Filed: Oct. 11, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 18-2604 _ ELTON EUGENE HILL, II, Appellant v. SUPERINTENDENT MAHANOY SCI; ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania D.C. No. 1-10-cv-00574 District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) September 13, 2019 Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. (Filed: October 11, 2019) _ OPINI
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 18-2604 _ ELTON EUGENE HILL, II, Appellant v. SUPERINTENDENT MAHANOY SCI; ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania D.C. No. 1-10-cv-00574 District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) September 13, 2019 Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. (Filed: October 11, 2019) _ OPINIO..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 18-2604
_____________
ELTON EUGENE HILL, II,
Appellant
v.
SUPERINTENDENT MAHANOY SCI;
ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
D.C. No. 1-10-cv-00574
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 13, 2019
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 11, 2019)
_____________________
OPINION*
_____________________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not
constitute binding precedent.
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
In this appeal of a denial of a § 2254 habeas petition, this Court granted a
certificate of appealability on one issue: was petitioner Elton Hill’s trial counsel
ineffective for failing to move to suppress statements that Hill made following a
polygraph? The Pennsylvania courts answered no, and the District Court held that this
answer was not an unreasonable application of federal law. We will affirm.
I.
We write for the parties and so recite only the facts necessary to our disposition.
After driving home from a party, Hill and a friend were discussing their desire to
beat up another young man in their class. Hill was 17 years old. They walked to their
classmate’s house, where his family was sleeping — their classmate in one room, his
father in another, and his mother in a third with two younger children. Hill’s friend
entered the house, while Hill claims he retrieved and waited in it.
Wielding a baseball bat, Hill’s friend entered the room where the mother and
children were sleeping. He awoke the mother, threatened to injure her sleeping children
with the bat, and raped her. The father then burst in, subdued the attacker, and ran
outside. Hill sped away in his car and, when the father drove after him, Hill tried to run
him off the road.
The next morning, police officers interviewed Hill at his house. One of them was
Daniel Kelly. Hill gave a short statement. Three days later at the police station, Hill
answered questions and provided a more detailed statement, after which he was arrested
and charged with various offenses. Hill’s parents hired an attorney.
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Hill’s attorney decided that a polygraph exam would benefit Hill’s case, since he
was persuaded that Hill never entered the house. He reviewed the polygraph questions
beforehand and trusted the detective who would administer the exam, Joseph Steenson.
The attorney advised Hill to tell the truth, but said nothing about post-polygraph
questioning. Hill executed a signed waiver of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). That form has been lost, but it apparently indicated that Hill would
“consent to talk with” Steenson and mentioned polygraphs multiple times. Joint
Appendix 124.
Hill took the polygraph and failed. He then gave Steenson a contradictory written
statement. Steenson left the room, and Kelly entered. Kelly interrogated Hill about the
discrepancies in his statements, and Hill provided further incriminating details.
At trial, the prosecution tried to discredit Hill due to his inconsistent statements.
Kelly testified that he had confirmed with Hill that he was aware of his Miranda rights
before the post-polygraph questioning, and Hill testified that he knew he had the right to
stop the questioning or remain silent at any time during that interview. Hill was
convicted by a jury of numerous crimes.
After losing his direct appeal, Hill sought collateral relief under the Pennsylvania
Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). At the PCRA hearing, Hill testified that Kelly
offered no further Miranda warnings before the post-polygraph questioning and that he
had asked for his attorney. But Kelly again testified that he had confirmed Hill knew his
Miranda rights and that Hill never asked for his attorney. Hill’s attorney also testified. In
addition to explaining why he thought the polygraph itself would be beneficial, Hill’s
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attorney testified that he did not believe that the post-polygraph statements were harmful
at trial because he thought that the jury would understand a scared kid giving accounts
with some inconsistencies. He also testified that he felt the statements might even have
been beneficial, since Hill was consistent that he never entered the home. That, he
explained, was why he did not move to suppress them.
The PCRA court denied relief. It found that the agreed-upon polygraph process
encompassed the post-polygraph questioning and credited Kelly’s testimony that Hill did
not invoke his right to silence or to counsel. Thus, it held that Hill’s attorney was not
ineffective for declining to move to suppress. A divided Pennsylvania Superior Court
originally reversed, holding that the written waiver did not extend to post-polygraph
questioning. Pennsylvania v. Hill, 42 A.3d 1085 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). But that decision
was itself reversed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which concluded that the
Superior Court had overlooked the trial testimony that Hill was aware of his Miranda
rights during this interview (among other errors). Pennsylvania v. Hill,
104 A.3d 1220
(Pa. 2014). On remand, the Superior Court affirmed that the PCRA court’s findings of
fact demonstrated that Hill voluntarily made his post-polygraph statements and a motion
to suppress would have been without merit. Pennsylvania v. Hill, No. 646 MDA 2011,
2015 WL 6875004 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 10, 2015).
Hill then petitioned for habeas relief under § 2254, which the District Court
denied. This timely appeal followed.
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II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and we have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Since the District Court held
no evidentiary hearing, our review is plenary. McKeever v. Warden SCI-Graterford, 486
F.3d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 2007).
III.
We review Hill’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel “[u]nder the doubly
deferential judicial review that applies to a Strickland claim evaluated under the
§ 2254(d)(1) standard.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). Under
Strickland, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential” and
“must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
And under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief may not be granted unless the earlier state
court’s decision “was contrary to” or “involved an unreasonable application of” federal
law then clearly established by the Supreme Court, or “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts” in light of the record before the state court. Harrington v.
Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Our inquiry is limited to “whether there is any
reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.”
Id. at 105.
The state courts held that Hill’s attorney was not ineffective because a motion to
suppress would not have been meritorious. The merits of a motion to suppress turn on
whether Hill’s uncounseled post-polygraph statements were made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently based on the totality of the circumstances. See Wyrick v.
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Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 47–48 (1982). The circumstances suggest that they were. There was
“clear evidence that [Hill] understood [his] right[s] and was aware of his power to stop
questioning at any time or to speak to an attorney at any time” during post-polygraph
questioning.
Id. at 48. Most clear of all, Hill himself testified at trial that he knew and
understood his rights at the time. Hill now emphasizes that he was a minor
unexperienced with the criminal-justice system, which he argues the state courts
unreasonably ignored. But there is no indication in the record that he failed “to
understand the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver would
be,” because of his age or inexperience. Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U.S. 707, 726 (1979).
Though technically a minor, Hill was only four months away from his eighteenth
birthday. He testified at trial that he did well in school, had good SAT scores, had an
interest in computer programming, and planned to go to college. “There is no indication
that he was of insufficient intelligence” or was otherwise “unable to understand the
nature of his actions.”
Id. Concluding that Hill’s counsel performed effectively when he
declined to move to suppress the post-polygraph statements was not an unreasonable
application of federal law.
IV.
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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