles was convicted of two counts: interference with commerce by
robbery (i.e., Hobbs Act robbery) and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery.3 She
was acquitted of the other three counts: using and carrying a firearm during and in
relation to a crime of violence, conspiracy to use and carry a firearm, and robbery under
the V.I. Code.4
1
The District Court did not resolve whether Iles also spoke to her mother in the
parking lot during that time frame, as Iles’ mother asserted.
2
Ohio App. 101.
3
18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951.
4
18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), 924(o); 14 V.I.C. §§ 11, 1862(2).
3
In her sentencing memorandum, Iles requested a downward departure for coercion
and duress under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.12, arguing that she was in an abusive relationship with
Plante, who threatened her if she did not help with the robbery. Iles’ Presentence Report
recommended a two-level enhancement for a loss between $50,000 and $250,000 based
on the store owner’s statement that “he believe[d] approximately $100,000 of
merchandise was stolen.”5 The District Court rejected the enhancement, decreasing Iles’
offense level from 29 to 27 because of a lack of credible evidence to support the loss
amount. Iles was sentenced at the lowest end of the Guidelines range, 70 months,
followed by three years’ supervised release.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1612 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a).
The issues in this appeal implicate several standards of review. First, “[w]hether a
person was in custody for the purposes of Miranda, and whether a statement was
voluntary for the purposes of a motion to suppress, are conclusions reviewed de novo.
However, the factual findings underlying the District Court’s decision are reviewed for
clear error.”6 Second, this Court “exercise[s] plenary review over a district court’s grant
5
Ohio App. 1016.
6
United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
4
or denial of a motion for acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence.”7 We apply
the same standard as the district court, “viewing ‘the record in the light most favorable to
the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could [convict] . . . based
on the available evidence.’”8 Third, we review a district court’s denial of a motion for
new trial for abuse of discretion.9 Finally, we review the District Court’s sentencing
procedures for abuse of discretion.10 Where the district court properly exercises its
discretion to deny a motion for a downward departure in sentencing, we lack jurisdiction
to review the denial.11
III.
A.
Iles argues that her police station confession was obtained in violation of Miranda
and Seibert, and that the District Court erred in denying her motion to suppress. Based on
this alleged error, she also contends that the District Court should have granted her
motion for judgment of acquittal or new trial.
Under Miranda v. Arizona, “the privilege against self-incrimination is
jeopardized”—and warnings are required—“when an individual is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is
7
United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1002 (3d Cir. 2008).
8
Id. (quoting United States v. Smith,
294 F.3d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 2002)).
9
Id. at 1005.
10
United States v. Vazquez-Lebron, 582 F.3d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 2009).
11
United States v. Handerhan, 739 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 2014).
5
subjected to questioning.”12 In Missouri v. Seibert, the Supreme Court rejected a police
tactic meant to evade Miranda requirements: that of (1) questioning a suspect until she
confesses; (2) giving Miranda warnings; (3) leading the suspect to restate her confession;
and then (4) seeking to admit only the second, warned statement.13
At the threshold, a Miranda warning is required “only when the person the police
are questioning is in custody.”14 Iles argues that she was in custody, and that warnings
were therefore required, when she arrived at the police station. The custody inquiry is an
objective one that asks whether, evaluating “all of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation,”15 a “reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to
terminate the interrogation and leave.”16 The District Court found that Iles voluntarily
drove to the police station, was permitted to interact with her mother and stepfather, was
not restrained or intimidated by the detectives, and was told that she was not under arrest.
These factual findings are not clearly erroneous. It is true that station-house interviews
“should be scrutinized with extreme care for any taint of psychological compulsion or
intimidation[,] because such pressure is most apt to exist while a defendant is interviewed
12
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
13
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616-17 (2004) (plurality opinion).
14
United States v. Willaman, 437 F.3d 354, 359 (3d Cir. 2006).
15
Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012) (quoting Stansbury v. California,
511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam)).
16
Id. at 509 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane,
516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)).
6
at a police station.”17 However, given all of the circumstances, the District Court did not
err in ruling that Iles was not in police custody for Miranda purposes. Furthermore,
Seibert does not apply because Iles did not make any incriminating statements before she
signed the Miranda waiver.18 The District Court did not err by denying Iles’ motion to
suppress.
Because there was no error with respect to the suppression motion, we reject Iles’
arguments that the District Court should have granted her motions for acquittal or new
trial. Those arguments are based entirely on her position that her confession should have
been suppressed.19
B.
