UNPUBLISHED

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                       FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT


                            No. 98-6585



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                               Plaintiff - Appellee,

          versus


ARTHUR MOATES,

                                            Defendant - Appellant.



Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District
Judge. (CR-86-92, CA-97-2324-13-6)


Submitted:   July 2, 1998                  Decided:   July 29, 1998


Before NIEMEYER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and HALL, Senior
Circuit Judge.


Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.


Arthur Moates, Appellant Pro Se. William Corley Lucius, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.


Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:

     Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal. We dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction. The time periods for filing notices of appeal

are governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4. These periods are “mandatory and

jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections, 

, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 

, 229 (1960)). Parties to civil actions have sixty days within

which to file in the district court notices of appeal from judg-

ments or final orders. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). The only exceptions

to the appeal period are when the district court extends the time

to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal

period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).

     The district court entered its order on October 9, 1997.

Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed on April 17, 1998, which is

beyond the sixty-day appeal period. Appellant’s failure to note a

timely appeal or obtain an extension of the appeal period leaves

this court without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appel-

lant’s appeal. We therefore deny a certificate of appealability and

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the mate-

rials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

                                                         DISMISSED




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