ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

GRADY YOUNG,
Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

PHOEBE JOHNSON, Warden of Perry
                                                                   No. 99-6141
Correctional Institution; CHARLES M.
CONDON, Attorney General of the
State of South Carolina,
Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.
Charles E. Simons, Jr., Senior District Judge.
(CA-98-2127-4-6AK)

Submitted: August 17, 1999

Decided: September 3, 1999

Before ERVIN, WILKINS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Grady Young, Appellant Pro Se. William Edgar Salter, III, OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Colum-
bia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Grady Young sought to appeal the district court's order denying
relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 &
Supp. 1999) on the grounds that it had not been timely filed. See
Young v. Johnson, No. CA-98-2127-4-6AK (D.S.C. Dec. 28, 1998).
We initially agreed that the petition was untimely, denied a certificate
of appealability, and dismissed Young's appeal. See Young v.
Johnson, No. 99-6141 (4th Cir. June 2, 1999).

Young filed a petition for rehearing. While his petition was pend-
ing, this court decided Taylor v. Lee, ___ F.3d ___, No. 98-36 (4th
Cir. July 29, 1999). In Taylor we held that"under § 2244(d)(2) the
entire period of state post-conviction proceedings, from initial filing
to final disposition by the highest state court . . ., is tolled from the
limitations period for federal habeas corpus petitioners who were
already involved in state post-conviction proceedings on April 24,
1996." Taylor v. Lee, slip op. at 8. Applying Taylor, we now find that
Young's § 2254 petition was timely. See Taylor v. Lee, slip op. at 8;
Brown v. Angelone, 

, 375-76 (4th Cir. 1998). Accord-
ingly, we grant Young's petition for rehearing, grant a certificate of
appealability, vacate the district court order, and remand for the dis-
trict court to consider the merits of Young's claims. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

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