Filed: Dec. 20, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: DLD-065 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 19-1942 BITON, a/k/a BITTON, a/k/a REDFORD; a/k/a FHIMA FAMILY Appellant v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED CONTINENTAL AIRLINES _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-17-cv-01764) District Judge: Honorable Kevin McNulty _ Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 December 12, 2019 Before: RESTREPO,
Summary: DLD-065 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 19-1942 BITON, a/k/a BITTON, a/k/a REDFORD; a/k/a FHIMA FAMILY Appellant v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED CONTINENTAL AIRLINES _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-17-cv-01764) District Judge: Honorable Kevin McNulty _ Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 December 12, 2019 Before: RESTREPO, P..
More
DLD-065 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-1942
BITON, a/k/a BITTON, a/k/a REDFORD; a/k/a FHIMA FAMILY
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED CONTINENTAL AIRLINES
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-17-cv-01764)
District Judge: Honorable Kevin McNulty
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 12, 2019
Before: RESTREPO, PORTER, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 20, 2019)
OPINION *
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Danielle Biton, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against the United States and
United Airlines. The allegations in the complaint and amended complaints are difficult to
decipher, but it appears that Biton espouses a conspiracy theory that implicates the
President, multiple attorneys general, and many large banks. She complained that the
President had somehow enslaved her and others by invading their privacy and deporting
their families, that the FBI falsely arrested her and her family, and that United Airlines
stole her fingerprints in violation of the Constitution. The District Court granted United
Airlines’ motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Biton appealed.
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We construe Biton’s pro se
complaint liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). We
may summarily affirm if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See Murray v.
Bledsoe,
650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on
its face. Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist.,
706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013). The
District Court did not err in holding that Biton’s original and amended complaints do not
state any plausible claims. They rely on “fantastic or delusional scenarios,” Neitzke v.
Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989), and Biton has provided only bald accusations
without any supporting details. Moreover, United Airlines, a private actor, cannot be
held liable under the Constitution in this instance. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n.,
2
489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989). As the District Court first pointed out, no facts in the
complaint support any federal cause of action. 1
Accordingly, because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will affirm
the judgment of the District Court. 2 See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
1
Because Biton was proceeding in forma pauperis, sua sponte dismissal of the complaint
with respect to the United States, which had not submitted a motion to dismiss, was
appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
2
Biton’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied. See Tabron v. Grace,
6 F.3d 147,
155 (3d Cir. 1993).
3