UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

RAYMOND SPENCER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                                      No. 95-2171
SHIRLEY S. CHATER, COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Winston-Salem.
James A. Beaty, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-94-38-6)

Submitted: November 28, 1995

Decided: January 31, 1996

Before WIDENER and HALL, Circuit Judges,
and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Joseph E. Wolfe, WOLFE & FARMER, Norton, Virginia, for Appel-
lant. Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Walter C.
Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Mack A. Davis, Acting Chief
Counsel, Region III, Mary Ann Sloan, Principal Regional Counsel,
Social Security Disability Litigation, Haila Naomi Kleinman, Super-
visory Assistant Regional Counsel, John C. Stoner, Assistant
Regional Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from a decision of the district court affirming the
denial of Social Security disability benefits. We affirm. Appellant
raises three assignments of error against the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ): (1) the ALJ did not accord great weight to the uncontra-
dicted opinion of a consulting psychiatrist; (2) the ALJ asked a hypo-
thetical question which did not contain all of the impairments
suggested by Appellant's consulting physician; and (3) the ALJ based
his determination, in part, on his observations of Appellant during the
hearing. Appellant also contends that the ALJ's determination that
Appellant was not disabled within the meaning of 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(f) or 416.920(f) (1995) was not supported by substantial
evidence.

We find Appellant's three assignments of error to be without merit.
The ALJ's decision not to accord great weight to the opinion of
Appellant's consulting psychiatrist is supported by 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d). The propriety of this decision also
justifies the ALJ's hypothetical question. The question contained all
of Appellant's physical impairments and those mental impairments
supported by the record. The question was thus supported by substan-
tial evidence and was not posed in error. See Martinez v. Heckler, 

, 774 (9th Cir. 1986). As to Appellant's third allegation of
error, we find that the ALJ's observations regarding Appellant's
memory and frequent confusion may have been error. However, given
the fact that the ALJ included these impairments in the question posed
to the vocational expert, we find any error to be harmless.

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Finally, we find that the ALJ's determination that Appellant was
not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act to be sup-
ported by substantial evidence.* Significantly the only expert who
testified that Appellant was totally and permanently disabled was the
consulting psychiatrist. As explained, the ALJ chose not to accord this
opinion great weight. He thus eliminated the portions of the opinion
in conflict with Appellant's testimony and included the remaining
impairments in the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert. The
vocational expert testified that these impairments did not prevent
Appellant from finding employment in a significant number of avail-
able fields. In the absence of other medical evidence of mental
impairment, we find that the vocational expert's testimony constitutes
substantial evidence upon which the ALJ was justified in relying.
Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Spencer
v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., No. CA-94-38-6 (M.D.N.C.
May 23, 1995). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
_________________________________________________________________
*Appellant has only raised a challenge to the ALJ's finding of no men-
tal disability. Therefore, he has waived any challenge regarding a physi-
cal disability. See Shopco Distrib. Co. v. Commanding Gen., 

, 170 n.3 (4th Cir. 1989).

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