UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

TIMOTHY P. FEENEY, t/a Whispering
Pines Nursery, Incorporated; STATE
AUTO INSURANCE COMPANIES,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
                                                               No. 99-1771
v.

DONALD C. JONES, t/a Hickory
Mechanical Services,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Frederic N. Smalkin, District Judge.
(CA-98-2616-S)

Submitted: March 20, 2000

Decided: April 26, 2000

Before LUTTIG and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges,
and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Herbert R. O'Conor, III, O'CONOR & GRANT, Towson, Maryland,
for Appellants. William C. Parler, Jr., PARLER & WOBBLER,
L.L.P., Towson, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Timothy P. Feeney, trading as Whispering Pines Nursery, and State
Auto Insurance Companies appeal the district court's orders granting
summary judgment to Donald C. Jones, trading as Hickory Mechani-
cal Services, and denying a motion for reconsideration filed under
Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.

After a fire destroyed a building housing the businesses operated
by Feeney and Jones, Feeney filed a lawsuit in state court seeking
damages, alleging that Jones' negligence caused the fire. Specifically,
Feeney alleged that Jones was negligent in leaving his two dogs unat-
tended at the business with an operating kerosene heater.*

Feeney challenges the district court's exclusion of his expert's tes-
timony regarding the cause of the fire. A district court's decision to
exclude testimony during its review of a motion for summary judg-
ment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See General Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 

, 142-43 (1997). We find that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony of Feeney's
expert.

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo.
See Jakubiak v. Perry, 

, 26 (4th Cir. 1996). Summary
judgment should only be granted if a party's submissions to the court
"show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.
_________________________________________________________________
*The case was removed to federal court on the basis of diversity juris-
diction. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441 (1994). Feeney's insurer, State Auto Insurance Companies was
added as a use-plaintiff.

                     

. P. 56(c). We find that summary judgment for Jones was
appropriate because Feeney offered no evidence, other than specula-
tion, that Jones' dogs caused the fire. Without any evidence establish-
ing that Jones' negligence in leaving the dogs unattended caused the
fire, Feeney's claim must fail. See Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A.,

, 188 (Md. 1994) (elements of a negligence action under
Maryland law).

Furthermore, we find that the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion by denying Feeney's motion for reconsideration filed under Rule
59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Pacific Ins. Co. v.
American Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 

, 402 (4th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 

, 

, 

, 

(U.S. Jan. 19, 1999) (No. 98-742).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's orders. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-
quately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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