UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                     No. 97-4159

RANDALL G. CRAWFORD,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston.
Charles H. Haden II, Chief District Judge.
(CR-96-151)

Submitted: September 25, 1997

Decided: October 15, 1997

Before LUTTIG, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Hunt L. Charach, Federal Public Defender, Edward H. Weis, First
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellant. Rebecca Betts, United States Attorney, Michael L. Keller,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Randall G. Crawford pled guilty to attempting to interfere with
internal revenue laws in violation of 26 U.S.C.§ 7212(a) (1994), and
received a sentence of 18 months imprisonment. He appeals his sen-
tence, alleging that the district court clearly should have awarded him
an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual, § 3E1.1 (1995). We affirm.

Crawford failed to report as income $110,630 which he stole and
embezzled from his employer during 1994 and 1995. Following his
guilty plea, he was charged with driving on a suspended license. His
license had previously been suspended after he was convicted of driv-
ing under the influence of alcohol. Crawford failed to report the new
charge to the probation officer supervising him in Kentucky (where
he was living) or to the probation officer in West Virginia who inter-
viewed him and prepared the presentence report. Although Crawford
cooperated with authorities after his guilty plea and the government
did not oppose an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, the dis-
trict court decided that Crawford's conduct, and his failure to report
it to the probation officer, showed a continued disregard for the law.
The court refused to make the adjustment.

We review the court's decision under the clearly erroneous stan-
dard.* The district court may find that a defendant has not accepted
responsibility despite a guilty plea and truthful admission of his con-
duct if he engages in conduct inconsistent with acceptance of respon-
sibility. See USSG § 3E1.1, comment. (n.3). Crawford contends that
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*Crawford asserts that our review should be de novo because the facts
are undisputed. However, the district court's evaluation of a defendant's
acceptance of responsibility is a factual determination. See United States
v. Myers, 

, 1372 (4th Cir. 1995).

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new criminal conduct which is unrelated to the offense of conviction
should not be considered in determining acceptance of responsibility.
While the Sixth Circuit has so held, see United States v. Morrison,

, 733-35 (6th Cir. 1993), the weight of authority from
other circuits is to the contrary. See United States v. Ceccarani, 

, 129-30 (3d Cir. 1996) (post-offense conduct can shed sig-
nificant light on sincerity of defendant's claimed remorse), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 

(U.S. Feb. 24, 1997) (No.
96-7616); United States v. Byrd, 

, 197 (8th Cir. 1996);
United States v. McDonald, 

, 142-44 (7th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Pace, 

, 343 (11th Cir. 1994); United
States v. O'Neil, 

, 601-02 (1st Cir. 1991); United States
v. Watkins, 

, 985 (5th Cir. 1990). Following these
authorities, we find that the district court did not clearly err in finding
that Crawford had not accepted responsibility for his criminal con-
duct.

We therefore affirm the sentence. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.

AFFIRMED

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