Filed: Sep. 18, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 18-1863 _ CE’MONNE HANNA, Appellant v. GIANT EAGLE INC; BENJAMIN SIMMONS, in his official capacity _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 2-15-cv-01009) District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone _ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) April 30, 2019 _ Before: RESTREPO, ROTH and FISHER, Circuit Judges. (Filed: September 18, 2019) _ OPINION* _ * Th
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 18-1863 _ CE’MONNE HANNA, Appellant v. GIANT EAGLE INC; BENJAMIN SIMMONS, in his official capacity _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 2-15-cv-01009) District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone _ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) April 30, 2019 _ Before: RESTREPO, ROTH and FISHER, Circuit Judges. (Filed: September 18, 2019) _ OPINION* _ * Thi..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 18-1863
_____________
CE’MONNE HANNA,
Appellant
v.
GIANT EAGLE INC;
BENJAMIN SIMMONS, in his official capacity
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-15-cv-01009)
District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 30, 2019
______________
Before: RESTREPO, ROTH and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: September 18, 2019)
______________
OPINION*
______________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Ce’monne Hanna appeals the dismissal of her suit against her former
employer Giant Eagle for alleged racial discrimination leading to her constructive
termination. She seeks a new trial based on her belief that the District Court allowed
Giant Eagle to present certain evidence in violation of both the rules of discovery and the
rules of evidence. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
We presume the parties’ familiarity with this case and only set out the facts as
needed for the discussion below. Ce’monne Hanna brought suit against her former
employer Giant Eagle on the basis of alleged racial discrimination that forced her to quit
her job as a pharmacy technician. She filed her Complaint in Pennsylvania state court, but
Giant Eagle removed it to the District Court. The District Court granted partial summary
judgment in favor of Giant Eagle on Hanna’s claims of: (1) racial discrimination with
respect to alleged unfair discipline based on Hanna’s attendance; (2) constructive
discharge; and (3) retaliation. It held a jury trial on the rest of Hanna’s claims.
After a six-day trial, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Giant Eagle
on all of Hanna’s remaining claims. Accordingly, the District Court entered Judgment in
favor of Giant Eagle pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58. Hanna filed the instant appeal on the
same day.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
III.
Hanna comes before us with a variety of claims regarding the District Court’s
alleged procedural errors throughout her trial, each of which she believes is cause for a
new trial. None of her claims withstand scrutiny.
First, Hanna argues that the District Court committed legal error by allowing Giant
Eagle to introduce evidence at trial that its representative said did not exist during his
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition testimony. Her argument finds no support in the law.
Rule 30(b)(6) testimony binds a corporation in that it is “deemed to be the testimony of
the corporation itself,” not “something akin to a judicial admission.” State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. New Horizont, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 203, 212 (E.D. Pa. 2008). This remains
true whether the testimony speaks to factual or legal issues.1 As testimony, it may be
contradicted or used for impeachment at trial, which was the case here. Thus, no error
occurred.
Second, Hanna claims that the District Court erred by denying her request to
introduce certain documents into evidence after the close of all testimony. We
traditionally do not interfere with a district court’s evidentiary ruling unless it constitutes
an abuse of discretion. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997). Here, where
1
Hanna claims that State Farm stands for the proposition that a corporation is
bound at trial by factual statements made during a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. As grounds,
she argues that this Court explicitly stated that legal conclusions made during such a
deposition are not binding on the corporation, see AstenJohnson, Inc. v. Columbia Cas.
Co., 562 F.3d 213, 229 n.9 (3d Cir. 2009), but remained silent on factual statements like
those reviewed in State Farm. Ipso facto, she claims, factual statements are binding.
Simply put, we do not agree.
3
Hanna sought to introduce documents to the jury without the benefit of descriptive
testimony or the opportunity for Giant Eagle to respond, the District Court was well
within its discretion to deny her request.
Next, Hanna argues that the District Court should have declared a mistrial or, in
the alternative, sanctioned Giant Eagle when a trial witness contradicted Giant Eagle’s
statement during discovery that the pharmacy did not have video cameras. Either remedy
would be extreme, and neither is appropriate here. First, our Court is not in the practice of
granting mistrials in the face of alleged prejudicial trial events, and we decline to follow
Hanna’s suggestion that we adopt the Pennsylvania practice of doing so.2 See
Commonwealth v. Judy, 978 A.2d 1015, 1019 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (noting that the trial
court has the discretion to grant a mistrial in response to an overly prejudicial event).
Second, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose a sanction
when the discovery error had no impact on the issue being tried.3 See DiPaolo v. Moran,
407 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying an abuse of discretion standard to a district
court’s sanctions determination under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11).
2
Generally, a mistrial is not granted unless the errors are so gross as to cause
prejudice and the prejudice has not been neutralized by the trial judge. See, e.g., Dunn v.
Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1377–78 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Draper v. Airco, Inc.,
580 F.2d 91, 97
(3d Cir. 1978)).
3
Hanna’s discovery requests included one request for video recordings—
specifically, recordings from May 9, 2014, the date she allegedly suffered harassment at
work. Per Giant Eagle’s discovery response, the recording on the date in question had
already been overwritten as part of Giant Eagle’s general practice of overwriting
recordings after thirty days.
4
Hanna finally argues that the District Court erred by refusing to vacate its grant of
summary judgment in favor of Giant Eagle after being made aware of the discovery
issues discussed above. Because we find no error in the District Court’s disposition of
each of these issues, we have no reason to disturb its ruling here.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
5
