Filed: Jan. 06, 2000
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT MELANIE A. WARNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BETTY RAMOS, Defendant-Appellee, No. 99-1775 and STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. James E. Bradberry, Magistrate Judge. (CA-98-95-4) Submitted: November 30, 1999 Decided: January 6, 2000 Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. _ Aff
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT MELANIE A. WARNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BETTY RAMOS, Defendant-Appellee, No. 99-1775 and STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. James E. Bradberry, Magistrate Judge. (CA-98-95-4) Submitted: November 30, 1999 Decided: January 6, 2000 Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. _ Affi..
More
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
MELANIE A. WARNER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BETTY RAMOS,
Defendant-Appellee, No. 99-1775
and
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News.
James E. Bradberry, Magistrate Judge.
(CA-98-95-4)
Submitted: November 30, 1999
Decided: January 6, 2000
Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges,
and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
Robert J. Haddad, SHUTTLEWORTH, RULOFF & GIORDANO,
P.C., Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Henry S. Carter, Wm.
Tyler Shands, CARTER & SHANDS, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Appellant, Melanie A. Warner, appeals from the final judgment
after a jury verdict in the Appellee's favor in her diversity personal
injury action arising from an automobile accident. The parties con-
sented to jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C.
ยง 636(c)(1) (1994). Warner also appeals from the magistrate judge's
denial of her motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial
filed after final judgment. The evidence showed that Warner's vehicle
was struck from the rear by an automobile driven by the Appellee,
Betty Ramos. Warner challenges the district court's denial of her
motions for judgment as a matter of law on the liability issue. Finding
no error, we affirm.
This court reviews de novo a district court's grant of a motion for
judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477
U.S. 242, 251 (1986); Gairola v. Virginia Dep't of Gen. Servs.,
753
F.2d 1281, 1285 (4th Cir. 1985). In considering the motion, the dis-
trict court has the benefit of seeing the parties' evidence tested in
open court. See Kim v. Coppin State College,
662 F.2d 1055, 1059
(4th Cir. 1981). Thus, this court must decide, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party and without weigh-
ing the credibility of witnesses, whether reasonable jurors could only
decide in favor of the movant. See
Gairola, 753 F.2d at 1285.
Upon review of the briefs and the record, we conclude that the
magistrate judge did not err in denying Warner's motions for judg-
ment as a matter of law. We agree with the magistrate judge that,
2
given the evidence presented, the jury could have found that Ramos
was not negligent, even in light of Weems v. Blalock,
309 S.E.2d 302,
303 (Va. 1983), and Watford v. Morse,
118 S.E.2d 681, 683 (Va.
1961). Additionally, we agree that the jury may have found, based
upon the evidence, that Warner did not suffer an injury related to the
accident.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
3