UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

TRACY MARIE GIBSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA STATE
EDUCATION ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY,                                     No. 95-2595
Defendant-Appellee,

and

DEBERA F. CONLON,
Trustee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
Rebecca B. Smith, District Judge.
(BK-94-23424-B; CA-95-268-2)

Argued: April 3, 1996

Decided: May 21, 1996

Before RUSSELL, HALL, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Tom Cain Smith, Jr., Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appel-
lant. Daniel Gordon Bloor, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant, Tracy Marie Gibson, brought this action in conjunction
with a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, seeking a determination of
whether her student loans are dischargeable in bankruptcy. Gibson
owes Appellees, Commonwealth of Virginia Education Assistance
Authority, approximately $16,000 in student loan debt. Pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A) (1994), student loans are dischargeable in
bankruptcy only if they first became due more than seven years prior
to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, "exclusive of any applicable
suspension of the repayment period."

Gibson's loans first became due on July 5, 1987. She filed her
Chapter 13 petition on July 22, 1994. Hence, at first blush it appears
Gibson's student loans have been due for the requisite seven years.
However, for 105 days in 1988, repayment of this debt was automati-
cally suspended by virtue of Gibson's filing of a Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy petition. If these 105 days are considered an applicable
suspension of the repayment period, they must be excluded from
§ 523(a)(8)(A)'s seven-year period, and Gibson's student loans can-
not be discharged.

The bankruptcy court held that a prior suspension of repayment
during a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding was not an"applicable sus-
pension" to be excluded from § 523(a)(8)(A)'s seven-year repayment
period. The district court reversed. In so doing, the district court
found that § 523(a)(8)(A)'s plain language requires tolling of the
repayment period during any applicable suspension of repayment.

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Repayment was clearly suspended for 105 days in 1988; hence,
§ 523(a)(8)(A)'s plain language requires that period to be excluded
from calculation of the requisite seven years. Accord Saburah v.
United States Department of Education (In re Saburah), 

, 254 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that length of time repay-
ment was suspended during prior Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition tolls
§ 523(a)(8)(A)'s seven-year repayment period).

To the extent Gibson contended the plain language should be over-
looked in favor of congressional intent, the district court recognized
§ 523(a)(8)(A)'s legislative history offers her no support. In enacting
§ 523(a)(8)(A), Congress intended to protect the student loan program
by preventing borrowers from discharging their student loans shortly
after graduation. To further this policy, Congress intended to excerpt
from discharge student loans until they have been"due and owing"
for the statutory period. S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865. Application of
the "due and owing" standard to the instant case reveals that Congress
intended suspension of repayment during a previous bankruptcy peti-
tion to toll § 523(a)(8)(A)'s seven-year period. While the debt contin-
ued to be "owing" during those 105 days, it was not "due" because
of the automatic suspension of repayment. See Georgina v. Higher
Education Assistance Foundation (In re Georgina), 

,
564 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that period during which lender
granted a forbearance of repayment was an "applicable suspension of
repayment" because, while loans were owing, they were not due).

We have read the briefs, heard oral argument, and given full con-
sideration to the parties' contentions. Finding no error in the district
court's thorough opinion, we affirm on its reasoning. Gibson v. Com-
monwealth of Virginia (In re Gibson), 

(E.D. Va. 1995).

AFFIRMED.

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