UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CATHY G. SCHUSTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                                      No. 99-2664
CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Greenville.
Malcolm J. Howard, District Judge.
(CA-98-101-4-H)

Submitted: June 20, 2000

Decided: September 13, 2000

Before MURNAGHAN,* WILKINS, and NIEMEYER,
Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Geraldine Sumter, FERGUSON, STEIN, WALLAS, ADKINS,
GRESHAM & SUMTER, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appel-
_________________________________________________________________
*Judge Murnaghan participated in the consideration of this case but
died prior to the time the decision was filed. The decision is filed by a
quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
lant. Leslie A. Dent, A. Craig Cleland, PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOF-
SKY & WALKER, L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Cathy Schuster appeals from the district court's order granting
summary judgment in favor of her employer, Champion International
Corporation ("Champion"), and dismissing her employment discrimi-
nation action alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 1994), and North
Carolina common law. In the district court, Schuster claimed gender
discrimination, discriminatory and constructive discharge, sexual
harassment, and retaliation. Schuster limits her appeal to the issue of
whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her
discriminatory discharge claim.

Our review of the record and the district court's opinion discloses
that this appeal is without merit. Specifically, we find that Schuster
failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.1 See
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 

, 312-
13 (1996); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

, 802 (1973); Lawrence v. Mars, Inc., 

, 905-06 (4th
Cir. 1992).
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1 To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, Schuster
must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered
an adverse employment action; (3) at the time of the adverse employ-
ment action she was performing at a level that met her employer's legiti-
mate job expectations; and (4) the position remained open to or was
filled by similarly qualified applicants outside the protected class. See
Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 

, 607 (4th Cir. 1999).

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Schuster's complaint centers around allegations of discriminatory
discharge arising from conflicts with her co-workers in Champion's
machine shop. Schuster was laterally transferred to Champion's
safety crew, and settled a union grievance, agreeing not to enter the
machine shop unless she had a legitimate, work-related reason for
doing so. As a result of repercussions from an unsuccessful personal
relationship with a co-worker on the safety crew, Champion granted
Schuster's request to transfer her to the general maintenance crew.
Schuster began eating lunch in the machine shop, an admitted viola-
tion of the union grievance settlement agreement. Upon complaints
from machine shop employees about Schuster's presence in the
machine shop during the lunch break, C. Ray Edwards, department
supervisor, informed Schuster that her presence there violated the set-
tlement agreement terms and that she was not to eat lunch in the
machine shop until further notice. The following day, Schuster
informed Edwards that despite the prior agreement, she should be
allowed to eat lunch wherever she wanted. Edwards refused her
request to eat in the machine shop, whereupon Schuster became very
upset, threw her arms into the air, and said, "I guess I don't work here
anymore."

Schuster then left Edwards' office and sought out Human
Resources manager Robert Seevers. Seevers told Schuster he would
investigate the matter. After leaving Seevers' office, Schuster clocked
out mid-shift and never returned. Schuster's husband visited Seevers
that same day, telling him that he and his wife had just started a busi-
ness and that she could not quit her job. Union representatives told
Seevers two days later that Schuster did not intend to quit her job, and
asked him to reinstate Schuster, but Seevers declined to reinstate her
at that time. As a result of a union grievance Schuster filed concern-
ing the incident,2 Champion informed her that she could return to
work on January 27, 1997. Schuster never returned to work at Cham-
pion.3
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2 Following a hearing, the arbitrator held that Schuster did not have the
intent to permanently quit her job, that Champion should have accepted
her attempt to withdraw her resignation, and ordered Champion to rein-
state Schuster. Champion complied with the decision.
3 On January 25, 1997, Champion received a letter from Schuster's
psychologist informing them that Schuster was unable to return to work
and should not be expected within the next four months.

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We agree with the district court that Schuster failed to establish
that Champion took adverse employment action against her. We find
that there is no genuine issue of material fact contrary to the finding
that Schuster voluntarily left her job after she was told by Edwards
that she should not eat lunch in the machine shop, given her procla-
mation that she "no longer work[ed] [t]here," her admission that
Edwards thought she quit based on her conduct, and her action of
walking off the job in the middle of her shift. 4 Moreover, her argu-
ment that it is her subjective intent which governs the law on this
issue is unfounded. See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Mayor & City Council, 

, 1072 (4th Cir. 1993) (in constructive discharge context).5
Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court's finding of non-
discrimination was clearly erroneous. See Anderson v. City of Besse-
mer, 

, 574 (1985).

We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of Champion. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
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4 We further find that Schuster's contention that her evidence that she
went to the Human Resources manager to try to resolve the problem after
leaving Edwards' office, and that she sent her husband and later two
union representatives to explain that she did not really intend to quit her
employment supports her claim that she did not really quit was properly
construed by the district court as evidence that she had attempted to
rescind her resignation after she had quit.

5 Given our finding that Schuster failed to establish her prima facie
case, we need not address the issue of whether Champion's evidence of
a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not allowing Schuster to
rescind her resignation was mere pretext for intentional discrimination.




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