Iles argues that her sentencing was procedurally unreasonable because the District
Court did not independently rule on her request for a downward departure. For a sentence
to be procedurally reasonable, a district court must show “meaningful consideration of
the relevant statutory factors and the exercise of independent judgment.”20 “When
imposing a sentence, a district court must follow a three-step process,” preferably
17
Jacobs, 431 F.3d at 105 (quoting Steigler v. Anderson,
496 F.2d 793, 799 (3d
Cir. 1974)).
18
See Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23, 31 (2011) (per curiam) (“[U]nlike in Seibert,
there is no concern here that police gave [the defendant] Miranda warnings and then led
him to repeat an earlier murder confession, because there was no earlier confession to
repeat.”).
19
Even if we leave aside Iles’ confession, the remaining evidence presented at
trial—particularly the jewelry store owner’s testimony—would have allowed a rational
juror to conclude that Iles was guilty of conspiracy and Hobbs Act robbery.
20
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571-72 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).
7
addressing these steps—known as the Gunter steps—separately and in sequence.21 The
court: (1) calculates the defendant’s sentence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines;
(2) formally rules on the motions of both parties and states, on the record, whether a
departure is granted and how that departure affects the Guidelines calculation; and
(3) exercises its discretion by considering the relevant § 3553 factors, regardless of
whether it varies from the Guidelines sentence.22
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court addressed the Gunter steps out of
order when it began by discussing step three, i.e., its authority to vary from the
Guidelines. The court said: “I recognize that the [S]entencing [G]uidelines are advisory. I
recognize that the . . . [G]uidelines require me to consider some factors in your case.
Those factors are reflected in what we call the [§] 3553 factors.”23 The District Court then
addressed Gunter step one. It discussed the Guidelines sentence calculation and
decreased the offense level by two points because there was insufficient evidence to
support the amount-of-loss enhancement.
Next, the court stated: “I recognize that I have the authority to vary your sentence,
but I decline to do so, having already in my initial calculation decreased it by two levels.
The sentence . . . is one that I can only say is required by the statute and . . . the guideline
21
See, e.g., Handerhan, 739 F.3d at 120.
22
United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).
23
Ohio App. 1085-86.
8
range.”24 The Government argues, and Iles concedes, that the District Court misspoke
when it said, “I have the authority to vary your sentence,” and that it meant to say
“depart.” Thus, the parties agree that the court ruled on Iles’ departure motion—and the
record, viewed as a whole, supports the parties’ position. The departure motion was front
and center throughout the proceedings. It was a central argument in Iles’ sentencing
memorandum, and it was defense counsel’s near-singular focus at the sentencing hearing.
Iles and her mother, in their statements to the court, discussed abuse and coercion
extensively. The judge asked clarifying questions about the abuse and threats.
On this record, we agree with the parties that the District Court ruled on the
departure motion. And because the court said that it “recognized” its “authority to
[depart],”25 we can infer that it declined to exercise its authority and denied the motion as
a matter of its discretion.26 We lack jurisdiction to review that decision.27
Iles takes issue with the District Court’s statement that it was denying her
departure motion because it had “already in [its] initial calculation decreased” her offense
level “by two levels.”28 She contends that linking the denial of the departure motion
(Gunter step two) with the rejection of the amount-of-loss enhancement (Gunter step
24
Ohio App. 1087.
25
Ohio App. 1087.
26
See Handerhan, 739 F.3d at 121 (recognizing that when we examine rulings on
downward departure motions, we have the “ability to ‘infer meaning from the District
Court’s actions’”) (quoting United States v. Jackson,
467 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 2006)).
27
Id. at 122.
28
Ohio App. 1087.
9
one) was “procedural error,” and that “conflating the sentencing steps is a ground for
remand [and] resentencing.”29 Iles relies on United States v. Friedman, but that case is
distinguishable. Not only did the district court there fail to “follow the proper order of the
steps set forth in Gunter,” it also skipped two of the three required steps.30 Here, by
contrast, the District Court calculated the offense level to reach the Guidelines range (step
one), meaningfully considered the § 3553 factors (step three), and ruled on her departure
motion (step two). Addressing the steps in an overlapping fashion, and out of order, may
not be ideal. But it does not require remand for resentencing.
IV.
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
29
Reply Br. 21.
30
United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 359 (3d Cir. 2011) (district court
failed to “compute a definitive loss calculation or offense level to reach its Guidelines
range” at step one and failed to “meaningfully consider § 3553(a)(6)” at step three).
10
