Filed: Nov. 05, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 18-1151 _ In re: DERRICK THOMAS, Petitioner _ On Application for Leave to File a Second or Successive Habeas Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) Related to E.D. Pa. No. 2-03-cv-06273 Before the Honorable District Judge James Knoll Gardner _ Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) October 31, 2019 Before: HARDIMAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. (Filed: November 5, 2019) _ OPINION* _ * This disposition is not
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 18-1151 _ In re: DERRICK THOMAS, Petitioner _ On Application for Leave to File a Second or Successive Habeas Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) Related to E.D. Pa. No. 2-03-cv-06273 Before the Honorable District Judge James Knoll Gardner _ Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) October 31, 2019 Before: HARDIMAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. (Filed: November 5, 2019) _ OPINION* _ * This disposition is not ..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 18-1151
____________
In re: DERRICK THOMAS,
Petitioner
____________
On Application for Leave to File a Second or Successive
Habeas Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)
Related to E.D. Pa. No. 2-03-cv-06273
Before the Honorable District Judge James Knoll Gardner
____________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 31, 2019
Before: HARDIMAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: November 5, 2019)
____________
OPINION*
____________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Derrick Thomas applies for leave to file a second or successive habeas
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). We will deny his application as untimely.
I
Twenty-six years ago, Thomas was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and
other crimes. Although Thomas committed those crimes when he was 19 years old, the
state court found the offenses sufficiently serious to warrant a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole. Thomas unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief six times in
state court and once in federal court, Thomas v. Tennis,
2009 WL 904682 (E.D. Pa.
2009).
On December 23, 2017, Thomas applied for leave to file a second or successive
habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Although he was not a minor when he
committed the crimes at issue, Thomas nevertheless relied on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460 (2012), which held that mandatory life
without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth
Amendment.
Id. at 465.
II
Assuming, without deciding, that the constitutional right initially recognized in
Miller provides a sufficient basis for Thomas, who was over 18 at the time of his crime,
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to file a second or successive habeas petition, his petition is untimely. State inmates have
one year to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As relevant here,
that limitation period runs from “the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). In Dodd v.
United States,
545 U.S. 353 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the limitation period
runs “from the date on which the right [a petitioner] asserts was initially recognized by
this Court”—not the date on which the Court makes the right retroactive.
Id. at 357.
The Supreme Court decided Miller on June 25, 2012, so Thomas’s December 23,
2017 application was filed well beyond “the date on which the right [Thomas] asserts was
initially recognized by [the] Court.”
Dodd, 545 U.S. at 357. Thomas now claims his
application is timely because he filed it within a year of Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.
Ct. 718, 732 (2016), which he says “clarifi[ed]” Miller. But the Supreme Court in
Montgomery simply made Miller retroactive. So even if we were to accept Thomas’s
proposition that the Supreme Court established “the right for a 19-year-old to escape a
mandatory life sentence,” that right would derive from Miller, which announced a
“substantive rule that is retroactive in cases on collateral review.” Montgomery, 136 S.
Ct. at 732. And because 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) starts the limitation period from “the
date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme
Court,” (emphasis added), Thomas’s application is untimely. Accordingly, we must deny
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Thomas’s application for leave to file a second or successive habeas petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b).
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